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We are all aware of the recent world health crisis, namely COVID-19. 
Every single person experiences the direct impact of this pandemic on 
their personal life and day-to-day activities. For the first time in our 
lives, we see government intervention at a global scale with nationwide 
lockdowns and other preventive measures that may change people’s 
habits and behaviors. As never before, we feel the immense role of 
government in our lives that impacts our future. Therefore, the topic of 
state ownership and political connectedness found throughout this 
thesis is worthwhile for investigation to embrace the role of national 
government and its relationship to company performance through share 
prices, firm-level innovation for future growth and sustainability, 
liquidity and survival opportunities. 
From an economic perspective, we see many small businesses collapsing 
without government support, and we have witnessed the historic price 
crash on the futures contract for WTI crude oil to as low as -$37.63 per 
barrel on April 21, 2020 due to travel bans. We have also experienced 
share prices plummeting due to worldwide instability. Differences in the 
countries’ policies have resulted in different outcomes for each country. 
Surprisingly enough, neither Europe nor the US is dealing with the 
crisis better than smaller countries that have prompt support from 
government (for example, New Zealand) or Asian countries (e.g., 
Vietnam) with its records of strong involvement into company 
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operations. In this sense, the current reality has proven that there is 
something to learn from smaller countries that deserve attention from 
academics as a prospective viable economic model where the government 
has significant influence on businesses. Vietnam is a good example of a 
small resilient country, going through multiple financial crises with 
minimal impacts and fast post-crisis recovery. China is chosen for its 
significant influence on the world’s economic map. Both countries 
feature prominent government involvement into company operations 
and represent an emerging market in Asia with impressive economic 
growth in recent years. 
This thesis comprises three empirical essays that explore asset pricing 
models (Chapters 2 and 3) and firms’ value in the emerging markets of 
Asia where the state is involved actively in financial market 
development and capital allocation (Chapter 4). Starting from Chapter 
2 with different factor models and state ownership, this thesis further 
explores asset pricing models with time-varying factor loading in 
Chapter 3 and extends the understanding of state ownership to political 
connectedness in Chapter 4. 
Chapter 2 investigates the applicability of different Fama-French (FF) 
factor models in Vietnam, examines the value factor redundancy and 
explores the choice of the profitability factor. Empirical evidence shows 
that the FF five-factor model has more explanatory power than the FF 
three-factor model. The value factor remains important after inclusion 
of profitability and investment factors. Operating profitability performs 
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better than cash and ROE profitability as a proxy for the profitability 
factor in the FF factor modeling. The value factor and operating 
profitability have the biggest marginal contribution to a maximum 
squared Sharpe ratio for the five-factor model’s factors, highlighting 
HML non-redundancy in describing the stock returns in Vietnam. 
Chapter 3 studies factor models using both the time-series factors of the 
Fama and French (2015) approach and cross-sectional factors from the 
Fama-Macbeth (1973) methodology. The work provides evidence that 
the cross-sectional factor models have less explanatory power than the 
time-series factor models with time-varying factor loadings. The 
superiority of the time series models with time-varying loadings is still 
prevalent for the Vietnamese market regardless of the profitability 
factor choice. Chapter 2 is further supported by Chapter 3, as the latter 
shows that operating profitability still performs better than cash and 
ROE profitability as a proxy for the profitability factor in the models 
with time-series and cross-sectional factors. 
Chapter 4 extends the understanding of state ownership by exploring 
state impact on company performance and value. Using innovation 
value-added growth (IVAG), this chapter studies how political 
connectedness affects firm’s efficiency of capital allocation. By 
differentiating different forms of political connectedness, the study 
shows that companies with strong informal political ties take less 
financial leverage than firms with weak connections, but it is the formal 
political connection that determines the survivability of a company. By 
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designing a comprehensive innovation index for innovation activities 
this study provides evidence that informal political interference has 
stronger influence on corporate innovation activities than formal 
political ties. By exploring the differences between internally driven 
innovation activities and market-led innovation performance, this study 
documents the stronger effects of political connectedness on innovation 
activities than on innovation performance. This chapter also sheds light 
on capital allocation by providing evidence that Chinese firms without 
government-appointed CEOs appear to allocate capital more efficiently 
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Since they were introduced over the past 50 years, Fama-Macbeth cross-
sectional regressions have become a standard tool in asset pricing 
testing that links the average stock returns to its characteristics. Thirty 
years later, Fama and French (1993) introduced time-series three-factor 
models to explain the variation in stock returns. Until recently, it has 
become clear that there is a wide array of asset pricing anomalies that 
these models cannot explain. The new five-factor model (Fama and 
French, 2015) tries to explain the relationship between these new factors 
(profitability and investment) and stock expected returns. There are now 
debates over which factors to use in the asset pricing models (Fama and 
French, 2018; Hou et al., 2019, Ball et al., 2015), especially with regard 
to the controversy around the choice of a proxy for the profitability factor 
and the issue of value factor redundancy (Fama and French, 2015). What 
is more, findings of Fama and French (2017) suggest that Japanese stock 
returns have little relation to new factors. Cakici (2015) reports similar 
results and concludes that with the inclusion of the two new factors, the 
value factor becomes redundant in North American, European and 
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global portfolios, but not in the Asia Pacific region. All of the 
aforementioned literature lends this work grounds to believe that the 
performance of the factor models and the choice of a superior factor 
model are specific to a country or a region. 
I am particularly interested in the Vietnamese stock market since there 
is no research exploring factor models for an emerging market; Chapter 
2 addresses this gap in current asset pricing literature. My research 
provides new evidence on value factor non-redundancy, operating 
profitability supremacy and Fama-French five-factor model superiority 
for the region. There also has not been much research in the context of 
state ownership and stock returns, which I consider as an important 
factor for a transitional economy, like Vietnam, that is not fully 
integrated with the global financial market. Hence, I also investigate 
state ownership in conjunction with factor models in Chapter 1 of this 
thesis. 
In Chapter 3, following the latest development in the asset pricing 
literature (Fama and French, 2019), I extend factor models to allow 
time-varying factor loadings for the purpose of assessment of different 
model performance in predicting stock returns. A new technique of 
testing the Fama-Macbeth (1973) approach and the Fama-French (2015) 
methodology will be applied for testing the Vietnamese stock market. 
The Fama-French five-factor model (2015, 2018) with time-series factors 
will be challenged against the models that use cross-section factors. 
Because this methodology of testing cross-setional factors in time-series 
models has been developed in 2019 and tested only on the US market 
(Fama and French, 2019), this research will provide further evidence on 
the models in an emerging market of Asia. 
 
Chapter 1: Introduction  3 
 
 
Given a special interest in state-owned enterprises (SOEs) due to my 
previous work experience as an expert in the R&D Department of the 
Hanoi Stock Exchange, I decided to extend Chapter 2 to analyze state 
interference into firms’ business. Hence, Chapter 4 of my thesis focuses 
on political connectedness, firms’ value, innovation and capital 
allocation. 
In recent decades, the effects of political connections to the business 
world have attracted substantial attention from the public, academics 
and regulators. It is believed that corporate connectedness with 
government plays a significant role in a firm’s value creation process and 
its performance outcomes, which in turn, have macroeconomic 
implications for the country’s long-term growth. In this study, I examine 
different types of political connections, ranging from formal 
relationships (CEO appointment by government and state ownership) to 
informal ties with government. There is no prior study that has 
investigated such aspects of political interference and this approach 
allows me to precisely identify which form of political connectedness is 
affecting company performance and its magnitude. 
Although the topic of resource allocation has been extensively explored 
in the past, researchers have had challenges in developing 
methodologies to measure unobservable capital investment efficiency. In 
addition, the study of whether government direct or indirect interference 
distorts corporate investment behavior and affects firms’ innovation 
activities and performance has not been explored yet. Given the scarce 
literature in this area, I investgate the value that Chinese firms can 










1.2 Structure of this PhD thesis 
The thesis consists of five chapters that cover three empirical studies. 












Figure 1.1: Structure of this PhD thesis 
 
Chapter 1 provides the overview of the thesis, including research 
background and contribution, as well as the structure of the entire 
thesis. Chapters 2 to 4 comprise three empirical studies related to the 
emerging markets in Asia, i.e., China and Vietnam. 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 3 decide which asset pricing model would provide 
the best description of average returns of Vietnamese equities among all 
INTRODUCTION 
CHAPTER  3 CHAPTER  2 CHAPTER  1 
CONCLUSION 
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factor models analyzed, with the former focusing on determining which 
type of an asset pricing model and the latter on the methodology of 
constructing model’s factors and their associated factor loadings. The 
discussion of the value factor redundancy and the investigation of 
different measures of the profitability factors will be conducted in both 
chapters. 
Chapter 2 and Chapter 4 are tied by the examination of political 
connectedness, with the former focusing on formal political connections, 
i.e., state ownership, and the latter extending the analysis to both formal 
and informal forms of political linkage. 
Major findings and overall conclusions are summarized in Chapter 5. 
 
 






1.3 Contribution of this PhD thesis 
Chapter 2 makes several contributions to the current asset pricing 
literature. First, this is a study on the explanatory power of the FF five-
factor model as compared with the traditional model of asset pricing of 
the Fama and French three-factor model in the context of an emerging 
stock market in Vietnam. Second, the study reveals some new evidence 
on the ongoing controversy regarding the redundancy of the value factor 
in the presence of profitability and investment factors in the model 
(Fama and French, 2015, 2017, 2018; Cakici, 2015; Chiah et al., 2016). 
Third, this research provides further evidence on the controversy 
regarding the choice of a profitability proxy to construct the profitability 
factor in the five-factor model (Fama and French, 2017, 2018; Ball et al., 
2015; Hou, Mo, Xue and Zhang, 2019) for Asia. Lastly, this  study 
provides new evidence on the performance of the asset pricing models 
using different profitability measures for state owned entreprises. There 
also has not been much research in the context of state ownership with 
the respect to stock returns, which I consider as an important factor for 
a transitional economy, like Vietnam.  It is crucial to test this market as 
an example of the emerging stock market in order to come up with the 
conclusion of whether the FF (2015) five-factor model’s superior 
performance is consistent regardless of the capital market development 
stage, economic conditions and political system. 
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Chapter 3 makes two contributions to the current asset pricing 
literature. First, this study presents new evidence about the superiority 
of the time-series factor models with cross-sectional factor loadings in 
an emerging market. These results urge the need of further verification 
of results evident in developed countries to be applied to developing 
markets (Fama and French, 2019). Second, the study provides further 
evidence regarding the choice of the profitability factor in the presence 
of different approaches of testing the factor models (Fama and French, 
2006, 2017, 2018; Ball et al., 2015; Hou, Mo, Xue and Zhang, 2019). My 
results show that operating profitability is superior in the Fama-French 
five-factor model for Vietnamese asset pricing testing regardless of the 
choice between time-series or cross-sectional factors for the models with 
constant regression slope factor loadings and time-varying factor 
loadings. 
By distinguishing different forms of political connections, Chapter 4 
extends the analysis in Chapter 2 on state ownership to include analysis 
of informal political ties. With the focus on the value that firms can 
obtain from political connectedness, this chapter provides evidence on 
the dynamics of an informal political network on firm performance and 
risk-taking behavior, including innovation, leverage and likelihood of 
survival. By augmenting the existing investment models to measure the 
quality of value-added growth through innovation, this study delivers 
empirical results on the investment efficiency and capital allocation of 
Chinese firms. The results show the misallocation of resources by the 
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firms that have a CEO appointed by the government. By distiguishing 
various forms of political connectedness, this study shows different 
effects of political interference on the risk-taking behavior and 
performance of a firm, represented by leverage (short-term risk), 
innovation (medium-term risk) and survivability (long-term risk). The 
findings of Chapter 4 provide important implications for policy makers 
to improve market-oriented innovation mechanisms through informal 
channels of government interference with firms that lead to more 








CHOOSING FACTORS FOR THE 
VIETNAMESE STOCK MARKET 
 
 
This chapter supersedes the prior working paper titled “Fama French Five-
Factor Model: Evidence from Vietnam” presented  at the 2016 New Zealand 
Finance Colloquium, 11-12 February 2016, University of Otago, Queenstown, 
New Zealand (https://www.nzfc.ac.nz/archives/2016/papers/updated/49.pdf). 
2.1 Introduction 
Motivated by the recent Fama and French’s (2018) analysis of a metric 
for ranking asset pricing models, this chapter examines the Fama-
French (FF hereafter) multi-factor models (Fama and French, 1993, 
2015) in asset pricing for the equity market of Vietnam. This new 
approach is supposed to overcome the challenge in choosing the best 
model among competing models with different factors in light of 
different anomalies previously discovered in international markets. This 
study adds to current literature further empirical evidence from a 
developing country that the FF five-factor model (Fama and French, 
2015) outperforms the traditional FF three-factor model (Fama and 
French, 1993), which is consistent with Fama and French’s (2017) 
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findings in the stock markets of 25 developed countries. However, this 
study’s findings are contrary to Fama and French’s (2015, 2018) 
conclusion about the redundancy of the value factor (i.e., the book-to-
market ratio) in the new five-factor model and the superiority of the cash 
profitability factor as the variable used to construct profitability factors. 
This study aims to add to the international empirical literature on asset 
pricing tests with a detailed investigation of the Vietnamese stock 
market, the youngest in the ASEAN region, where the economy has gone 
through a massive privatization process over the past decade. This work 
entails a study of all major asset pricing models, both traditional and 
new, for the fast-growing market of Vietnam that features different 
financial market development conditions as well as a different political 
system. It is crucial to test this market as an example of the emerging 
stock market in order to come up with the conclusion of whether the FF 
(2015) five-factor model’s superior performance is consistent regardless 
of the capital market development stage, economic conditions and 
political system. 
Over the past 20 years of the FF three-factor model, it has become clear 
that there is a wide array of asset pricing anomalies that these models 
cannot explain. Among the anomalies – such as momentum (Jegadeesh 
and Titman, 1993), return reversal (Huang, Liu, Rhee and Zhang, 2010), 
liquidity risk (Pastor and Stambaugh, 2003) and idiosyncratic volatility 
(Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang, 2006) – there are profitability and 
investment patterns that burden different models from explaining the 
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cross-sectional variation in expected returns (Hou, Xue & Zhang, 2015; 
Novy-Marx, 2013; Titman et al., 2004). Hou et al. (2015, 2019) provide 
evidence that the q-factor model (with profitability and investment 
factors) outperforms the FF three-factor (1993) and Carhart four-factor 
(1997) models in explaining the returns of a broad list of anomalies. 
The new five-factor model (Fama and French, 2015) tries to explain the 
relationship between these new variables and stock expected returns 
from the dividend discount model perspective and the valuation theory. 
Fama and French (2015) suggest using profitability and investment 
factors, in addition to existing factors (market, size and value), to 
capture patterns in average stock returns. Fama and French’s (2015) 
findings also suggest that the value factor (i.e., the book-to-market ratio) 
is redundant for explaining returns in the five-factor model that 
performs better in terms of describing the expected stock returns. 
However, when testing on international markets, Fama and French 
(2017) find evidence that the five-factor model performs better in North 
America and Europe and for big stocks. Their findings also suggest that 
Japanese stock returns have little relation to new factors. Cakici (2015) 
reports similar results. Cakici compares the three-factor, four-factor and 
five-factor models on 23 developed stock markets and finds strong 
evidence for the five-factor model in North America, Europe and the 
global market. The author concludes that with the inclusion of the two 
new factors, the value factor becomes redundant in North American, 
European and global portfolios, but not in the Asia Pacific region. Hence, 
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it is more appropriate to assess the performance of the FF five-factor 
model at the country or regional level. Fama and French (2018) argue 
that the performance of the five-factor model is sensitive to the choice of 
the profitability factor, which improves the description of average 
portfolio returns. They provide evidence that cash profitability (Ball et 
al., 2015) would be more appropriate than operating profitability in the 
five-factor model. On the other hand, Hou, Mo, Xue and Zhang (2019) 
suggest that the q-factor model outperforms the FF five-factor model 
(2015). 
Fama and French (2018) using the maximum squared Sharpe ratio of 
intercepts and a model’s factors (Barillas and Shanken, 2017) document 
the superiority of cash profitability over operating profitability in the 
five-factor modeling. Furthermore, their results provide evidence that 
the value factor adds no marginal contribution to the maximum squared 
Sharpe ratio of the five-factor model’s model with the cash profitability 
factor. 
Little, if any, has been published on the choice of the value and 
profitability factors for an emerging market and the explanatory power 
of the FF five-factor model. Heaney, Koh and Lan’s (2016) findings show 
that the correlation between asset returns and the market-to-book firm 
characteristic is sensitive to an asset pricing model used in risk 
adjustment and this firm property is absorbed by the FF five-factor 
model, suggesting the latter model might be a better choice for asset 
pricing tests for the Australian equity market. Yet, there is no research 
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exploring the question of the choice of factors in FF multi-factor models 
over the traditional models for an emerging market; hence, this chapter 
addresses this gap in the literature.  
Despite the considerable literature on emerging asset pricing with 
CAPM, there is limited empirical research that has applied the three-
factor model to emerging markets. Notably, there is a study on ASEAN 
markets that uses Fama-French three-factor model in the analysis of 
five markets, namely Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, and the 
Philippines (Nartea, Bert and Lee, 2011). By providing evidence of a 
positive relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and stock returns 
in Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand and Indonesia, the authors claim that 
generalizing empirical results obtained in developed stock markets to 
new and emerging markets could be potentially misleading. Nartea, Wu 
and Liu (2013) also suggest verifying the findings evident in developed 
countries for emerging markets at a country level due to distinctive 
features of each country when analyzing idiosyncratic volatility for the 
Chinese stock market. There are other papers that deal with the asset 
pricing issue in Asian markets. Momentum and information uncertainty 
have been identified as pricing factors (Cheema and Nartea, 2014). 
Volatility or MAX effect are also under the three-factor model’s analysis 
for Hong Kong (Nartea, 2013) and South Korean markets (Nartea, 2014), 
respectively. There is no evidence of the superiority of the newly 
established five-factor model (Fama and French, 2015) in South East 
Asia or any investigation on a factor modeling in a setting for a country 
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in Asia. This study provides new evidence on the value factor non-
redundancy, operating profitability (Novy-Max, 2013) supremacy and 
Fama-French five-factor model superiority for the region. 
Literature studying Vietnam’s stock market is sparse. Fang, Wu and 
Nguyen (2017) study the three-factor model for the stock market in 
Vietnam using idiosyncratic risk-sorted portfolios. Notably, they only 
test the three-factor model on portfolios formed on size and book-to-
market. While their study finds support for the three-factor model, the 
methodology of creating three factors does not follow Fama and French’s 
(1993) methodology. In addition, their model’s test results suggest that 
size and value factors fail to explain the returns of value-weighted 
portfolios sorted on idiosyncratic risk. As with most findings in the 
finance literature, some studies also document other capital anomalies, 
such as liquidity, in Vietnam. Batten et al. (2014) show a positive 
relationship between liquidity and Vietnamese stock returns during the 
global financial crisis. 
There also has not been much research in the context of state ownership 
and stock returns for a transitional economy. Empirical studies provide 
mixed or contradictory evidence from developed countries, developing 
markets or transitional economies. Fama and Jensen (1983) show that 
an increase in managerial ownership would lead to increased 
entrenchment of managers. McConnell and Servaes (1990) and Cornet 
(2010) analyze the linkage between ownership structure and the 
performance of firms (measured by ROA and ROE). Lin and Zhang 
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(2009) provide evidence that the “Big Four” state-owned commercial 
banks in China are less profitable and less efficient and have a lower 
quality of assets than other types of banks. 
Our research deals with the following questions: 1) Which multi-factor 
model (FF three-factor, FF four-factor or FF five-factor) best describes 
the behavior of the stock market of Vietnam? 2) Does the value factor 
become redundant for explaining the stock returns in a developing 
economy after including new factors into the asset pricing model? 3) Is 
the new five-factor model (Fama and French, 2015) sensitive to the 
choice of the profitability factor in the context of the Vietnamese market? 
4) How do the asset pricing models perform under different ownership 
structures? 
This study makes four contributions to the current asset pricing 
literature. First, this study reveals new evidence on the forecasting 
power of the FF factor models in the context of an emerging stock market 
featuring state dominant role in the society. This study presents further 
evidence supporting Fama and French’s (2017) claim about the 
superiority of the five-factor model for a liberalized market where a 
country is dominated by individual investors. 
Second, the study provides further evidence on the controversy 
regarding the redundancy of the value factor in the presence of 
profitability and investment factors in the model (Fama and French, 
2015, 2017, 2018; Cakici, 2015; Chiah et al., 2016). The results urge the 
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need of developing market verification of results evident in developed 
countries. 
Third, this study provides new evidence on the controversy regarding 
the choice of a profitability factor in the five-factor model (Fama and 
French, 2017, 2018; Ball et al., 2015; Hou, Mo, Xue and Zhang, 2019; 
Novy-Max, 2013). 
Lastly, this study reveals further findings on the performance of the 
asset pricing models using different profitability measures for state-
owned entreprises listed in Vietnamese stock market.  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 2.2 
provides an overview of the Vietnamese stock market, with a description 
of its distinctive features. Section 2.3 describes the data and 
methodology used in this analysis, including factor design and 
construction of test portfolios, with a detailed analysis of the state 
ownership–stock return relationship in Vietnam. Section 2.4 delivers 
empirical results on the FF five-factor model (2015) as compared with 
the three-factor framework (Fama and French, 1993), with a focus on 
the state ownership structure of listed firms. Section 2.5 verifies 
whether the value factor is redundant for explaining expected stock 
returns in Vietnam. Section 2.6 investigates different measures for a 
profitability factor in the five-factor model. Section 2.7 offers further 
results of the value factor non-redundancy and the choice of a 
profitability factor. Section 2.8 concludes the findings. 
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2.2 Vietnam’s stock market and its unique feature 
The Hochiminh Stock Exchange, under a government initiative, was 
established on 28 July 2000. During the 2000–2005 period, the stock 
market had very few listings. In 2005, there were 44 listed companies 
with a total market capitalisation of VND 5 trillion. With the 
establishment of the Hanoi Stock Exchange in the same year and the 
country’s favorable economic conditions, by the end of 2009 there were 
541 listed companies with total market capitalisation of VND 620.5 
trillion, equivalent to 40% GDP. During that year, Vietnam established 
a third stock market (UPCoM) to provide a pathway for small companies 
to trade their shares on an exchange, thus limiting the over-the-counter 
market and thereby increasing transparency and liquidity for 
Vietnamese firms. 
After persistent and robust growth during the 2006–2007 period, the 
stock market of Vietnam was hit by the global financial crisis and 
affected by the government’s tightening monetary policies to control 
inflation and stabilize the economy, leading to a continuous and 
significant drop in stock prices. The stock market of Vietnam has been 
gradually stabilizing since 2008. 
The first listed companies were primarily state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs). According to the Business Innovation and Development 
Committee, in August 2009 the country had more than 1500 enterprises 
fully owned by the state. With the goal to restructure Vietnam’s economy 
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and increase the efficiency of SOEs’ performance through privatization 
of government-owned companies,1 the state gradually sold its stake in 
SOEs through initial public offerings (IPOs) and listing on stock 
exchanges. However, the government still keeps the largest ownership 
proportion in many listed companies. Motivated by this idea, a special 
attention is devoted to SOEs which are considered as a separate group 
in the analysis. This work presents new empirical evidence on the 
relationship between a state-ownership structure and stock returns in a 
country with distinctive political and economic regimes. The effects of 
state ownership are important for policymakers who focus on stock 
market regulation and for investors who want to understand stock price 
behavior for portfolio management.  
2.3 Data and methodology 
2.3.1 Data 
The analysis in this study is conducted for all common stocks traded on 
the Hochiminh and Hanoi Stock Exchanges (inclusive of UPCoM) at a 
monthly frequency from August 2007 to July 2015.2 The source of data 
is the Thomson Reuters database, which includes daily data of adjusted 
closing prices, trading volume, market-to-book ratios, market 
capitalisation, total assets as well as annual information of revenue, 
                                                     
1 State-owned banks operated less profitably, held less core capital and had greater 
credit risk than private firms, but had more stable operations during unfavorable 
market conditions and survived better during the financial crisis (Cornet, 2010). 
2 For UPCoM, stock prices are obtained as at the end of 2014. 
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administrative expense, interest expense, cost of goods sold and state 
ownership. An interbank offer rate is also extracted monthly from 
Datastream and used as the risk-free rate in this study to be consistent 
with previous studies on Vietnam. 
To be in the sample for the analysis, all stocks must have daily returns 
of no greater than 50% in absolute terms and monthly returns of no more 
than 200% to avoid stocks with abnormal trading or price errors on the 
Datastream system. To reduce the impact of infrequent trading3, all 
stocks with no return data for the previous 10 consecutive business days 
are excluded from the analysis in that specific month. In addition, stocks 
with no return data for more than 10 business days in a month are 
omitted from the sample during that month.4 This study also excludes 
all stocks with negative book-to-market ratios from the sample to be 
consistent with Fama and French’s (1993, 2015) methodology. To be in 
the sample on a specific date, in addition to having required accounting 
data5 as prescribed by Fama and French (1993, 2015), companies must 
have a valid trade and not have been delisted prior to the formation 
period. 
                                                     
3 Infrequent abnormal trading is a very prominent issue in young stock markets, like 
Vietnam. To eliminate the distortion of our empirical results, this study applies data 
filtering as other conventional literature dealing with new markets with illiquid stocks 
the prices of which can be manipulated by large investors. 
4 Angelides (2010) removes all the stocks that have fewer than five observations during 
a month. 
5 To reduce the noise in computing variables, several stocks with extreme values of 
book-to-market ratio (higher than 8.0), operating profitability ratio (more than 100%) 
and investment ratio (higher than 4.0) are excluded. 
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Table 2.1 presents the coverage of stocks used in the sample. Hence, this 
study has 135 stocks in December 2007 and 438 stocks in 2015, 
accounting for 1,113,948 daily and 50,112 monthly observations in total. 
The sample covers about 60% of the population of ordinary stocks in the 
Datastream database and represents 89% and 73% of the market in 
terms of total trading value and market capitalisation, respectively, over 
the sample period.6 On average, there are 56 state-owned enterprises 
(SOEs) in a year, equivalent to 16.32% of the average annual stock 
number in the sample. 
By applying the Fama and French (1993, 2015) methodology, for 
inclusion in a portfolio in July of each year (annual rebalancing) a stock 
must have market equity data for December of the previous year and 
June of the current year; a non-missing (positive) book-to-market ratio 
for December of the previous year; non-missing revenues and at least 
one of the following: cost of goods sold, sales, general and administrative 
expenses, or interest expense at the end of the fiscal year (December) 
ending in the previous year; and total assets data at the end of the fiscal 
year ending in year t-1 and t-2. 
2.3.2 Fama-French five-factor construction 
                                                     
6 It is important to note that stocks are not removed completely from the entire sample. 
They are omitted for the specific month when they have inadequate trading (no return 
data for the previous 10 consecutive business days or no return data for more than 10 
business days in total during a month), and they are included again whenever they 
satisfy the criteria on trading activities. 
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This study follows the FF methodology in constructing risk factors 
(Fama and French, 1993, 2015).  
2.3.2.1 Market factor (MKT) 
MKT is the average excess return on a market portfolio constructed from 
the sample of stocks. MKT is value-weighted using market capitalisation 
as at the end of month t-1. The excess return of each stock is calculated 
as a monthly percentage change in a stock’s price less the interbank offer 
rate in Vietnam. 
2.3.2.2 Size factor (SMB) 
To form a size portfolio in July of year t, stocks are sorted by the market 
equity as at the end of June of each year t. The stocks are allocated to 
two size portfolios (small and large), depending on whether their market 
equity is above or below the median. These two portfolios are annually 
rebalanced, with average returns calculated under a value-weighted 
approach. The size factor (SMB) is the return difference between the 
average returns on the small firms’ portfolios and the average returns 
on big firms’ portfolios. 
2.3.2.3 Value factor (HML) 
The book-to-market sort uses the book-to-market ratio for the fiscal year 
ending in calendar year t-1 (at the end of December of t-1). Three 
portfolios are formed using breakpoints at the 30th to 70th percentiles. 
These portfolios are annually rebalanced, with average returns 
 
 
Chapter 2: Choosing Factors for the Vietnamese Stock Market 22 
 
 
calculated under a value-weighted approach. From the independent 
sorting, I construct six portfolios from the intersection of two size and 
three book-to-market portfolios. The value factor (HML) is the return 
difference between the high book-to-market portfolios and the low book-
to-market portfolios. 
2.3.2.4 Operating, cash and ROE profitability factors (RMW, RMWC 
and RMWR) 
RMW uses accounting data for the fiscal year ending in calendar year t-
1. For portfolios formed in June of year t, operating profitability is 
defined as annual revenues minus cost of goods sold, interest expense, 
and selling, general and administrative expenses, all divided by book 
equity (Fama and French, 2015; Novy-Marx, 2013). Three portfolios are 
formed using the breakpoints of 30% and 70%. These portfolios are 
annually rebalanced, with average returns calculated using the value-
weighted approach. I construct six portfolios from the intersection of two 
size and three profitability portfolios. The RMW factor is the return 
difference between the average returns on the high (robust) profitability 
portfolios and the average returns on the low (weak) profitability 
portfolios. 
Cash profitability (RMWC) suggested by Fama and French (2018) and 
Ball et al. (2015) and the ROE profitability (RMWR)  of Hou, Mo, Xue 
and Zhang (2019) are used in the factor testing to determine which 
profitability definition would be best to use in the FF five-factor model 
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to describe the stock returns. However, to make the analysis on different 
profitability factors more comparable, one-year-lagged book equity is 
used to calculate ROE profitability 7  and conventional double (2x3) 
sorting on size and profitability. 
2.3.2.5 Investment factor (CMA) 
For portfolios formed in June of year t, CMA uses the change in total 
book equity in the fiscal year t–1 compared with the fiscal year t–2. 
Three portfolios are formed using the breakpoints of 30% and 70%. 
These portfolios are annually rebalanced, with average returns 
calculated using the value-weighted approach. Six portfolios are  
constructed from the intersection of two size and three investment 
portfolios. The CMA factor is the return difference between the average 
returns on the conservative investment portfolios and the average 
returns on the aggressive investment portfolios. 
Table 2.2 presents the summary statistics of all factors. Panel A shows 
that the factors have a negative market premium, consistent with Fang 
et al. (2017). The market premium (mean MKT) for Vietnam is -0.65% 
per month, the size premium (mean SMB) and the value premium (mean 
SMB) is 0.38% and 0.61%, respectively. The monthly premium for 
profitability and investment has the value of 0.34% and 0.095% during 
the 2008–2015 period. 
                                                     
7 This study follows Fama and French’s (2015, 2016, 2017) methodology of one-year-
lagged book equity as opposed to Hou, Mo, Xue and Zhang’s (2018) approach that uses 
one-quarter-lagged book equity in the calculation of the profitability factor. 
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Panel B of Table 2.2 shows the correlations between the factors. 
Consistent with Fama and French (2015), profitability (RMW) is 
negatively correlated with all factors. There is a negative and high 
correlation between RMW with SMB and HML, suggesting smaller-
sized companies tend to be high book-to-market (B/M) firms and they 
seem to be less profitable. There is a positive and high correlation 
between HML and CMA, indicating companies with high book-to-
market (B/M) values tend to be low-investment firms. While RMW and 
CMA are each negatively correlated with MKT as Fama and French 
(2015) report, there is no correlation between SMB and MKT, similar to 
that of Australia (Chiah et al., 2016). 
2.3.3 Factor model tests 
Following Fama and French (2018), this study applies two approaches 
to deal with the task of the factor choice. 
2.3.3.1 Left-hand-side (LHS) approach for nested models 
The first approach, the LHS approach, is used to assess competing 
models with distinct factors (i.e., nested models) to capture excess 
returns of different sets of LHS stock portfolios. 
Given it is impossible to make meaningful statistical inference of 316 
factors (Harvey et al., 2015), Fama and French (2018) suggest using a  
limited number of factors in a model testing and a short list of model 
alternatives for comparison purposes. Hence, this study investigates the 
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performance of three multi-factor models of Fama and French (1993, 
2015): 
Three-factor model: 
𝑅𝑝,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝑏𝑝𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝑠𝑝𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑝𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑝,𝑡    (1) 
Four-factor model (five-factor model without HML): 
𝑅𝑝,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝑏𝑝𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝑠𝑝𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + 𝑟𝑝𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝑐𝑝𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝑝,𝑡 ,   (2) 
Five-factor model: 
𝑅𝑝,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝑏𝑝𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝑠𝑝𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑝𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑟𝑝𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝑐𝑝𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝑝,𝑡  (3) 
where 𝑅𝑝,𝑡  is the returns of portfolio p in month t; 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 , 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 , 𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 
and 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡  are the factor-mimicking portfolios for size, value, 
profitability and investment of Vietnamese equities; and 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡  is the 
monthly excess returns on Vietnam’s stock market portfolio.  
This work investigates the explanatory power of the new five-factor 
model on the variation of stock returns by looking at the average 
adjusted R2, GRS test statistics and its p-value (Gibbons, Ross and 
Shanken, 1989), the average value of absolute intercepts, A|𝛼|, the 
Sharpe ratio for the intercept, Sh(𝛼), the maximum squared Sharpe ratio 
for intercepts, Sh2( 𝛼 ) (Fama and French, 2018), and the maximum 
squared Sharpe ratio for a model’s factors, Sh2(f), (Barillas and Shanken, 
2017). GRS tests whether the regression intercepts are jointly equal to 
zero. As Merton (1973) suggests, the intercept is indistinguishable from 
zero if an asset pricing model completely captures expected returns. 
According to Lewellen et al. (2006), the smaller Sh( 𝛼 ), the fewer 
unexplained average returns; hence, the better the model. In the same 
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manner, the study uses average absolute intercepts, A| 𝛼 |, of the 
portfolios under analysis to assess the performance of the models. The 
model that best describes the variation in stock returns across portfolios 
is the one that provides the lowest value of A|𝛼|. Fama and French 
(2018) suggest using the maximum squared Sharpe ratio of time-series 
regression’s intercepts, Sh2(𝛼), and the maximum Sharpe ratio for a 
model’s factors, Sh2(f) to overcome the limitation of other asset pricing 
tests when dealing with the issue of varying inferences across sets of 
LHS portfolios. Sh2( 𝛼 ) and Sh2(f) assist this work in judging the 
competing factor models and can be used as ultimate metrics for ranking 
asset pricing models. The best model is the one that provides the lowest 
Sh2(𝛼) and whose factors have the highest Sh2(f). 
2.3.3.2 Right-hand-side (RHS) approach for non-nested models 
The second approach, the RHS approach, is applied to spanning 
regressions to assess whether a specific factor should be added to a (non-
nested) model by looking at its contribution to an explanation of the 
average portfolio excess returns provided by a model. The marginal 
contribution of a factor to a model, α2/sd2(e), is calculated as the ratio of 
the squared intercepts in a spanning regression of the factor on the 
model’s remaining factors and the residual variance of the same 
spanning regression (Fama and French, 2018). A factor that has a high 
value of α2/sd2(e) compared with other factors in a model is considered to 
have a significant contribution to the model in capturing stock average 
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returns. This approach enables this study to estimate the role of a factor 
in a specified model and decide on the relevancy or redundancy of a 
factor. 
Since there has been controversy in the value factor role and the choice 
of the profitability measure, the RHS approach (Barillas and Shanken, 
2017) is particularly useful in investigating the value factor and proxies 
for the profitability factor. 
2.3.4 Left-hand-side (LHS) portfolio characteristics 
Three sets of 3x3 portfolios are formed to test asset pricing models. All 
stocks are allocated to three different portfolios at the end of December 
of each year based on market capitalisation using breakpoints at the 
33rd and 67th percentiles. In the second sort, further sorting of each size 
portfolio into three sub-portfolios is executed based on book-to-market, 
profitability and investment. The average portfolio monthly returns are 
calculated from July of year t+1 using a value-weighted approach. The 
portfolios are rebalanced on an annual basis.  
For the investigation of the return and other characteristics of state-
owned equities (SOEs), two sub-portfolios for each size portfolio using an 
approach similar to the above are formed, with one sub-portfolio 
containing all firms that have a government stake in shares and the other 
sub-portfolio containing the firms that are entirely private.  
Table 2.3 reports the characteristics of the single-sorted portfolios. The 
highest-earning portfolio is the one with average book-to-market. The 
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loser portfolio over the sample period is the portfolio with an average 
investment ratio or with a weak profitability ratio. 
The results in Table 2.3 provide the 3x3 single-sorted portfolio 
characteristics consistent with factor characteristics in Panel B of Table 
2.2. Firms with a low book-to-market ratio have high profitability and 
invest more than those with low book-to-market values. 
One interesting finding from this ownership structure analysis shows 
that SOEs have significantly higher average excess returns, though they 
invest less aggressively and have lower profitability and book-to-market 
ratios compared with private (non-SOE) firms. One potential 
explanation is that investors prefer SOEs that are backed by 
government and have more stable operations during unfavorable 
market conditions and survived better through the economic recession 
(Cornet, 2010).  
Table 2.4 provides detailed summary statistics for three sets of nine 
double-sorted portfolios to be used in asset pricing tests. The two last 
columns show the sort on size and state-ownership structure of the firm. 
Panel A shows the monthly excess returns for each portfolio. Panel B 
reports the average B/M ratio for a portfolio, while Panels C and D show 
the profitability and investment ratios of each portfolio. 
Panel A of Table 2.4 reports no obvious univariate relationship between 
the average excess returns and the B/M, profitability and investment of 
listed firms across all portfolios. Fama and French (2015, 2017) report 
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that the five-factor model fails to capture the low average return on 
small stocks. 
The size effect is found in all portfolios, except for the return 
characteristics of large-cap firms with an average book-to-market ratio, 
with an average profitability ratio and a high investment ratio (Panel A 
of Table 2.4) as well as the investment characteristics of portfolios sorted 
on size-profitablity (Panel D of Table 2.4). Small firms have higher 
average returns and B/M values despite the evidence that they are, on 
average, less profitable and invest less than large-cap firms. 8  The 
winner portfolio for each set of sorting would be all small-cap firms, 
either with average B/M, high profitability or low investment ratio or 
belong to the SOE group. However, the best performer among all 
portfolios is the small-cap SOEs with an average excess return of 1.23% 
per month. Multivariate regressions would provide a clearer picture on 
the average return behavior in the Vietnamese market. 
The study also performs sorting on the state holdings of a firm and 
suggests that there is a return premium for state entities, with small-
cap firms having the highest returns. There is a size effect in all 
characteristics of portfolios sorted on size-non-SOEs. The portfolio of 
private firms has the higher B/M, profitability and investment ratios 
compared with that of state-owned entities (except the small-sized 
portfolio sorted on profitability and investment). 
                                                     
8 Except for the cases when small-sized SOEs invest more than large-cap SOEs.  
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There is strong evidence of the similar size patterns of different 
characteristics for SOEs and non-SOEs except for investment 
characteristics of portfolios based on ownership sorting. 
Although the FF sort does not provide much information on the 
univariate characteristics of portfolios sorted on size and B/M, 
profitability and investment, the sort on ownership structure provides 
some interesting findings. Profitable private firms (non-SOEs) tend to 
provide lower returns to investors than their counterparts. Mid- and 
large-cap non-SOEs tend to have higher profits and invest more 
aggressively than SOEs of the same size. 
2.4 Empirical results on asset pricing tests 
Table 2.5 reports the summary results of asset pricing tests. For brevity, 
the study reports the average adjusted R-squared, GRS test statistics 
and its p-values, the average values of absolute intercepts, Sharpe ratios 
for intercepts, the maximum squared Sharpe ratio for intercepts and 
model factors (Fama and French, 2018). The tests report the results of 
three asset pricing models, namely FF three-factor, FF four-factor (i.e., 
FF five-factor without HML) and FF five-factor. 
Overall, the test statistics show that the new model can account for more 
asset pricing anomalies than the traditional asset pricing models of 
CAPM, the three-factor and the four-factor. Consistent with Fama and 
French’s results (2015), the five-factor model tested on the Vietnamese 
 
 
Chapter 2: Choosing Factors for the Vietnamese Stock Market 31 
 
 
stock market performs best in relation to explaining the average returns 
of three sets of nine portfolios sorted by B/M, profitability and 
investment (Column All of each panel). The average of adjusted R-
squared for all double-sorted portfolios (Column All of Panel A) improves 
from 89.58% (the three-factor model) to 90.49% (the five-factor model), 
with the lowest performing (four-factor) model at 89.49% average 
adjusted R-squared. This result is consistent with average adjusted R-
squared for the Asia Pacific region (Fama and French, 2017). Similar 
results of superiority of the five-factor model over the three-factor are 
found for the Australian stock market (Chiah et al., 2016). 
Looking at each set of portfolios, the five-factor model still outperforms 
all other models in explaining the expected returns of portfolios with 
each sorted on size and either book-to-market, profitability or 
investment. The average adjusted R-squared for size-B/M sorted 
portfolios (Column B/M of Panel A), size-profitability portfolios (Column 
OP of Panel A)  and size-investment portfolios (Column Inv of Panel A) 
is  91.0%, 90.9% and 89.6% for the five-factor model, respectively. 
Table 2.5 shows consistent results of the Fama-French five-factor 
model’s superiority as evidenced in the tests of Panels A to G for all 27 
portfolios (Column A of all panels) and for three sets of 9 portfolios with 
each sorted on size and a combination of B/M (Column B/M of all panels), 
operating profitability (Column OP of all panels) and investment 
(Column Inv of all panels). Despite there being different rankings for the 
three- and four-factor models among the portfolios, all results 
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consistently show the superiority of the five-factor model (Columns All, 
B/M, OP and Inv of Panel D).  
In relation to portfolios sorted on state ownership, the obtained results 
of the average adjusted R-squared for SOEs (Column SOE of Panel A) 
contradict with that of the remaining tests. Although the average value 
of absolute intercepts, the value of Sharpe ratio, GRS test statistics and 
its p-value extend the preference to the five-factor model for the size-
SOE portfolios, the average adjusted R-squared shows the preference for 
the four-factor model. Referring to the results of the maximum squared 
Sharpe ratio for intercepts (Fama and French, 2018), this study 
concludes that the five-factor is the best model to capture stock returns 
on the SOE portfolio sorted on size (Column SOE of Panel F). 
Referring to the results of non-SOEs, it is found that the average 
adjusted R-squared prefers the five-factor model, but GRS test statistics 
and the tests for intercepts (Column non-SOE in Panels B, D and E) 
point out the priority of the three-factor model. Based on the maximum 
squared Sharpe ratio for intercepts, Sh2(𝛼 ), it is concluded that the 
three-factor still takes the place as the best model to explain the non-
SOE portfolio sorted on size (Column non-SOE of Panel F).9 The study 
arrives at the conclusion that the three-factor model best explains the 
variation in returns of non-SOEs and the five-factor model is most 
                                                     
9 The unreported results on the maximum squared Sharpe ratio for intercepts with the 
cash profitability factor provide supporting evidence for the Fama-French five-factor 
model’s superiority for all 6 portfolios sorted on size and state ownership as well as for 
3 SOE portfolios sorted on size. The three-factor model is preferred over other models 
for non-SOE portfolios sorted on size. 
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preferred for all porftolios sorted on size and state ownership as well as 
SOE portfolios sorted on size from the results of the maximum squared 
Sharpe ratio for intercepts (Columns SOE and non-SOE of Panel F). 
Notably, Fama and French (2015) report that the five-factor model 
produces lower GRS statistics than the original three-factor model (the 
lowest GRS test statistic as compared with the three-factor model is 
produced by the five-factor model in the portfolio sorted on size and 
profitability). The results in Table 2.5 show that the GRS test statistic 
is at its lowest of 0.78 for the portfolio sorted on size and investment 
(Inv) with the highest p-value of 0.64 for GRS. The average value of 
absolute intercepts also shows that the largest improvement of the five-
factor model is produced for the size-investment portfolios, consistent 
with GRS test values. Additional tests are conducted to decide on the 
explanatory power of Fama-French multi-factor models: the maximum 
squared Sharpe ratio for intercepts (Sh2(𝛼)) and the maximum squared 
Sharpe ratio for factors (Sh2(f)). Both tests show the superiority of the 
five-factor model consistent over all types of portfolio testing, with the 
exception of the non-SOE portfolios sorted on size. Overall, the results 
of Table 2.5 show that the five-factor model is the preferred model for all 
portfolios sorted on size and a combination of B/M, profitability and 
investment, taken together or standalone, and for the portfolios sorted 
on size-SOE. 
Fama and French (2015) report that HML is redundant for describing 
U.S. average returns during the 1962–2013 period, but it is not 
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redundant for explaining average returns in any region during the 
1990–2014 period (Fama and French, 2017). They observe a strong 
positive relationship between the book-to-market ratio and average 
returns of Japanese equities. Consistent with Fama and French’s (2017) 
findings in Europe, Japan and the Asia Pacific region, this study 
provides evidence that HML is not redundant in Vietnam. The results 
on the Vietnamese stock market provide evidence that without the value 
factor (HML), the asset pricing model with only market, size, 
profitability and investment factors performs worse than the traditional 
three-factor model with market, size and value factors (Panels A, D, E 
and F). The value factor became even more important under the five-
factor model. The five-factor model minimizes the intercept effects for 
all portfolios through a large difference in average mean intercepts 
between the four-factor and five-factor models. Hence, the study 
suggests that some anomalies can be eliminated from previous versions 
of asset pricing models by including the value factor. There is only one 
portfolio, the SOE portfolio sorted on size, that has no obvious difference 
in average absolute intercepts between the four- and five-factor models. 
However, the maximum squared Sharpe ratio provides evidence that the 
five-factor model is the best one to explain the SOE returns. Table 2.7 
will provide further investigation of the value factor redundancy. 
Overall, Table 2.5 shows that the five-factor model performs relatively 
well in explaining the expected returns of 27 portfolios with each 9 
portfolios sorted on either book-to-market, profitability or investment. 
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GRS fails to reject all of the models, providing the preference for the five-
factor model as the best one among all tested. The maximum squared 
Sharpe ratio for intercepts gives a preference to the five-factor model 
with the exception of the non-SOE portfolios sorted on size. The 
maximum squared Sharpe ratio for factors shows that the five-factor 
model is superior to the three- and four-factor models in explaining the 
stock returns.  
2.5 Is the value factor (HML) redundant? 
As the previous asset pricing tests suggest, the FF five-factor model 
works best and has superiority over the three-factor model when HML 
is included in the model. To further test the hypothesis of HML 
redundancy and to see the relationship of the factors, regressions of each 
factor on the other four remaining are conducted to find whether the 
explanatory variables can absorb the factor or not. Table 2.6 shows the 
results of five spanning regressions (in columns) with MKT, SMB and 
HML, RMW and CMA as the dependent variable in each of the 
regressions. In the first model where the dependent variable is the 
return on market portfolio (MKT), the average market returns being left 
unexplained by the model are negligible, as the effect is absorbed by the 
HML (0.61% per month, t-stat=2.34) and CMA (-0.97% per month, t-
stat=-2.24) factors. The same happens when running the test on HML; 
that is, the value effect is absorbed by both market (MKT) and 
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investment (CMA) factors. Consistent with the results from Panel B of 
Table 2.2 where the correlation between HML and CMA is found to be 
highest, the average HML returns are captured by the exposures of 
HML to CMA and MKT. However, unlike Fama and French’s results 
that show CMA and RMW absorbing all the effects of HML, the test 
reports that the average CMA return is captured to a greater extent by 
its exposure to HML; RMW cannot absorb HML. Notably, a similar 
controversy is discovered about the RMW and SMB with the largest 
negative correlation (Panel B of Table 2.2). Table 2.6 shows that in the 
non-nested model regression, RMW largely absorbs the SMB effect. 
Hence, the evidence suggests that in Vietnam, adding HML improves 
the mean-variance efficient tangency portfolio produced by combining 
the risk-free asset, the market, size, profitability and investment 
portfolios. One possible explanation for the value factor non-redundancy 
in Vietnam can be the strong correlation between the profitability and 
value factors (-0.49) as opposed to the US market (Fama and French, 
2015). Cakici (2015) also highlights the similar evidence on the 
correlation of these two factors for Japan which is different from other 
regions in the world. 
To further verify the findings on the HML redundancy, this study follows 
Fama and French (2018) to deconstruct the maximum squared Sharpe 
ratio for a model’s factors, Sh2(f), in Table 2.5 by analyzing the extent of 
marginal contribution of a factor to Sh2(f), α 2/sd2(e), defined as the 
squared intercept over the variance of the regression residuals, and t-
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statistics for the intercept (t(𝛼)) in a factor-spanning regression. The 
factor’s intercept (𝛼) is close to zero and/or the residual standard error, 
s(e), is large if the factor’s expected return is well explained by the 
remaining factors in a model. Hence, a factor is considered to be 
redundant if its marginal contribution to a model’s maximum squared 
Sharpe ratio is small.  The results of α2/sd2(e) in Table 2.6 report that 
RMW and HML are by far the biggest marginal contributions to Sh2(f), 
which further supports the finding on the value factor in Table 2.5. 
Therefore, the value factor is confirmed to be non-redundant in the 
factor models for the Vietnamese stock market. 
2.6 Operating, cash or ROE profitability? 
Fama and French (2018) provide evidence that the five-factor model 
(Fama and French, 2015) is sensitive to the choice of the profitability 
factor. More specifically, the cash profitability suggested by Ball, 
Gerakos, Linnainmaa and Nikolaev (2015) improves the description of 
the average returns for portfolios of different sorts.  
Cash profitability (RMWC) is the cash profits without accruals (i.e., 
before interest) scaled by total assets in the 2x3 portfolios sorted on size 
and profitability. Using cash profitability (Ball et al., 2015), Fama and 
French (2018) try to explain small stocks with returns that behave like 
those of firms that invest a lot despite low profitability (Fama and 
French, 2015, 2017). Although this study does not have a similar issue, 
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the focus is on the choice of profitability factor that would be best for the 
five-factor model to explain the variation in the Vietnamese stock 
market. Table 2.7 shows the hypothesis that higher profitability leads 
to higher expected returns is only correct for large stocks with ROE 
profitability (Hou, Mo, Xue and Zhang, 2019). This hypothesis is also 
true for small and medium equities if cash profitability (Ball et al., 2015) 
is used. The size effect is evident in returns of all double-sorted portfolios, 
except for portfolios with average operating profitability (Novy-Max, 
2013), average cash profitability (Ball et al., 2015) and low profitability 
(Hou, Mo, Xue and Zhang, 2019). 
Panel B of Table 2.7 shows the identical size patterns for B/M regardless 
of the choice for profitability factor, that is, smaller firms tend to have 
higher book-to-market ratios. Panel C of Table 2.7 shows an opposite 
size pattern for cash profitability as compared with portfolios calculated 
using operating and ROE profitability. One explanation would be that 
small firms rely more on equity capital and have lower access to 
borrowing. Hence, such contradictory results are observed.  
Table 2.8 is the direct comparison of the FF multi-factor model 
performance when using different profitability ratios. The model with 
Ball et al.’s (2015) cash profitability factor, RMWC (Panel A), 
outperforms the model with RMW (Fama and French, 2015; Novy-Max, 
2013) and the model with ROE profitability, RMWR (Hou, Xue and 
Zhang, 2015; Hou, Mo, Xue and Zhang, 2019), in the tests of the average 
adjusted R-squared performed on all portfolios (Columns All of Panels A, 
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B and C). However, Sh(𝛼), p-value of GRS, the average value of absolute 
intercepts, A|𝛼|, show preference for RMW. The GRS test values for the 
five-factor model further complicate the analysis providing very low 
results for size-BM, size-Inv portfolios using operating profitability in 
Panel C and showing RMWC is the best model among four-factor models. 
Therefore, the maximum squared Sharpe ratio, Sh2(𝛼 ), is chosen to 
determine which profitability measure suits best for the four-factor and 
five-factor models. The results indicate RMWC is equally good when 
testing for all 27 portfolios taken together (Column All of Sh2(𝛼) in Table 
2.8) and RMW is superior to all other models when it comes to explain 
the variation of each of the three sets of portfolios sorted on size and a 
combination of value, profitability and investment (Columns B/M, Profit 
and Inv of Sh2(𝛼) in Table 2.8). 
Contradicting results are detected in the choice of profitability factor 
when turning attention to the comparison of the four-factor models. 
Sh2( 𝛼 ) indicates the superiority of cash profitability (RMWC) when 
testing all 27 portfolios but not for each set of double-sorted portfolios 
(the FF 4-factor model of Columns B/M, Profit and Inv in Table 2.8). 
What is consistent across all tests is the results showing that regardless 
of profitability factor choice, the superiority of the five-factor model in 
explaining the average returns as compared with the four-factor models 
in Table 2.8 across all profitability factors.  
To further testify the results on profitability measures, a test of 
profitability factors is conducted similar to the test applied to the value 
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factor for redundancy. Given inconclusive results over the choice of 
profitability factors in Table 2.8, Table 2.9 with α 2/sd2(e) confirms the 
superiority of the operating profitability (Fama and French, 2015; Novy-
Max, 2013) over the cash (Ball et al., 2015) and ROE profitability (Hou et 
al., 2019) factors, with the RMW intercepts having slightly more 
incremental information about the average returns under the tests. 
Operating profitability (RMW) is likely to perform better than cash 
profitability (RMWC) and ROE profitability (RMWR). 
Similar to Fama and French (2018), this study provides evidence that 
changing the profitability from an operating one to cash profitability does 
not change the conclusion that all the factors have explanatory power. In 
addition, the returns of RMWR are found to be largely absorbed by SMB 
and HML. Although it is evident that there are strong negative slopes on 
SMB for RMW under both tests with RMWC and RMWR, as discussed 
earlier, SMB cannot absorb RMW as shown in the results of Table 2.6. 
Robustness tests in Section 2.7 confirm these findings. 
2.7 Robustness tests 
By re-testing the five-factor model with cash profitability and ROE 
profitability as profitability proxies (Table 2.10), this study reconfirms 
the HML non-redundancy.10 Both panels of Table 2.10 report that the 
intercept in the spanning regression using cash profitability (RMWC) 
                                                     
10 Fama and French (2015) find that HML is redundant for the US stock market when 
using operating profitability (Novy-Max, 2013). 
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and ROE profitability (RMWR) to explain HML is 0.01% per month (t-
statistics=1.63) and 0.01% per month (t-statistics=1.50), the highest 
value for the t-statistics among all the models under both profitability 
versions. 
The results of α2/sd2(e) for Panel A provide evidence that the value factor 
contributes most to the Sh2(f) of the five-factor model using cash 
profitability (0.034). The returns of SMB and CMA are absorbed by 
strong positive slopes on HML. Cash profitability is another significant 
marginal contributor to Sh2(f) with α2/sd2(e) of 0.029. The returns of 
MKT are absorbed by this factor.  
Panel B provides persistent results for HML non-redundancy with the 
value factor having the highest marginal contribution to Sh2(f) of the 
five-factor model using ROE profitability (0.027). RMWR does not 
contribute much to Sh2(f), supporting the findings in Table 2.8. SMB can 
be well explained by RMWR. The returns of CMA and RMWR are 
absorbed by MKT. The MKT, RMWR and CMA returns are absorbed by 
strong slopes on HML. 
The values of Sh2(f) as indicated in Tables 2.6 and 2.10 for the five-factor 
model with RMW, RMWC and RMWR are 0.073, 0.062 and 0.037, 
respectively. These results further indicate the preference for operating 
profitability (RMW) when testing the maximum squared Sharpe ratio for 
the five-factor model’s factors with different profitability proxies. 
 
 




This chapter empirically examines three FF factor models for the 
Vietnamese stock market during the 2008–2015 period. Similar to Japan 
(Fama and French, 2017), the GRS test cannot reject all the asset pricing 
models in their power of capturing the average returns of Vietnamese 
equities. Test results point out the superiority of the FF five-factor model 
over the three-factor and four-factor models in explaining the returns of 
portfolios sorted on size and a combination of book-to-market, 
profitability and investment. While the three-factor model is a preferred 
model in explaining the returns of non-SOEs sorted on size, the FF five-
factor model is still superior for SOE sorted on size. The study also 
reports evidence of the return premium on state-owned equities in 
Vietnam; that is, state-owned enterprises have significantly higher 
average returns than private firms, although the former invest less 
aggressively and have lower profitability and book-to-market ratios than 
private (non-SOE) firms. Profitable private firms (non-SOEs) tend to 
provide lower returns to investors and invest more aggressively than 
SOEs. The findings also show that investors holding the portfolio with 
small-cap SOEs during the sample period would realize the highest 
returns during the sample period. The loser portfolio over the sample 
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The findings suggest that the value factor (HML) has a relationship with 
portfolio returns, and its effect is not absorbed by profitability and 
investment factors newly included in the traditional three-factor model 
(Fama and Fama, 2015). In contrast to Fama and French’s (2018) 
findings on HML value, it is not redundant in the Vietnamese stock 
market after considering different measures for the profitability factor. 
The value factor and operating profitability have the biggest marginal 
contribution to the maximum squared Sharpe ratio for the five-factor 
model’s factors (Barillas and Shanken, 2017), implying HML is 
important in describing the stock returns in Vietnam. 
The operating profitability (Novy-Max, 2013) used in the FF five-factor 
model performs better than cash profitability (Ball et al., 2015) and ROE 
profitability (Hou, Xue and Zhang, 2015; Hou, Mo, Xue and Zhang, 2019), 
indicating its intercepts have more incremental information about the 
average returns. All the tests provide consistent results on the 
superiority of the FF five-factor model over other traditional asset 
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Table 2.1 Sample coverage for the Vietnamese stock market  
 
Co is the number of listed companies during a year. MCap is market capitalisation 
in trillions of Vietnamese Dong (VND) as at the end of a year. Value and Volume are 
annual trading value (in trillions of VND) and trading volume (in millions of 
shares) of all stocks.  OP, CP and RP are the average value of operating profitability 
ratio, cash profitability ratio and ROE profitability ratio per stock, respectively, using 
Fama and French (2015, 2018, 2019), Ball et al. (2015) and Hou, Mo, Xue and Zhang 
(2019) profitability definition. INV is the average investment ratio per stock, 
respectively, as defined using Fama-French methodology (2015). BM is the average 
book-to-market ratio per stock. SOE is the number of listed companies that have 




Year Co MCap Value Volume OP CP RP INV BM SOE 
2007 135 334.5 267.6 2.610 0.0523 0.102 0.157 0.689 0.442 31 
2008 189 148.3 120.5 5.261 0.0563 0.100 0.051 0.278 0.885 44 
2009 279 371.0 445.9 18.79 0.0579 0.088 0.094 0.331 0.928 54 
2010 400 453.1 408.0 19.12 0.0655 0.089 0.100 0.342 0.813 64 
2011 421 308.9 137.6 11.27 0.0709 0.092 0.069 0.151 1.488 67 
2012 442 383.4 193.2 18.77 0.0770 0.090 0.049 0.046 1.879 70 
2013 425 446.9 229.7 22.09 0.0747 0.086 0.049 0.069 1.939 62 
2014 460 542.2 523.1 40.16 0.0783 0.087 0.066 0.125 1.416 62 









Table 2.2 Summary statistics for Fama-French factors for Vietnamese stocks 
 
Panel A reports the summary statistics for the Fama-French’s monthly risk factors. Panel B reports the time-series correlation between the 
factors. 
In July of year t, two size portfolios are formed based on market capitalisation as at the end of year t-1 and use the median as the  
breakpoint. These two portfolios are calculated using monthly returns and rebalanced annually. The size factor (SMB) is the return 
difference between the average returns on the small firm portfolios and the average returns on t h e  portfolios containing large firms. Six 
portfolios are then constructed from the intersection of two size and three book-to-market portfolios (SL, SN, SH, BL, BN, BH) based on 
the 30th and 70th percentiles. The value factor (HML) is the return difference between the average returns on the high book-to-market 
portfolios and the average returns on the low book-to-market portfolios. Similarly, six portfolios are constructed from the intersection of 
two size and three profitability portfolios (SR, SN, SW, BR, BN and BW). Profitability factor (RMW) is the return difference between the 
average returns on the robust profitability portfolios and the average returns on the weak profitability portfolios. Six portfolios are from 
the intersection of two size and three investment portfolios (SC, SN, SA, BC, BN and BA). Investment factor (CMA) factor is the return 
difference between the average returns on the conservative investment portfolios and the average returns on the aggressive investment 
portfolios. All portfolios are value-weighted and returns are in percentages. MKT is the value-weighted excess return on the  market 
portfolio of all sample stocks minus the one-month interbank offer rate. Statistics reported are the mean, median, standard deviation 
(st.dev), maximum (max), minimum (min), skewness and kurtosis. The sample is from September 2008 to July 2015.  
 
Panel A: Summary statistics  
 
 















SMB 0.0038 0.0540 0.0002 3.9358 -0.1388 0.1704 
HML 0.0061 0.0464 0.9480 5.9929 -0.0978 0.1774 
RMW 0.0034 0.0378 -0.1730 5.3969 -0.1249 0.1277 










Table 2.2 Continued 
 
Panel B: Correlation 
 





    
SMB -0.0640 1    
HML 0.1287 0.3821 1   
RMW -0.0844 -0.5832 -0.4928 1  
CMA -0.2159 0.1076 0.4888 -0.2730 1 
 
The factors are calculated as follows (Fama and French, 2015) with S and B denoting small- and big-sized portfolios, H, N and L for  high, 










Table 2.3 Characteristics of value-weighted single-sorted portfolios 
The table provides time-series averages of average percentage monthly excess returns, book-to-market (B/M), profitability (OP) and investment 
(Inv) ratios in July of year t to June of year t+1 for portfolios formed in December of year t-1 on a single sort of book-to-market, profitability or 
investment. Portfolio breakpoints are the 33rd and 67th percentiles. Each of the ratios for a portfolio in a given year is the value-weighted average 
of the ratios for the firms in the portfolios. Firms in the columns Ownership are sorted on (state) ownership structure. Column Low (under 
Book-to-market)  is the characteristics for portfolios of stocks with low book-to-market ratio. Column Ave shows the characteristics for portfolios 
of stocks with average book-to-market ratio. Column High shows the characteristics for portfolios of stocks with high book-to-market ratio. Column 
Weak (under Profitability) shows the characteristics for portfolios of stocks with low profitability ratio. Column Ave (under Profitability) shows 
characteristics for portfolios of stocks with average profitability ratio. Column Robust shows the characteristics for portfolios of stocks with high 
profitability ratio. Column Conserv (under Investment) shows the characteristics for portfolios of stocks with low investment ratio. Column Ave 
shows characteristics for portfolios of stocks with average investment ratio. Column Aggr shows characteristics for portfolios of stocks with high 
investment ratio. The sample is from September 2008 to July 2015. 
 
 
        Book-to-market                 Profitability                        Investment                   Ownership 
   Low  Ave High Weak  Ave   Robust Conserv   Ave  Aggr  SOE  non-SOE 
Excess returns  -0.66 -0.09 -0.14 -0.99 -0.53 -0.55  -0.69 -1.00 -0.22  -0.21   -0.59 
B/M  0.57 1.18 1.64 1.23 1.07 0.66  1.01 0.88 0.65   0.67    0.78 
OP  0.29 0.15 0.08 0.02 0.04 0.31  0.18 0.21 0.27   0.22    0.25 











Table 2.4 Characteristics of double-sorted portfolios 
 
The table provides time-series averages of average percentage monthly excess returns, book-to-market, profitability and investment ratios 
in July of year t to June of year t+1 for portfolios formed in December of year t-1 on double sort of size and a combination of book-to-
market, profitability and investment. The portfolio formation and book-to-market, profitability and investment ratios follow Fama-French 
(2015) methodology. Each of the ratios for a portfolio in a given year is the value-weighted average of the ratios for the firms in the 
portfolios. Firms in the columns Ownership are sorted on size and ownership structure. Panel A provides time-series averages of monthly 
returns in excess of Vietnam’s interbank offer rate (in percentages). Panel B, C  and  D show the book-to-market, profitability and 
investment times-series averages for a portfolio. Column Low (below Book-to-market) shows characteristics for portfolios of stocks sorted on 
size (Small, Medium and Large) and low book-to-market ratio. Column Ave shows characteristics for portfolios of stocks sorted on size (Small, 
Medium and Large) and average book-to-market ratio. Column High shows the characteristics for portfolios of stocks sorted on size (Small, 
Medium and Large) and high book-to-market ratio. Column Weak (below Profitability) shows characteristics for portfolios of stocks sorted on 
size (Small, Medium and Large) and low profitability ratio. Column Ave shows characteristics for portfolios of stocks sorted on size (Small, 
Medium and Large) and average profitability ratio. Column Robust shows characteristics for portfolios of stocks sorted on size (Small, Medium 
and Large) and high profitability ratio. Column Conserv (below Investment) shows characteristics for portfolios of stocks sorted on size (Small, 
Medium and Large) and low investment ratio. Column Ave shows characteristics for portfolios of stocks sorted on size (Small, Medium and 
Large) and average investment ratio. Column Aggr shows characteristics for portfolios of stocks sorted on size (Small, Medium and Large) and 
high investment ratio. The sample is from September 2008 to July 2015. 
 
 
     Book-to-market Profitability  Investment Ownership 
Low     Ave    High   Weak       Ave    Robust Conserv   Ave    Aggr SOE   non-SOE 
 
Panel A: Excess returns 
 
Small 0.29 0.43 0.28 0.27 -0.22 0.65 0.68 -0.10    0.36  1.23  0.13 
Medium -0.83    -0.20    -0.18   -0.17 -0.63 -0.31 -0.01 -0.56   -0.43 -0.34 -0.43 










Table 2.4 Continued 
Panel B: Book-to-market 
Small 1.16 1.52 1.98 1.55 1.54 1.51 1.52 1.61 1.48 1.44 1.50 
Medium 0.89 1.23 1.69 1.28 1.28 1.27 1.36 1.31 1.16 1.19 1.26 
Large 0.49 0.85 1.37 1.09 0.86 0.59 0.92 0.75 0.61 0.63 0.71 
 
Panel C: Profitability 
Small 0.03 0.03 0.04 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.05 0.03 
Medium 0.08 0.09 0.08 0.01 0.04 0.17 0.08 0.08 0.09 0.06 0.09 
Large 0.32 0.23 0.13 0.03 0.08 0.37 0.21 0.26 0.28 0.23 0.27 
 
Panel D: Investment 
Small 0.20 0.20 0.10 0.18 0.14 0.18 0.11 0.19 0.21 0.19 0.16 
Medium 0.26 0.17 0.12 0.12 0.22 0.19 0.11 0.19 0.23 0.15 0.18 











        All       B/M            OP            Inv   SOE        non-SOE 
 
  Fama-French 3-factor  0.8958 
Fama-French 4-factor  0.8949   
Fama-French 5-factor  0.9049 
 
 0.9080        0.8969       0.8825 
 0.8904        0.9044       0.8898 
 0.9097        0.9091       0.8960 
 
 0.6721        0.9618     
 0.6755        0.9570     
 0.6715        0.9630   
 
 
        All       B/M            OP            Inv   SOE        non-SOE 
 
Fama-French 3-factor  1.5629 
Fama-French 4-factor  1.5403   
Fama-French 5-factor  1.4003 
 
 1.0278        1.4262       0.9739 
 1.1892        1.3022       1.0858 
 0.9157        1.0259       0.7789 
 
 4.2280        9.9838     
 3.9507      11.7091     







Table 2.5 Summary results of the factor models 
The table provides the summary results of  the multivariate regressions for portfolios formed by size and a combination of book-to-market 
(B/M), profitability (OP), investment (Inv), SOE and non-SOEs. Portfolios are formed in July of year t to June of year t+1 from stock sorted 
in December of year t-1. The portfolio formation and book-to-market (HML), profitability (RMW) and investment (CMA) factor construction 
follows Fama-French’s (1993, 2015) methodology.  
Summary results show the average value of all adjusted R-squared and the absolute intercepts (A|𝛼|) of all portfolios from the respective 
regressions in Panels A to D of Table 6. GRS is the Gibbons, Ross and Shanken’s (1989) test statistic and its p-value, p(GRS). Sh(𝛼), Sh2(𝛼) 
and Sh2(f) are the Sharpe ratio for intercepts, its maximum squared value and the maximum squared Sharpe ratio for the model’s factors, 
respectively. These five tests are applied to all portfolios (All) and portfolios formed by size and a combination of book-to-market (B/M), 
profitability (OP), investment (Inv). The tests also show the results for the portfolios sorted on size and a combination of SOEs and 
non-SOEs. 
Fama-French 3-factor model: Rp,t = ap + bp M K Tt + sp SM Bt + hp H M Lt + ei,t .  
Fama-French 4-factor model ( without HML): Rp,t = ap + bp M K Tt + sp SMBt + rp RM Wt + cp C M At + ei,t .  
Fama- French 5-factor model: Rp,t = ap + bp M K Tt + sp SM Bt + hp H M Lt + rp RM Wt + cp C M At + ei,t . The sample is from 
September 2008 to July 2015. 
            
 



















        All       B/M            OP            Inv   SOE        non-SOE 
 
Fama-French 3-factor  0.0822 
Fama-French 4-factor  0.0902   
Fama-French 5-factor  0.1484 
 
 0.4268        0.1935       0.4689 
 0.3157        0.2516       0.3843 
 0.5170        0.4286       0.6363 
 
 0.0080         0.0000     
 0.0113         0.0000     
 0.0146         0.0000   
 
 
        All       B/M            OP            Inv   SOE        non-SOE 
 
Fama-French 3-factor  0.0033 
Fama-French 4-factor  0.0043   
Fama-French 5-factor  0.0029 
 
 0.0032        0.0032       0.0034 
 0.0051        0.0039       0.0038 
 0.0030        0.0031       0.0026 
 
 0.0137         0.0072     
 0.0135         0.0086     
 0.0135         0.0073   
 
 
        All       B/M            OP            Inv   SOE        non-SOE 
 
Fama-French 3-factor  0.9040 
Fama-French 4-factor  0.9102   
Fama-French 5-factor  0.8913 
 
 0.3657        0.4307       0.3559 
 0.3980        0.4165       0.3803 
 0.3578        0.3787       0.3300 
 
 0.4112         0.6318     
 0.4019         0.6920     





Table 2.5 Continued 
 
 





































        All  
 
Fama-French 3-factor  0.0266 
Fama-French 4-factor  0.0363   
Fama-French 5-factor  0.0725 
 
        All       B/M            OP            Inv   SOE        non-SOE 
 
Fama-French 3-factor  0.8171 
Fama-French 4-factor  0.8285   
Fama-French 5-factor  0.7944 
 
 0.1337        0.1855       0.1267 
 0.1584        0.1734       0.1446 
 0.1280        0.1434       0.1088 
 
 0.1691        0.3992     
 0.1616        0.4788     










































Table 2.6 Testing a Fama-French factor by regressing the 
remaining variables of the five-factor model 
 
The table reports the results of time-series regressions with each of the variables 
being regressed by the remaining of the five factors. MKT is the value-weighted 
excess return on the market portfolio, and SMB is average return on the portfolio 
sorted on size. HML is the value factor with size and book-to-market sort. RMW is 
the profitability factor. CMA is the investment factor. All factors are 2x3 portfolios 
constructed using Fama-French’s (1993, 2015) methodology. Sh2(f) is the 
maximum squared Sharpe ratio for a model’s factors from Table 5. α , s(e) and 
α2/sd2(e) are the factor’s intercept, residual standard error from spanning regressions 
and the marginal contribution of a factor to a model’s Sh2(f), respectively. The Newey-


















  (-1.63) (2.06) (-0.96) (-2.29) 
SMB -0.39  0.19* -0.34*** -0.13 
 (-1.39)  (1.67) (-3.73) (-1.18) 
HML 0.61** 0.27*  -0.18 0.40*** 
 (2.34) (1.84)  (-1.30) (4.56) 
RMW -0.39 -0.76*** -0.28  -0.15 
 (-0.99) (-5.14) (-1.25)  (-0.94) 
CMA -0.97** -0.30 0.60*** -0.15  
 (-2.24) (-1.22) (4.25) (-0.89)  
α -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01* -0.00 

































t-statistics in parentheses 












Table 2.7 Characteristics of portfolios sorted on a combination 
of size and operating profitability, cash profitability or ROE 
profitability 
 
The table provides time-series averages of excess returns, book-to-market, 
profitability and investment ratios in July of year t to June of year t+1 for 
portfolios formed in December of year t-1 on double sort of size and a combination 
of cash profitability (Ball et al., 2015; Fama and French, 2018), ROE profitability 
(Hou et al., 2015, 2019) and operating profitability (from Table 4). The portfolio 
formation and book-to-market, profitability and investment ratios follow the 
Fama-French (2015) methodology. Each of the ratios for a portfolio in a given year 
is the value-weighted average of the ratios for the firms in the portfolios. Panel A 
provides time-series averages of monthly returns in excess of the Vietnam’s 
interbank offer rate (in percentages). Panels B, C, D show the book-to-market, 
profitability and investment times-series averages for a portfolio. Column Weak 
shows characteristics for portfolios of stocks sorted on size (Small, Medium and 
Large) and low profitability ratio. Column Average shows characteristics for 
portfolios of stocks sorted on size (Small, Medium and Large) and average 
profitability ratio. Column Robust shows characteristics for portfolios of stocks sorted 
on size (Small, Medium and Large) and high profitability ratio. The sample is from 





 Operating Profitability      Cash Profitability      ROE Profitability 
Weak   Average Robust Weak  Average Robust  Weak    Average Robust 
 
Panel  A: Excess returns 
 
Small   0.27 -0.22  0.65 0.14 0.15 0.53 0.22  0.20  0.45 
Medium   -0.17 -0.63 -0.31 -0.42 -0.35 -0.30 -0.36 -0.26 -0.48 
Large   -0.87 -0.37 -0.53 -0.79 -0.22 -0.43 0.54  -0.63 -0.79 
 
Panel  B: Book-to-market 
Small 1.55 1.54 1.51 1.66 1.62 1.33 1.81 1.61 1.32 
Medium 1.28 1.28 1.27 1.40 1.34 1.11 1.60 1.30 1.06 
Large 1.09 0.86 0.59 0.74 0.70 0.71 1.19 1.02 0.59 
 
Panel  C: Profitability 
Small 0.01 0.02 0.06 0.04 0.08 0.18 0.00 0.01 0.02 
Medium 0.01 0.04 0.17 0.03 0.08 0.19 0.02 0.03 0.09 
Large 0.03 0.08 0.37 0.01 0.04 0.12 0.28 0.43 0.81 
 
Panel  D: Investment 
Small 0.18 0.14 0.18 0.19 0.17 0.16 0.07 0.19 0.21 
Medium 0.12 0.22 0.19 0.14 0.19 0.20 0.12 0.16 0.23 










  All   SOE  non-SOE   All    B/M  Profit   Inv  All   B/M  Profit  Inv 
 
Panel A: Using RMWC as the profitability factor 
Fama-French 4-factor   0.8952 0.6943 0.9590 
Fama-French 5-factor  0.9096 0.6946 0.9678 
 
Panel B: Using RMWR as the profitability factor  
Fama-French 4-factor   0.8929 0.6809 0.9566 
Fama-French 5-factor  0.9061 0.6837 0.9649 
 
Panel C: Using RMW as the profitability factor  
Fama-French 4-factor   0.8949 0.6755 0.9570 
Fama-French 5-factor   0.9049 0.6715 0.9630 
 
 
1.53 1.22 1.42 1.37 
1.41 1.04 1.22 1.09 
 
 
1.76 1.19 1.52 1.37 
1.65 1.02 1.32 1.14 
 
 
1.54 1.19 1.30 1.09 
1.40 0.92 1.03 0.78 
 
 
 0.90  0.40   0.43        0.42 
 0.89  0.38  0.42    0.39 
 
 
  0.96  0.39  0.44   0.42 
  0.95  0.37  0.42   0.39 
 
 
  0.67  0.40  0.42   0.38 
  0.66  0.36  0.38   0.33 
  
 
Panel A of this table describes the average adjusted R-squared of all portfolios sorted by size and a combination of B/M, profitability, investment 
and the average adjusted R-squared of size-All (All), size-SOE (SOE) and size-non-SOE sorted (non-SOE) portfolios. The portfolio formation and 
book-to-market (HML), cash profitability (RMWC) and investment (CMA) factor construction follow Fama-French (1993, 2015, 2018) methodology. 
Summary results show the average value of all adjusted R-squared (Adj.R2) and the absolute intercepts (A|𝛼|) of all portfolios from the respective 
regressions in Panels A to D of Table 6. GRS is the Gibbons, Ross and Shanken’s (1989) test statistic and its p-value, p(GRS). Sh(𝛼) and Sh2(𝛼) are 
the Sharpe ratio for intercepts and its maximum squared value, respectively. These five tests are applied to all portfolios (All) and portfolios formed by 
size and a combination of book-to-market (B/M), profitability (OP), investment (Inv). Column “SOE” shows the results for companies classified as 
state-owned and “non-SOE” column reports the results on the privately owned group of listed firms. The Fama-French five-factor model with cash 
profitability: Rp,t = ap + bp MKTt + sp SMBt + hp HMLt + rp RMWCt + cp CMAt + ei,t . Fama-French four-factor model (without HML): 
Rp,t = ap + bp MKTt + sp SMBt + rp RMWCt + cp CMAt + ei,t . The sample is from September 2008 to July 2015. 
Panel B follows the same data and methodology as in Panel A with the ROE profitability, RMWR, (Hou, Zue and Zhang, 2015; Hou, Mo, Xue and Zhang, 
2019) as the proxy for a profitability factor. The Fama-French five-factor model with RMWR: Rp,t = ap + bp MKTt + sp SMBt + hp HMLt + rp 
RMWRt + cp CMAt + ei,t . Fama-French four-factor model (without HML): Rp,t = ap + bp MKTt + sp SMBt + rp RMWRt + cp CMAt + 
ei,t . The sample is from September 2008 to July 2015. Panel C displays the summary results of Table 2.5 with operating profitability (RMW) in the 
models.  
 
                    Adjusted R̄ 2                             GRS                              Sh(𝜶) 

























  All   SOE  non-SOE   All    B/M  Profit   Inv  All     B/M  Profit  Inv 
 
Panel A: Using RMWC as the profitability factor 
Fama-French 4-factor   0.0038 0.0129 0.0061 
Fama-French 5-factor  0.0034 0.0126 0.0076 
 
Panel B: Using RMWR as the profitability factor  
Fama-French 4-factor   0.0039 0.0139 0.0080 
Fama-French 5-factor  0.0031 0.0133 0.0067 
 
Panel C: Using RMW as the profitability factor  
Fama-French 4-factor   0.0043 0.0135 0.0086 
Fama-French 5-factor   0.0029 0.0135 0.0073 
 
 
0.09 0.30 0.28 0.22 
0.14 0.42 0.29 0.38 
 
 
0.04 0.31 0.16 0.22 
0.06 0.43 0.24 0.35 
 
 
0.09 0.32 0.25 0.38 
0.15 0.52 0.43 0.64 
 
 
0.82  0.16  0.19        0.18 
0.79  0.14  0.17    0.15 
 
 
0.92  0.15  0.19   0.18 
0.90  0.14  0.18   0.15 
 
 
0.83  0.16  0.17   0.14 
0.79  0.13  0.14   0.11 
  
Table 2.8 Continued 
 
                                                          A|𝜶|                          p(GRS)                          Sh2(𝜶) 




























Table 2.9 Testing the profitability factors 
The table reports the results of time-series regressions with each of the profitability 
variables (operating profitability (RMW), cash profitability (RMWC) and ROE 
profitability (RMWR)) being regressed by the remaining of the five factors. MKT is 
the value-weighted excess return on the market portfolio, and SMB is average 
return on the portfolio sorted on size. HML is the value factor with size and book-to-
market sort.  RMW is the operating profitability factor (Fama and French, 2015). 
RMWC is the cash profitability factor (Fama and French, 2018; Ball et al., 2015). 
RMWR is the ROE profitability factor (Hou, Xue and Zhang, 2015; Hou, Mo, Xue and 
Zhang, 2019). CMA is the investment factor. All factors are 2x3 portfolios 
constructed using the Fama-French (1993, 2015) methodology. Sh2(f) is the 
maximum squared Sharpe ratio for a model’s all 6 factors. α, s(e) and α2/sd2(e) are the 
factor’s intercept, residual standard error from spanning regressions and the marginal 
contribution of a factor to a model’s Sh2(f), respectively. Newey-West t-statistic is 




RMW RMWC RMW RMWR 
          
MKT -0.03 -0.11* -0.05 0.08* 
 (-0.47) (-1.84) (-1.00) (1.94) 
SMB -0.35*** 0.16 -0.35*** -0.28*** 
 (-3.78) (1.31) (-3.10) (-3.28) 
HML -0.13 -0.17 -0.19 -0.37*** 
 (-1.10) (-1.58) (-1.35) (-3.56) 
RMW  0.33***  -0.01 
  (2.87)  (-0.09) 
RMWC/RMWR 0.21***  -0.01  
 (2.67)  (-0.09)  
CMA -0.13 -0.05 -0.15 -0.09 
 (-0.81) (-0.34) (-0.87) (-0.61) 
α 0.00 0.00 0.01* 0.00 
 (1.33) (1.10) (1.84) (0.70) 


























   
    t-statistics in parentheses  
















This table reports the results of time-series regressions with each of the variables 
being regressed by the remaining of the five factors. MKT is the value-weighted excess 
return on the market portfolio, and SMB is average return on the portfolio sorted 
on size. HML is the value factor with size and book-to-market sort. CMA is the 
investment factor. All factors are 2x3 portfolios constructed using the Fama-
French (1993, 2015) methodology. Sh2(f) is the maximum squared Sharpe ratio for a 
model’s factors. α and α2/sd2(e) are the factor’s intercept from spanning regressions 
and the marginal contribution of a factor to a model’s Sh2(f), respectively. The Newey-
West t-statistic is given in parentheses. The sample is from September 2008 to 
July 2015. Panel A shows the analysis with respect to the cash profitability factor 
(RMWC) by Fama and French (2018) and Ball et al.(2015). Panel B describes the ROE 





    Panel A: Cash Profitability (RMWC) 
 













  (-0.97) (1.89) (-2.12) (-2.20) 
SMB -0.22 
-0.22 
 0.29***   0.05 -0.08 
 ( .93)  (3.59) (0.47) (-0.90) 
HML 0.51* 0.58***  -0.23* 0.42*** 
 (1.86) (4.30)  (-1.74) (4.85) 
RMWC -0.56* 0.09 -0.22  -0.06 
 (-1.90) (0.50) (-1.50)  (-0.61) 
CMA -0.92** -0.24 0.62*** -0.10  
 (-2.13) (-0.90) (4.76) (-0.58)  
α -0.00 -0.00 0.01 0.01 -0.00 

























t-statistics in parentheses 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
Table 2.10 Testing the redundancy of the value factor using 
cash profitability (Fama and French, 2018; Ball et al., 2015) and 











Table 2.10 Continued 
 
 
  Panel B: ROE Profitability (RMWR) 
 
 MKT  SMB HML   RMWR   CMA 
MKT  -0.02 0.16*** 0.08** -0.11** 
  (-0.31) (2.92) (1.98) (-2.05) 
SMB -0.06  0.09 -0.28*** -0.11 
 (-0.31)  (0.81) (-3.01) (-0.90) 
HML 0.90*** 0.17  -0.37*** 0.39*** 
 (3.36) (0.73)  (-3.68) (3.02) 
RMWR 0.67* -0.75** -0.53***  -0.10 
 (1.93) (-2.41) (-2.70)  (-0.51) 
CMA -0.82** -0.27 0.50*** -0.09  
 (-2.24) (-0.97) (3.28) (-0.56)  
α -0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 -0.00 
 (-1.01) (0.25) (1.50) (0.63) (-0.55) 

























t-statistics in parentheses  











COMPARING CROSS-SECTION AND TIME-
SERIES FACTOR MODELS IN VIETNAM 
 
3.1 Introduction 
Motivated by the recent Fama and French’s (2019) paper on the 
application of Fama and Macbeth’s (1973) cross-sectional approach to 
extract factors for time-series asset price testing, this chapter examines 
the factor models using a different methodology of factor construction 
(Fama and French, 1993, 2015, 2018; Fama and Macbeth, 1973) in asset 
pricing for the equity market of Vietnam. This new approach using 
Fama-Macbeth cross-sectional factors in Fama-French time-series 
model testing is supposed to help in choosing the best factor model 
among competing methods of constructing factors in light of different 
methodologies previously developed in asset pricing literature. 
Over the past 50 years, Fama and Macbeth’s (FM 1973) cross-sectional 
regressions have become a standard tool in asset pricing testing that 
link the average stock returns to its characteristics. Much previous 
research has used this methodology in testifying the asset returns and 
verifying asset pricing hypotheses (Fama and French, 2006; Lewellen, 
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2015; and Bessembinder, Cooper and Zhang, 2019). By extending this 
model to allow time-varying factor loadings, Fama and French (2019) 
show the application of the FM approach to a time-series model setting 
for the purpose of assessing performance of different models in 
predicting stock returns. 
Following the FM two-stage approach, the development of asset pricing 
testing is extended to the factor models using a time-series methodology 
that is based on the FM (1973) cross-sectional regression findings that 
asset returns were associated with its characteristics. 
Later development in empirical asset pricing includes the work of Fama 
and French (1992) on the ability of size (i.e., market capitalisation) and 
book-to-market ratio (BM) to explain the variation in average stock 
returns uncaptured by the capital asset pricing model (CAPM) of Sharpe 
(1964) and Lintner (1965), providing grounds for Fama and French 
(1993) to establish the time-series three-factor models to describe stock 
returns. 
The Fama-French (FF) three-factor model was later challenged by the 
evidence of a wide array of anomalies that this model cannot explain. To 
name few, momentum (Jegadeesh and Titman, 1993) and idiosyncratic 
volatility (Ang, Hodrick, Xing, and Zhang, 2006) made it clear that the 
model needs to be modified for a better description of average stock 
returns. In recent years, Fama and French introduced the five-factor 
model in response to the findings of Titman, Wei and Xie (2004), Hou, 
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Xue & Zhang (2015) and Novy-Marx (2013) that profitability and 
investment characteristics hinder FF three-factor models from 
explaining the cross-sectional variation in expected returns. Hou, Xue 
and Zhang (2015) use the q-factor model to show that profitability and 
investment factors outperform the FF three-factor (1993) in explaining 
the returns of a broad list of anomalies. 
The dividend discount model and the valuation theory form the 
conceptual framework for the FF five-factor model (Fama and French, 
2015) to be developed with new variables of profitability and investment 
to be included into the existing FF model with market, size and value 
factors. In the same paper, Fama and French (2015) provide evidence 
that the value factor (i.e., the book-to-market ratio) becomes redundant 
in capturing patterns of average stock returns in the US market. An 
extensive research has been done over the international markets (Fama 
and French, 2017) that confirms the superiority of the FF five-factor 
model. The controversy on the redundancy of the value factor continues 
with the Cakici (2015) findings that the value factor becomes redundant 
in North American, European and global portfolios, but not in the Asia 
Pacific region. The debate has been further extended to the choice of the 
proxy for the profitability factor that would improve the performance of 
the FF five-factor model in explaining the relationship between the time-
series factors and stock expected returns. Ball, Gerakos, Kinnainmaa 
and Nikolaev (2015) suggest to use cash profitability for the profitability 
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factor. Fama and French (2018) provide supporting evidence of the FF 
factor model with cash profitability replacing operating profitability 
which improves the description of average portfolio returns. In the same 
paper, Fama and French document no marginal contribution of the 
value factor to the maximum squared Sharpe ratio (Barillas and 
Shanken, 2017) of the five-factor model’s model. 
Although Fama-Macbeth’s cross-sectional regressions have been used 
recently in asset pricing tests of Fama and French (2006), Lewellen 
(2015), Heaney, Koh and Lan (2016) and Bessembinder, Cooper and 
Zhang (2019), there is a study of Back, Kapadia and Ostdiek (2013, 2015) 
that uses FM constant slopes as factors in time-series regressions. The 
latest study of Fama and French (2019) extends this work by linking the 
cross-sectional factors and their time-varying loadings to the current 
time-series factor models to enhance the description of the expected 
returns of US equities. 
At a regional level, there are some studies that analyze the FF factor 
models in emerging markets. Nartea, Bert and Lee (2011) uses the 
Fama-French three-factor model in the analysis of five markets, namely 
Malaysia, Singapore, Thailand, Indonesia, and the Philippines, to 
discover the relationship between idiosyncratic volatility and stock 
returns in ASEAN markets. Nartea, Wu and Liu (2013) direct academic 
attention to the Chinese stock market featuring distinctive 
characteristics not evident in developed countries when analyzing 
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idiosyncratic volatility. The asset pricing literature for Asian markets 
also includes momentum and information uncertainty as a mispricing 
factor (Cheema and Nartea, 2014), the volatility effect for Hong Kong 
(Nartea, 2013) and South Korean markets (Nartea, 2014) using the FF 
three-factor model.  
No prior empirical investigation is found on factor loadings and the 
application of FM cross-section factors in a time-series model setting for 
a country in Asia. By extending the research on the Vietnamese stock 
market following Chapter 2, this study provides new evidence on the 
time-varying factor loadings from cross-section factors applied to a time-
series model for a country other than the US. This study also extends an 
understanding of different profitability measures in a model under a 
cross-sectional and time-series setting for the Vietnamese stock market. 
There are very limited studies on Vietnam’s equities market. Fang, Wu 
and Nguyen (2017) use the three-factor model when analyzing 
idiosyncratic risk in Vietnam. Batten et al. (2014) analyzes the 
association between liquidity and Vietnamese stock returns in the crisis 
period. None has been published on the time-varying factor loadings in 
a country other than the US; hence, Vietnam is the natural choice of this 
research following Chapter 2. In addition, the explanatory power of the 
FF five-factor model is still under question for further empirical 
verification. There is no research exploring the question of the choice of 
factors in the FF multi-factor models over the traditional models for an 
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emerging market; hence, this work addresses this gap in the literature. 
The question of value redundancy and choice of a profitability measure 
have not been analyzed for any Asian market. 
This study provides new empirical evidence from a developing country 
that the FF factor model (Fama and French, 2019) with time-varying 
loading outperforms the traditional FF factor models that use constant 
regression slopes (Fama and French, 1993, 2015). These findings are 
contrary to Fama and French’s (2019) conclusion about the superiority 
of the time-series factor model with cross-sectional factor returns over 
the same one that uses time-series factors. This work also provides 
evidence that time-varying characteristics used as factor loadings in the 
FF five-factor model significantly improves the description of the 
average stock returns. This study also supports the evidence in Chapter 
2 that operating profitability (Novy-Max, 2013) is still the preferred 
profitability factor in both factor models with cross-sectional and time-
series factors. 
This chapter studies factor models with time-varying factor loadings, 
both with time series factors and cross-sectional factors, for the 
emerging market of Vietnam. It is crucial to test another market to make 
sure the Fama and French (2019) findings on the US stock market are 
applicable to another market regardless of its capital market 
development stage, economic conditions and political system. 
 
 
Chapter 3: Comparing Cross-Section and Time-Series Factor Models in 





This research deals with the following questions: 1) Which factor model 
(with Fama-French time-series factors, or Fama-Macbeth cross-
sectional factors) best describes the return variation of Vietnamese 
equities? 2) Is the factor model sensitive to the choice of factor loadings 
(constant regression slope and prescribed time-varying characteristics)? 
3) Which proxy for a profitability factor  would be best for the new factor 
model with cross-sectional factors (Fama and French, 2019)? 
This study makes two contributions to the current asset pricing 
literature. First, this study analyzes the performance of the asset pricing 
models using factor loadings and provides new evidence about the 
superiority of the time-series factor models with cross-sectional factor 
loadings in an emerging market. The results presented in this chapter 
urge the need of developing market verification of results evident in 
developed countries. Second, the study provides further evidence on the 
controversy regarding the choice of the profitability factor in the 
presence of different approaches of testing the factor models (Fama and 
French, 2006, 2017, 2018; Ball et al., 2015; Hou, Mo, Xue and Zhang, 
2019; Novy-Max, 2013).  
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 
provides a framework of the methodology used in this analysis. Section 
3.3 describes the data, factor design and construction of test portfolios. 
Section 3.4 delivers empirical results on the cross-sectional factor 
models (Fama and French, 2019) as compared with the time-series factor 
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models (Fama and French, 1993, 2015, 2018). Section 3.5 investigates 
different measures for the profitability factor in the cross-sectional 
factor models and verifies the ability of the factor models with cash 
profitability and the ROE profitability proxies in explaining expected 
stock returns in Vietnam. Section 3.6 provides final conclusion on the 
findings. 
3.2 Factor model framework 
3.2.1 Application of the Fama-Macbeth cross-sectional 
approach to the Fama-French time-series regression setting 
In the latest paper of Fama and French (2019), the authors revisit the 
Fama Macbeth (FM hereafter) methodology and argue that FM cross-
section regressions are a type of factor model: 
𝑅𝑝,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑍,𝑡 + 𝑅𝑀𝐶,𝑡𝑀𝐶𝑝,𝑡−1 + 𝑅𝐵𝑀,𝑡𝐵𝑀𝑝,𝑡−1 + 𝑅𝑂𝑃,𝑡𝑂𝑃𝑝,𝑡−1 + 𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑉,𝑡𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑝,𝑡−1 + 𝑝,𝑡,(1) 
where 𝑀𝐶𝑝,𝑡−1 , 𝐵𝑀𝑝,𝑡−1 , 𝑂𝑃𝑝,𝑡−1  and 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑝,𝑡−1  are the predetermined 
portfolio characteristics of market capitalisation, book-to-market value 
and stock growth rate used to construct the factors in month t-1 (Fama 
and French, 1993, 2015, 2019). In FM Model (1), 𝑅𝑝,𝑡 is the returns of 
portfolio p in month t; 𝑅𝑍,𝑡 is the cross-sectional level return of standard 
portfolio Z with equal weight on all portofolio p in month t that is not 
captured by the regression explanatory variables. 
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The slopes 𝑅𝑀𝐶,𝑡, 𝑅𝐵𝑀,𝑡, 𝑅𝑂𝑃,𝑡 and 𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑉,𝑡 are MC, BM, OP and INV portfolio 
returns, respectively, that can be considered as factors. Fama (1976) 
shows that the slopes are actually the returns on each portfolio of the 
left-hand-side (LHS) portfolios with weights for portfolios (that 
determine its monthly t-1 value of the corresponding variable MC, BM, 
OP or INV) to one and zero out each explanatory variable. The slope 
portfolios assume no net investment, i.e., long positions in an LHS 
portfolio are financed by short positions in other LHS portfolios. Thus, 
𝑅𝑍,𝑡 sets the average of the regression’s predicted returns of all portfolios 
p for the month equal to the average of the realized portfolio returns.  
The logic is that Model (1) stacked across time t will allow the FM cross-
section regressions to turn into an asset pricing model for testing in a 
time-series approach. Model (1) can be rewritten as a four-factor model 
to explain the portfolio returns in excess of 𝑅𝑍,𝑡 by rearranging portfolio 
characteristics and factors and shifting 𝑅𝑍,𝑡 to the LHS of the equation: 
𝑅𝑝,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑍,𝑡 = 𝑀𝐶𝑝,𝑡−1𝑅𝑀𝐶,𝑡 + 𝐵𝑀𝑝,𝑡−1𝑅𝐵𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑂𝑃𝑝,𝑡−1𝑅𝑂𝑃,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑝,𝑡−1𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑉,𝑡 + 𝑝,𝑡.(2) 
The slopes 𝑅𝑀𝐶,𝑡, 𝑅𝐵𝑀,𝑡, 𝑅𝑂𝑃,𝑡 and 𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑉,𝑡 in Model (1) become the factors in 
Model (2) and the portfolio characteristics 𝑀𝐶𝑡−1 , 𝐵𝑀𝑡−1 , 𝑂𝑃𝑡−1  and 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑡−1 in Model (1) are the time-varying factor loadings in Model (2). 
This time-series model that uses FM cross-section factor returns will be 
used to compare with FF regressions with time-series factors: 
𝑅𝑝,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝑏𝑝𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝑠𝑝𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑝𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑟𝑝𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝑐𝑝𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝑝,𝑡,     (3) 
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where 𝑅𝑝,𝑡 is the excess returns of portfolio p in month t; 𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡, 𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡, 
𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡  and 𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡  are the factor-mimicking portfolios for size, value, 
profitability and investment, respectively; and 𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡  is the monthly 
excess returns on stock market portfolio (Fama and French, 2015). Given 
the evidence provided in Chapter 2 that the Fama-French five-factor 
model has more explanatory power than the three- and four-factor 
models, this analysis conducts the testing using all five factors of Fama 
and French (2015) for the models11 with both cross-sectional and time-
series factors and different profitability measures for 𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 (Hou, Mo, 
Xue and Zhang, 2019; Fama and French, 2018; Ball, Gerakos, 
Linnainmaa and Nikolaev, 2015; Novy-Max, 2013).  
Although it is seen that the pricing error for portfolio p is the intercept 
𝛼𝑝  in Model (3) and the average value across t of the residual 𝑝,𝑡  in 
Model (2), respectively, the factors in Model (2) are optimized to the 
specified time-varying factor loadings and LHS portfolio returns, i.e., the 
factor loadings that drive month-by-month optimization of the factors in 
Model (1).  In Model (3), however, the constant factor loadings in Model 
(3) are optimized in a time-series regression instead of the factors as in 
Model (2). Hence, there is no necessity to reestimate the factor loadings 
in Model (2) as they adjust themselves when the factors (i.e., portfolio 
characteristics 𝑀𝐶𝑡−1, 𝐵𝑀𝑡−1, 𝑂𝑃𝑡−1 and 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑡−1) change. Therefore, this 
                                                     
11  The findings of Chapter 2 show that the value factor (HML) and operating 
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study does not have the issue of factor loading change through the time 
as highlighted by some studies (Shanken, 1990; Ferson and Harvey, 
1991; Ferson and Schadt, 1996; Jagannathan and Wang, 1996; Fama 
and French, 1997; Avramov and Chordia, 2006). 
Looking at the factors of Model (2), it can be used to construct the 
mimicking portfolios for the Fama-French five-factor model (Fama and 
French, 2015) by considering cross-sectional factors 𝑅𝑀𝐶,𝑡, 𝑅𝐵𝑀,𝑡, 𝑅𝑂𝑃,𝑡 and 
𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑉,𝑡 in Model (2) as the size, value, profitability and investment factors 
in Model (3). In this case, the following time-series regression of the 
Fama-French five-factor model that uses cross-sectional factors 
𝑅𝑀𝐶,𝑡, 𝑅𝐵𝑀,𝑡, 𝑅𝑂𝑃,𝑡 and 𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑉,𝑡 of Model (2) is obtained: 
𝑅𝑝,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 = 𝑏𝑝 + 𝑚𝑝𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝑠𝑝𝑅𝑀𝐶,𝑡 + 𝑣𝑝𝑅𝐵𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑂𝑃,𝑡 + 𝑖𝑝𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑉,𝑡 + 𝑝,𝑡.       (4) 
Although Model (4) will be tested against other models in this Chapter, 
the criticism of this approach by Back, Kapadia and Ostdiek (2013, 2015) 
is that the uniqueness of the time-varying nature of the factor loadings 
in cross-sectional Model (2) for enhancement of the description of 
average stock returns is omitted in Model (4) with constant factor 
loadings. We expect this model to perform worst out of all models under 
analysis since no optimization is achieved in both factors and factor 
loadings. 
By including the assumption that average returns can vary with stock 
size and other characteristics (Fama and French, 1992, 1993, 1997), 
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Model (3) is augmented with interaction variables to allow time-varying 
loadings for the Fama-French five factors: 
𝑅𝑝,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝑏𝑝𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝑠𝑝𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑝𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑟𝑝𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝑐𝑝𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 +
𝑠𝑝2𝑀𝐶𝑝,𝑡−1𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑝2𝐵𝑀𝑝,𝑡−1𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑟𝑝2𝑂𝑃𝑝,𝑡−1𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝑐𝑝2𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑝,𝑡−1𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝑝,𝑡.   (5) 
Recent papers argue that the performance of the models is subject to 
profitability choice. The focus is to investigate model performance with 
different profitability measures used. This study takes further steps to 
investigate the variants of models (1) to (5) with operating profitability 
(Fama and French, 2015, 2017; Novy-Max, 2013) cash profitability 
(Fama and French, 2018; Ball et al., 2015) and ROE profitability (Hou 
et al., 2015, 2019) as proxies for the profitability factor. 
3.2.2 Test metrics 
This study investigates the explanatory power of the cross-sectional 
four-factor model (2) and the five-factor models (3), (4) and (5) on the 
variation of stock returns by looking at the GRS test statistics and its p-
value (Gibbons, Ross and Shanken, 1989), the average value of absolute 
pricing errors, A|𝛼|, the average value of absolute t-statistic for pricing 
errors, A|t( 𝛼 )|, the average squared pricing error over the cross-
sectional variance of the average returns on the test portfolios, A𝛼2/V r̄ , 
the average difference between each squared pricing error and its 
squared standard error divided by the cross-sectional variance of the 
average returns on the test portfolios, Aλ
2
/V r̄  (Fama and French, 2019), 
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the average standard error of pricing errors, As(𝛼), the average standard 
deviation of the residuals, Asd(e), and the maximum squared Sharpe 
ratio for pricing errors, Sh2(𝛼) (Fama and French, 2018; Barillas and 
Shanken, 2017). 
GRS statistic and p-value test whether the regression intercepts (the 
pricing errors) of a model are jointly equal to zero. As Merton (1973) 
suggests, the intercept is indistinguishable from zero if an asset pricing 
model completely captures expected returns. GRS tests can only be 
conducted for the models that have time-series regression intercepts and 
constant factor loadings. Hence, this work uses F-statistic and p-value 
of Hotelling T2 for the models without an intercept and constant factor 
models. Although GRS nor Hotelling T2 tests are useful in comparing 
models with constant factor loadings, this test metrics does not work for 
Model (5) and Model (2) with time-varying factor loadings (Fama and 
French, 2019). Hence, this study applies neither GRS nor Hotelling T2 
for the models of a time-varing factor loading nature.  
This work also provides additional test metrics to judge the performance 
of factor models. The study uses average absolute intercepts, A|𝛼|, as 
one of the main metrics. The model that best describes the variation in 
stock returns across portfolios is the one that provides the lowest value 
of A|𝛼|. The second model assessment approach is to investigate the 
cross-sectional dispersion in average returns missed by a model, A𝛼2/Vr̄ , 
and noise-adjusted Aλ
2
/V r̄ . The low values of these two metrics suggest 
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low intercept dispersion relative to the dispersion of LHS portfolio 
average returns (Fama and French, 2019). The last measures of 
regression fit are the average precision of pricing errors, Ase(𝛼), and the 
average of time-series standard errors of unexplained LHS returns, 
Asd(e), that will assist this chapter in the assessment of the explanatory 
power of the models. 
Unlike GRS and Sh2(𝛼) that show the magnitude of regression intercepts 
that account for covariances, all other test metrics weigh each regression 
equally. This work does not provide the regression adjusted R-squared 
since it cannot be used in Model (2) where the LHS portfolio returns are 
in excess of the standard portfolio returns, RZ. The best model is the one 
that provides the lowest values across the test metrics. 
3.3 Data selection, factor design and portfolio 
construction 
3.3.1 Data 
To be consistent with previous studies on Vietnam asset pricing testing, 
in this analysis the same data as in Chapter 2 are used for consistency 
of test results. The analysis is conducted for all common stocks traded 
on the Hochiminh and Hanoi Stock Exchanges (inclusive of UPCoM) at 
a monthly frequency from August 2007 to July 2015.12 The source of data 
                                                     
12 For UPCoM, stocks prices are available until the end of 2014. 
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is the Datastream database, which includes information on adjusted 
closing prices, trading volume, market-to-book ratios, market 
capitalisation, revenue, administrative expense, interest expense, cost 
of goods sold, total assets and state ownership. An interbank offer rate 
is used as the risk-free rate. 
To avoid stocks with abnormal trading or price errors on Datastream as 
well as reduce the impact of infrequent trading, this study applies the 
same stock screening as in Chapter 2, i.e., all stocks with daily returns 
of more than 50% in absolute terms, monthly returns of more than 200% 
and no return or trading data for the 10 business days will be excluded 
from the sample for the analysis in that specific month.13 Companies 
must also have a valid trade and not have been delisted prior to the 
formation period. Consistent with Fama and French’s (1993, 2015) 
methodology, all stocks with negative book-to-market ratios are 
excluded from the sample and they should have required accounting 
data14 as prescribed by Fama and French (1993, 2015). 
By applying the Fama and French (1993, 2015) methodology, for 
inclusion in a portfolio in July of each year (annual rebalancing) a stock 
must have market equity data for December of the previous year and 
June of the current year; a non-missing (positive) book-to-market ratio 
                                                     
13  Angelides (2010) removes all the stocks that have fewer than five observations 
during a month. 
14 To reduce the noise in computing variables, several stocks that have extreme values 
of book-to-market ratio (higher than 8.0), operating profitability ratio (more than 
100%) and investment ratio (higher than 4.0) are excluded. 
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for December of the previous year; non-missing revenues and at least 
one of the following: cost of goods sold, sales, general and administrative 
expenses, or interest expense at the end of the fiscal year (December) 
ending in the previous year; and total assets data at the end of the fiscal 
year ending in year t-1 and t-2. 
Table 3.1 presents the coverage of stocks used in the sample including 
the total trading value, volume and market capitalisation, over the 
sample period. 15  This table also provides statistics for cash and 
operating profitability measures. On average, this study has 346 
companies over the entire sample period. The average values for BM and 
INV are 1.233 and 0.254, respectively, over all years under analysis. 
Average OP, CP and RP are sitting at 0.067, 0.092 and 0.079, 
respectively. 
3.3.2 Cross-section factor construction 
This research follows the Fama and French (2019) methodology in 
constructing cross-sectional factors (Fama and Macbeth, 1973). 
3.3.2.1 Portfolio characteristics – MC, BM, Profit and INV 
The characteristics are computed on 18 portfolios that make up the 
Fama-French five factors. MC is the natural log of market cap and BM 
                                                     
15  It is important to note that stocks are not removed completely from the entire 
sample. They are omitted for the specific month when they have inadequate trading 
(no return data for the previous 10 consecutive business days or no return data for 
more than 10 business days in total during a month) and included again in the sample 
whenever they satisfy the criteria on trading activities. 
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is the market-to-book ratio. For the Profit measure, three proxies are 
used: operating profitability, cash profitability and ROE profitability. 
Operating profitability (OP) is defined as annual revenues minus cost of 
goods sold, interest expense, and selling, general and administrative 
expenses, all divided by book equity (Fama and French, 2015; Novy-
Marx, 2013) in the models that use OP in the testing. Cash profitability 
(CP) follows Ball et al.’s (2015) definition.  ROE profitability (RP) uses 
Hou, Mo, Xue and Zhang’s (2019) definition. The rate of growth of total 
assets or investment (INV) is the natural log of total assets in year t-2 
over total assets of year t-1. MC and BM are updated monthly, whereas 
Profit and INV are updated annually. All factor portfolios are formed at 
the end of June in each year t in the 2x3 format from the double-sort of 
three stock characteristics: size and value, profitability or investment. 
The portfolio characteristics will be used in deriving the cross-section 
factor returns and Fama-French time-series factors discussed in the 
next part of this section. 
3.3.2.2 Returns on a standard portfolio (Rz) 
RZ extracted from Model (1) and used in Model (2) is the level return on 
a standard portfolio with equal weights on all LHS portfolios. Monthly 
RZ are obtained in a form of intercept of the first-stage cross-sectional 
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3.3.2.3 Returns on size factor, value factor and investment 
factor 
Monthly returns on size factor (RMC), value factor (RBM) and investment 
factor (RINV) are the loadings on MC, BM and INV characteristics, 
respectively, after regressing 18 factor portfolios on a monthly basis 
against the characteristics (MC, BM, Profit, INV) of those portfolios 
using the first-stage of Fama and Macbeth methodology (1973). 
3.3.2.4 Returns on operating, cash and ROE profitability factors 
Similarly, returns on operating profitability factor (ROP), cash 
profitability factor (RCP) and ROE profitability factor (RRP) are extracted 
from loadings on OP, CP and RP after running the first-stage cross-
sectional regressions (Fama and Macbeth, 1973) with each of the profit 
proxies OP, CP or RP. 
Monthly cross-section returns, RMC, RBM, RINV, ROP, RCP and RRP, after 
being extracted from Model (1), will be used as factors in Model (2) and 
Model (4) to compare with other models. 
3.3.3 Time-series factor design 
This study follows the FF methodology in constructing risk factors 
(Fama and French, 1993, 2015) and uses the same dataset as in Chapter 
2. All portfolios are formed in June of year t. 
3.3.3.1 Market factor (MKT) 
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MKT is the monthly average return on a market portfolio of the sample 
stocks in excess of the interbank offer rate in Vietnam. MKT is value-
weighted using market capitalisation as at the end of month t-1. 
3.3.3.2 Size factor (SMB) 
To form a size portfolio in July of year t, stocks are assigned into either 
small or large size portfolios based on the market cap median threshold. 
These two value-weighted portfolios are annually rebalanced. The size 
factor (SMB) is the return difference between the average returns on the 
small firms’ portfolios and the average returns on big firms’ portfolios. 
3.3.3.3 Value factor (HML) 
The book-to-market sort uses the book-to-market ratio for the fiscal year 
ending in calendar year t-1 (at the end of December of t-1) and 
breakpoints at the 30th to 70th percentiles. Annual rebalancing and a 
value-weighted approach are applied to these portfolios. Six portfolios 
are constructed from the intersection of two size and three book-to-
market portfolios. The value factor (HML) is the return difference 
between the high book-to-market portfolios and the low book-to-market 
portfolios.  
3.3.3.4 Operating, cash and ROE profitability factors (RMW, 
RMWC and RMWR) 
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Profitability factor uses accounting data for the fiscal year ending in 
calendar year t-1. Portfolios are formed in June of year t using the 
breakpoints of 30% and 70%. Annual rebalancing and a value-weighted 
approach are applied to these portfolios. Six portfolios are formed from 
the intersection of two size and three profitability portfolios. The RMW 
factor is the return difference between the average returns on the high 
(robust) OP portfolios and the average returns on the low (weak) OP 
portfolios. The RMWC factor is the return difference between the 
average returns on the high (robust) CP portfolios and the average 
returns on the low (weak) CP portfolios. The RMWR factor is the return 
difference between the average returns on the high (robust) RP 
portfolios and the average returns on the low (weak) RP portfolios. In 
order to make the analysis of different profitability factors comparable 
and consistent for the purpose of determining which profitability proxy 
would be best in the FF five-factor model to describe the stock returns, 
one-year-lagged book equity is used to calculate ROE profitability16 and 
conventional double (2x3) sorting on size and RP. 
3.3.3.5 Investment factor (CMA) 
Three value-weighted portfolios are formed using the breakpoints of 30% 
and 70% and annually rebalanced. Six portfolios are constructed from 
                                                     
16 Fama and French’s (2015, 2016, 2017, 2018, 2019) method of one-year-lagged book 
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the intersection of two size and three investment portfolios. The CMA 
factor is the return difference between the average returns on the 
conservative investment portfolios and the average returns on the 
aggressive investment portfolios. 
For the purpose of testing the time-series (TS) versus the cross-section 
(CS) factors in the five-factor models, it is important to use the same 
portfolios (2x3 sorts) to produce TS and CS factors to address the central 
question of whether the optimized CS factors enhances the description 
of stock returns for the test portfolios (three sets of nine double-sorted 
portfolios). 
3.3.4 Left-hand-side (LHS) portfolios 
Three sets of 3x3 portfolios are formed to test the models. All stocks are 
allocated to three different portfolios at the end of December of each year 
based on market capitalisation using breakpoints at the 33rd and 67th 
percentiles. In the second sort, each portfolio is allocated into three 
portfolios based on book-to-market, profitability and investment. The 
average portfolio monthly returns are rebalanced on an annual basis 
and calculated from July of year t+1 using a value-weighted approach. 
Profitability factor uses either OP, CP or RP in the calculations (Fama 
and French, 2018; Novy-Max, 2013; Ball et al., 2015; Hou et al., 2019). 
Table 3.2 presents the summary statistics of all factors. Cross-section 
regressions with different profitability measures (Panels A to C) 
produces three different sets of CS factor returns, unlike the TS factors 
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in Panel D. The results show that the CS factors are arbitrary, consistent 
with Fama and French (2019). 
Panel D of Table 3.2 shows that all factors except TS investment factor 
(CMA) have statistically significant average returns. Panels A to C, 
instead, show a contradicting result with the only statistically important 
factor is CS investment factor (RINV). Consistent with Fama and French 
(2019), the sign of the mean values of TS factor returns (SMB) is opposite 
that of CS factor returns (RMC). The results also show the opposite sign 
for TS RMWR and CS RRP. In contrast to the same study, no difference 
in sign for CMA and RINV is observed; however, there are differences in 
t-statistics for TS and CS factors. This is in line with the later findings 
that a time-series model works better in explaining the variation in stock 
returns. All CS factors’ t-statistics (with the exception of RINV) are 
insignificant regardless of profitability choice. By using RP as the 
profitability factor (Panel C), the t-statistic for the cross-sectional value 
factor return becomes significant at the 5% level. 
The average TS value-weighted monthly market return, MKT (-0.65%) 
is higher than the averages of CS equally weighted monthly level 
returns on a standard portfolio, RZ, of OP, CP and RP versions of Model 
(1) that are -0.76%, -2.92% and -0.75%, respectively. 
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3.4 Empirical results on asset pricing tests 
Table 3.3 examines how well variants of Models (2), (3), (4) and (5) 
explain average returns on 27 portfolios sorted on size (MC) and a 
combination of value, profitability and investment. LHS returns of Panel 
A are in excess of the risk-free rate, Rf, and RHS factors include market 
factor (MKT), i.e., the excess market return Rm – Rf. Panels A1 and A2 
estimate constant factor loadings using ordinary least squares (OLS) 
slopes as specified in Models (3) and (4). 
On all metrics, Model (3) with operating and cash profitability can 
account for more asset pricing anomalies than Model (4) and Model (2) 
with constant factor loadings. Hence, there is no supporting evidence to 
suggest dropping time-series factors from Model (3) and replacing them 
with cross-sectional factors in the case of constant factor loadings. 
Panel A3 shows that Model (5) slightly improves the pricing error 
metrics results when interaction variables are used to include time-
varying factor loadings. However, the less precision of pricing errors of 
Model (5) with Ase(𝛼) of 0.0038 is shown compared with that of Model 
(3) in the range of 0.0034 – 0.0035. In addition, the sampling-error-
adjusted cross-sectional dispersion in average returns missed by a model 
(Aλ
2
/V r̄) is larger for Model (5) that uses cash and ROE profitability 
factors than Model (3) with corresponding factors. Regardless of the 
Ase(𝛼) and Aλ2/V r̄  results, all other test metrics provide a supporting 
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evidence that the time-varying factor loadings systematically improve 
the pricing error performance of time-series factor models. 
Panel B of Table 3.3 depicts summary results on the performance of 
variants of Model (2) where LHS returns are in excess of RZ, the level 
return on a standard portfolio, and RHS factors consist of only cross-
sectional factor returns extracted from Model (1) without the market 
factor (MKT). Panel B1 of Table 3.3 is analogous to Model (4) with 
constant factor OLS slopes but without the MKT factor. Despite Aλ
2
/Vr̄ , 
Ase(𝛼) shows preference for Model (4) with MKT, all other metrics show 
the superiority of the same model without MKT, i.e., Model (2) in Panel 
B1. The test metrics Aλ
2
/V r̄ , Ase(e) and Asd(e) that assess the noise-
adjusted dispersion in average returns missed by a model and the 
precision of pricing errors show that Model (2) is the worst out of all 
models in the analysis; this model using OLS regression slope as factor 
loadings still performs better than Model (4) based on the test metrics 
A|𝛼| and Ae2/V r̄  implying Model (2) in Panel B1 with the returns on a 
standard portfolio can better describe the variation in stock returns 
across portfolios and have less dispersion of pricing errors relative to the 
dispersion of LHS portfolio average returns than Model (4). 
Looking at the comparison between constant OLS slopes and a portfolio’s 
average characteristics for the models that use cross-sectional factors, 
Model (2) in Panel B1 with constant regression slopes outperforms the 
same model with a portfolio’s average characteristics as factor loadings 
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(Model (2) in Panel B2), but it cannot win over Models (2) in Panel B3 
that use time-varying factor loadings.  Hence, similar to the findings on 
the superiority of the factor model with time series factors and their 
time-varying loadings (Panel A3), the performance of the models in 
Panel B significantly improve when the loadings for cross-section factors 
are allowed to be the time-series average values of characteristics of each 
testing portfolio (Panel B3). 
To compare the explanatory power of the models of Panels A and B, the 
relevant test metrics are the cross-sectional average of time-series 
standard deviations of unexplained LHS portfolio returns, Ase(𝛼) in the 
case of Panel A and Ase(e) for Panel B that are equivalent in assessing 
the average precision of pricing errors. In this case, all the models that 
use time-series factors win the competition over their competing models 
with cross-sectional factors for the best model in explaining the variation 
of stock returns in Vietnam. 
Among the two models with time-series factors and LHS returns in 
excess of Rf, Model (5) that allows time-varying characteristic loadings 
for time-series factors dominates all the models on every pricing error 
metric (with the exception of the precision of pricing errors discussed 
above for the comparing purpose of CS and TS factor models). For 
example, the time-series Models (3) and (5) in Panel A1 and A3 of Table 
3.3 that include RMW as the RHS profitability factor and use size-OP 
for 9 out of 27 LHS portfolios should be compared with Models (4) and 
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(2) in Panel A2 and Panel B of Table 3.3 that use size-OP for 9 out of 27 
LHS portfolios and ROP as the RHS profitability factor in the model. The 
average absolute pricing error, A|𝛼|, is 0.0026 and 0.0029 for time-
series Models (5) and (3) in Panels A3 and A1, versus A|e| of 0.0047 and 
0.0042 for the variants of Model (2) in Panels B3 and B1. The dispersion 
of pricing error, A𝛼2/V r̄ , is 0.51 and 0.65 for Models (5) and (3) in Panel 
A, compared with Ae
2
/V r̄ of 0.31 and 0.34 for Model (2) with and without 
time-varying factor loadings in Panels B3 and B1, respectively. The 
measure of dispersion of pricing errors that accounts for covariances, 
Sh
2
(𝛼), is 0.44 and 0.79 for Models (5) and (3), versus Sh2(e) of 0.73 and 
0.88 in the equivalent variants of Models (2). Hence, the conclusion is 
that time-varying loadings add significant value in improving the 
predictions of the average returns of both models with time-series and 
cross-sectional factors, with the former one dominating over all others 
in the analysis. Likewise, the models with cash profitability and ROE 
profitability support this claim. Thus, the superiority of Model (5) is due 
to both its time-series factors and their time-varying characteristics, as 
evident in a significant improvement of pricing error metrics when the 
time-series models with time-series factors and prescribed time-varying 
characteristic loadings are used. 
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 investigating each set of 9 double-sorted portfolios 
also support the findings from Table 3.3. The five-factor model with 
time-varying loadings and time-series factors still outperforms all other 
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models in explaining the expected returns of portfolios, with each sorted 
on size and either book-to-market, profitability or investment. The 
average absolute pricing errors, A|𝛼|, for size-B/M sorted portfolios for 
the models with time-series factors, operating profitability and either 
constant regression slopes or time-varying characteristics as factor 
loadings are 0.003 (Panels A1 and A3 of Table 3.4), as compared with 
A|e| of 0.0054 and 0.0043 for the same models but with cross-sectional 
factors (Panels A1 and A3 of Table 3.5). The dispersion of pricing error, 
A𝛼2/V r̄ , is 1.52 and 1.04 for the same portfolios in the same models, 
versus Ae
2
/V r̄  of 0.0054 and 0.0043 for the same models but with cross-
sectional factors. Sh
2
(𝛼) is 0.13 and 0.10 for Models (3) and (5) in Table 
3.4, versus Sh
2
(e) of 0.16 and 0.007 in Models (2). It is observed that 
when analyzing each set of portfolios, the pricing error metrics improve 
with the inclusion of the time-varying characteristics, but the dispersion 
of pricing errors that account for covariances shows preference to the 
model with cross-sectional factors over the time-series models. A similar 
conclusion is drawn for the other two sets of 9 portfolios sorted on size-
profit and size-investment. 
Table 3.3 shows one anomaly results for the model that uses cash 
profitability and average characteristics as factor loadings. Table 3.5 
shows that such results were routed from the sets of size-CP and size-
investment portfolios (Panels B2 and C2 of Table 3.5) that would provide 
the best description of the average stock returns under the model with 
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cross-sectional factors by the maximum squared Sharpe ratio for 
unexplained returns.  
Overall, Tables 3.4 and 3.5 support Fama-French (2019) on the cross-
section factor model’s superiority. The results for all 27 LHS portfolios 
show that using different profitability measure and different portfolios 
setting would provide different results on the choice of the model with 
cross-sectional or time-series factors. Futher investigation of this matter 
will be discussed in Section 3.5. Despite there being different rankings 
for the model performance in describing stock returns among the sets of 
portfolios, all results consistently show the superiority of the time-
varying factor loadings over the constant loadings. 
3.5 Operating, cash or ROE profitability? 
Fama and French (2018) provide evidence that the five-factor model 
(Fama and French, 2015) is sensitive to the choice of the profitability 
factor. More specifically, the cash profitability suggested by Ball, 
Gerakos, Linnainmaa and Nikolaev (2015) improves the description of 
the average returns for portfolios of different sorts. Cash profitability 
(RMWC) is the cash profits without accruals (i.e., before interest) scaled 
by total assets in the 2x3 portfolios sorted on size and profitability. In 
Model (2) and Model (4) that include different profitability factor, all 
RHS factor returns change as we change profitability proxy. LHS test 
assets also use 3x3 portfolios sorted on size and a combination of value, 
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investment and either operating profitability (Novy-Max, 2013), cash 
profitability (Ball et al., 2015) or ROE profitability (Hou et al., 2019). 
Likewise, Model (2) with ROE profitability (Hou et al., 2019) uses RRP 
and other RHS factor returns that are different from that of the same 
types that use OP or CP. 
Chapter 2 provides an extensive analysis of profitability factors with a 
conclusion that operating profitability outperforms cash and ROE 
profitability in describing stock returns. Table 3.3 provides supporting 
results that operating profitability would provide the best pricing error 
metrics for the models with constant OLS regression slopes and time-
varying characteristics as factor loadings. However, Model (4) that uses 
ROE profitability as a profit measure and average characteristic 
loadings for cross-section factors (Panel A2) and Model (2) that uses cash 
profitability and average characteristic loadings for cross-section factors 
(Panel B2) produce smaller pricing error metrics than the corresponding 
cross-sectional Models (4) and (2) with different profit proxies. 
Tables 3.4 and 3.5 provide further insights on Models (4) and (2) with 
ROE and cash profitability measures discussed above. Panel B2 of Table 
3.4 shows that the set of 9 portfolios sorted on size and ROE profitability 
is the main source for the contradictory results in Table 3.3. The 9 
portfolios sorted on size-investment (Panel C2 of Table 3.4) are 
indifferent between operating and ROE profitability measure. The size-
BM portfolio (Panel A2 of Table 3.4) gives preference for the operating 
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profitability to be included in Model (4) for the description of average 
stock returns. 
Panels A2, B2 and C2 of Table 3.5 show persistent results of strong 
dominance of cash profitability proxies over the two remaining in 
describing stock returns for Model (2) with the constant average 
characteristics as factor loadings in each set of the double-sorted 
portfolios. The findings suggest that for this specific type of model with 
cross-sectional factors and constant average characteristic factor 
loadings, cash profitability is the preferred proxy. 
3.6 Conclusion 
This chapter investigates factor models using both cross-sectional 
factors from Fama-MacBeth’s (1973) approach and time-series factors of 
Fama and French’s (2015) methodology. In contrast to the US market 
(Fama and French, 2019), this study provides evidence that the time-
series factor models have more explanatory power than the cross-section 
factor models. Time-varying loadings that are natural additions to the 
constant slope model (3) are the major source of its superior description 
of average returns. The superiority of Model (5) is due to both its time-
series factors and their time-varying characteristics. Following Fama 
and French’s (2019) discussion on time-varying characteristics, it is 
evident that in the Vietnamese market a portfolio’s monthly 
standardized characteristics anticipate next month’s factor returns, 
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since this study provides evidence that both Fama-French time-series 
factors and portfolios’ time-varying characteristics largely impact the 
pricing error of the models. 
Overall, this study shows the superiority of the five-factor model that 
uses time-series factors in explaining monthly returns of Vietnamese 
equities. The pricing error metrics provide the preference for the model 
with the time-varying nature of factor loadings as the best model 
regardless of the choice for the Fama-Macbeth (1973) approach and 
Fama-French (2015) methodology. The operating profitability (Novy-
Max, 2013) used in the factor models is likely to perform better than 
cash profitability (Ball et al., 2015) and ROE profitability (Hou, Mo, Xue 
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Table 3.1 Sample coverage for the Vietnamese stock market  
 
Co is the number of listed companies during a year. MC is market capitalisation in 
trillions of Vietnamese Dong (VND) as at the end of a year. Value and Volume are 
annual trading value (in trillions of VND) and trading volume (in millions of shares) 
of all stocks. BM and INV are the average book-to-market ratio and the average 
investment ratio per stock, respectively, as defined using Fama-French methodology 
(2015, 2018, 2019). OP, CP and RP are the average value of operating profitability 
ratio, cash profitability ratio and ROE profitability ratio per stock, respectively, using 
Fama and French (2015, 2018, 2019), Ball et al. (2015) and Hou, Mo, Xue and Zhang 
(2019) profitability definition. Data are obtained from Datastream from July 2007 
to August 2015. 
 
 
Year Co Value Volume MC BM INV OP CP RP 
2007 135 267.6 2.610 334.5 0.442 0.689 0.052 0.102 0.157 
2008 189 120.5 5.261 148.3 0.885 0.278 0.056 0.100 0.051 
2009 279 445.9 18.79 371.0 0.928 0.331 0.058 0.088 0.094 
2010 400 408.0 19.12 453.1 0.813 0.342 0.066 0.089 0.100 
2011 421 137.6 11.27 308.9 1.488 0.151 0.071 0.092 0.069 
2012 442 193.2 18.77 383.4 1.879 0.046 0.077 0.090 0.049 
2013 425 229.7 22.09 446.9 1.939 0.069 0.075 0.086 0.049 
2014 460 523.1 40.16 542.2 1.416 0.125 0.078 0.087 0.066 
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Table 3.2 Summary statistics for Fama-French time-series and 
cross-section factors for Vietnamese stocks 
 
Panel A reports the statistics for the monthly factors extracted from the first-stage 
Fama-Macbeth (1973) cross-section regression: 𝑅𝑝,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑍,𝑡 + 𝑅𝑀𝐶,𝑡𝑀𝐶𝑝,𝑡−1 +
𝑅𝐵𝑀,𝑡𝐵𝑀𝑝,𝑡−1 + 𝑅𝑂𝑃,𝑡𝑂𝑃𝑝,𝑡−1 + 𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑉,𝑡𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑝,𝑡−1 + 𝑝,𝑡 .  𝑅𝑍,𝑡  is the intercept, 𝑅𝑀𝐶 , 𝑅𝐵𝑀, 𝑅𝑂𝑃𝑡 
and 𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑉  are the slopes on MC (log of market cap), BM (book-to-market ratio), OP 
(operating profitability) and INV (investment) of the portfolios used to create Fama 
and French (2015) factors. Panels B and C report the statistics similar to Panel A, but 
using CP (cash profitability) in Ball et. al. (2015) and RP (ROE profitability) of Hou 
et. al. (2015, 2019). 
Panel D reports the summary statistics for the Fama-French’s monthly time-series 
factors (Fama and French, 2015) created using an independent sort at the end of June 
of each year. MKT is the difference between the value-weighted return on the market 
portfolio of all sample stocks and the one-month interbank offer rate. The size factor 
(SMB) is the return difference between the average returns on the small firm 
portfolios and the average returns on the big firm portfolios. Six portfolios from the 
intersection of two size and three book-to-market portfolios (SL, SN, SH, BL, BN, 
BH) based on the 30th and 70th percentiles. The book-to-market ratio and market 
equity is updated monthly. The value factor (HML) is the return difference between 
the average returns on the high book-to-market portfolios and the average returns 
on the low book-to-market portfolios. Six portfolios from the intersection of two size 
and three profitability portfolios (SR, SN, SW, BR, BN and BW). Profitability factor 
(RMW) is the return difference between the average returns on the robust 
profitability portfolios and the average returns on the weak profitability portfolios. 
Six portfolios are from the intersection of two size and three investment portfolios 
(SC, SN, SA, BC, BN and BA). Investment factor (CMA) factor is the return 
difference between the average returns on the conservative investment portfolios 
and the average returns on the aggressive investment portfolios. Profitability and 
investment ratios are updated annually. All portfolios are value-weighted. The factor 
returns are calculated as follows (Fama and French, 2015) with S and B denoting 
small- and big-sized portfolios, H, N and L for  high, medium and low B/M, R, N and 
W for robust, medium and weak profitability, and C, N and A for conservative, 
medium and aggressive investment.  Statistics reported are the mean, standard 
deviation (st.dev), t-statistics of the mean, maximum (max), minimum (min), 
skewness and kurtosis. The sample is from September 2008 to July 2015.  
 
 
Panel A: Cross-section factor returns with operating profitability  
 

















RMC -0.0005 0.0184 -0.2594 0.5162 4.0823 -0.0534 0.0550 
RBM 0.0101 0.0643 1.3716 0.5254 3.6323 -0.1324 0.2047 
ROP 0.0044 0.1873 0.2032 -0.3869 3.8930 -0.5769 0.4445 
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Table 3.2 Continued 
 
Panel B: Cross-section factor returns with cash profitability  

















RMC 0.0009 0.0194 0.4009 -0.2895 4.3652 -0.0679 0.0520 
RBM 0.0083 0.0684 1.0585 0.2649 3.6522 -0.1800 0.1985 
RCP 0.0563 0.2669 1.8389 -0.0275 3.6029 -0.7311 0.7152 
RINV 0.0488 0.1663 2.5588 0.2336 3.1936 -0.3524 0.5221 
 
Panel C: Cross-section factor returns with ROE profitability  

















RMC -0.0011 0.0197 -0.5040 0.1727 3.3871 -0.0481 0.0464 
RBM 0.0150 0.0617 2.1241 0.6020 3.6222 -0.1168 0.2090 
RRP 0.0135 0.0778 1.5144 0.3748 5.2418 -0.1854 0.3081 
RINV 0.0679 0.1946 3.0431 1.0212 6.2667 -0.4239 0.8932 
 
 
Panel D: Time-series factor returns  
 

















SMB 0.0038 0.0540 3.3195 0.0002 3.9358 -0.1388 0.1704 
HML 0.0061 0.0464 6.2530 0.9480 5.9929 -0.0978 0.1774 
RMW 0.0034 0.0378 4.2867 -0.1730 5.3969 -0.1249 0.1277 
RMWC 0.0056 0.0392 6.7193 0.1621 4.7832 -0.1041 0.1483 
RMWR -0.0020 0.0389 -2.4811 -0.6992 4.1263 -0.1354 0.0840 














Table 3.3 Explaining excess returns of 27 characteristic portfolios 
Panel A: Summary of intercepts from regressions explaining returns in excess of Rf with five-factor models (3), (4) and (5) 
Model A|𝜶| A|t(𝜶)| A𝜶2/V r̄  Aλ2/V r̄ Ase(𝜶) Asd(e) Sh2(𝜶) GRS p(GRS)  
Panel A1: Model (3) with 27 LHS portfolios using different profitability factors; factor loadings are constant regression slopes 
 
(3) MKT, SMB, HML, RMW, CMA 0.0029 0.7837 0.6524 0.6083 0.0035 0.0301 0.7944 1.4003 0.1484   
(3) MKT, SMB, HML, RMWC, CMA 0.0034 1.0040 0.7134 0.5106 0.0034 0.0293 0.7910 1.4079 0.1446   
(3) MKT, SMB, HML, RMWR, CMA 0.0031 0.8705 0.6922 0.6069 0.0034 0.0298 0.9048 1.6480 0.0618   
Panel A2: Model (4) with 27 LHS portfolios using different profitability measures; factor loadings are constant regression slopes 
 
(4) MKT, RMC, RBM, ROP, RINV 0.0059 0.8586 2.2349 1.324 0.0065 0.0516 1.0279 1.5091 0.1103   
(4) MKT, RMC, RBM, RCP, RINV 0.0076 1.0832 3.6806 2.3202 0.0065 0.0514 1.0155 1.4584 0.1304   
(4) MKT, RMC, RBM, RRP, RINV 0.0057 0.8121 2.1608 1.5014 0.0067 0.0514 0.8717 1.1652 0.3195   
Panel A3: Model (5) with 27 LHS portfolios using different profitability proxies; factor loadings vary with characteristics 
(5) MKT, SMB, HML, RMW, CMA 0.0026 0.6920 0.5071 0.5697 0.0038 0.0284 0.4357    
(5) MKT, SMB, HML, RMWC, CMA 0.0024 0.6343 0.4462 0.5307 0.0038 0.0277 0.5291    








  Table 3.3 Continued 
Panel B: Summary of average errors, explaining returns in excess of RZ with four-factor model (2) 
Model A|e| A|t(e)| Ae2/V r̄  Aλ2/V r̄ Ase(e) Asd(e) Sh2(e) T2 p(T2)  
Panel B1: Model (2) with 27 LHS portfolios using different profitability measures; factor loadings are constant regression slopes 
(2) RMC, RBM, ROP, RINV 0.0047 0.3356 1.4041 6.5563 0.0136 0.1029 0.8757 1.3183 0.2022   
(2) RMC, RBM, RCP, RINV 0.0053 0.3680 1.7333 6.9436 0.0141 0.1131 0.8720 1.2925 0.2190   
(2) RMC, RBM, RRP, RINV 0.0067 0.4428 2.7979 6.5304 0.0146 0.1128 0.7199 0.9915 0.4983   
Panel B2: Model (2) with 27 LHS portfolios using different profitability measures; factor loadings are average characteristic 
(2) RMC, RBM, ROP, RINV 0.0062 0.4481 2.1830 6.7277 0.0141 0.1233 0.8816 4.3011 0.0382  
(2) RMC, RBM, RCP, RINV 0.0044  0.3257 1.1707 7.7017 0.0141 0.1230 0.8770 0.8318 0.3619  
(2) RMC, RBM, RRP, RINV 0.0069 0.5036 2.7315 6.3557 0.0140 0.1220 0.7996 5.9393 0.0149  
Panel B3: Model (2) with 27 LHS portfolios using different profitability measures; factor loadings are time-varying characteristics 
(2) RMC, RBM, ROP, RINV 0.0042 0.3067 1.0496 8.0150 0.0142 0.1234 0.7314 1.4069 0.2357  
(2) RMC, RBM, RCP, RINV      0.0047 0.3403 1.3028 7.9255 0.0144 0.1243 0.5532 1.8969 0.1686  
(2) RMC, RBM, RRP, RINV  0.0049 0.3495 1.5257 7.7561 0.0143 0.1239 0.6665 2.5889 0.1078  
The tests use 27 left-hand-side (LHS) portfolios from independent 3x3 sorts on MC, BM, Profit, INV. For profitability factors, OP (operating 
profitability), CP (cash profitability) or RP (ROE profitability) are used in each panel. Panel A provides the results for regressions that include 
MKT (the market factor) and explain the excess returns of 27 portfolios sorted on size (MC) and a combination of BM, Profit and INV. The sample 
is from September 2008 to July 2015. 
Panel A1 uses time-series factors (Fama and French, 2015) with different profitability proxies (Fama and French, 2019; Bal et al., 2015; Hou et al., 
2019).  Panel A2 uses cross-sectional regression intercepts and coefficients as factor returns from variants of Model (1): 𝑅𝑝,𝑡 = 𝑅𝑍,𝑡 + 𝑅𝑀𝐶,𝑡𝑀𝐶𝑝,𝑡−1 +
𝑅𝐵𝑀,𝑡𝐵𝑀𝑝,𝑡−1 + 𝑅𝑂𝑃,𝑡𝑂𝑃𝑝,𝑡−1 + 𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑉,𝑡𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑝,𝑡−1 + 𝑝,𝑡. Panel A3 summarizes the estimates for Model (5) that combines time-varying loadings in the time-
series factors of Model (3).  
Panel B reports the results for the variants of Model (2) in which LHS returns are in excess of 𝑅𝑍,𝑡. Right-hand-side (RHS) factors are extracted 
from the variants of Model (1) coefficients similar to 𝑅𝑍,𝑡. Panel B3 provides the model results from the prescribed portfolio (size, value, profitability 








value of the time-varying characteristics. Panel B1 summarizes the results using OLS (with an intercept) regression slopes as factor loadings. 
The metrics for Panel A are A|𝛼| and A|t(𝛼)|, the average absolute intercept and the average absolute t-statistic for the intercepts; A𝛼2/V r̄, the 
average squared intercept over the cross-section variance of the average returns on the LHS portfolios, r̄; Aλ2/V r̄, the average difference between 
each squared intercept and its squared standard error, s
2
(𝛼), over the cross-section variance of the average returns on the LHS portfolios, r̄; Ase(𝛼), 
the average standard error of the intercepts; Asd(𝛼), the average standard deviation of the residuals; Sh2 (𝛼), the maximum squared Sharpe ratio 
for the intercepts for 27 LHS portfolios; the GRS statistic (Gibbons, Ross and Shanken, 1989) and the p-value of GRS. The metrics for Panels B2 
and B3 are analogous to those in Panel A, with the exception of mean residual e replacing regression intercept α as an average model (or pricing) 
error and GRS statistic is replaced with F-statistic of the Hotelling T2. The metrics for Panel B1 is identical for Panel A. 
 
Model (2): 𝑅𝑝,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑍,𝑡 = 𝑀𝐶𝑝,𝑡−1𝑅𝑀𝐶,𝑡 + 𝐵𝑀𝑝,𝑡−1𝑅𝐵𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑂𝑃𝑝,𝑡−1𝑅𝑂𝑃,𝑡 + 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑝,𝑡−1𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑉,𝑡 + 𝑝,𝑡. 
Model (3): 𝑅𝑝,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝑏𝑝𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝑠𝑝𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑝𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑟𝑝𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝑐𝑝𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝑝,𝑡. 
Model (4): 𝑅𝑝,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 = 𝑏𝑝 + 𝑚𝑝𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝑠𝑝𝑅𝑀𝐶,𝑡 + 𝑣𝑝𝑅𝐵𝑀,𝑡 + 𝑝𝑝𝑅𝑂𝑃,𝑡 + 𝑖𝑝𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑉,𝑡 + 𝑝,𝑡. 
Model (5): 𝑅𝑝,𝑡 − 𝑅𝑓,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑝 + 𝑏𝑝𝑀𝐾𝑇𝑡 + 𝑠𝑝𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑝𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑟𝑝𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 + 𝑐𝑝𝐶𝑀𝐴𝑡 + 𝑠𝑝2𝑀𝐶𝑝,𝑡−1𝑆𝑀𝐵𝑡 + ℎ𝑝2𝐵𝑀𝑝,𝑡−1𝐻𝑀𝐿𝑡 + 𝑟𝑝2𝑂𝑃𝑝,𝑡−1𝑅𝑀𝑊𝑡 +








Table 3.4 Explaining returns of each set of characteristic portfolios in excess of Rf 
Panel A explains the excess returns of 9 portfolios from the independent size-BM sort and provides the results for regressions that include MKT 
(the market factor). Panel A1 uses time-series factors (Fama and French, 2015) with different profitability proxies (Fama and French, 2019; Ball et 
al., 2015; Hou et al., 2019).  Panel A2 uses cross-sectional regression intercepts and coefficients as factor returns from variants of Model (1): 𝑅𝑝,𝑡 =
𝑅𝑍,𝑡 + 𝑅𝑀𝐶,𝑡𝑀𝐶𝑝,𝑡−1 + 𝑅𝐵𝑀,𝑡𝐵𝑀𝑝,𝑡−1 + 𝑅𝑂𝑃,𝑡𝑂𝑃𝑝,𝑡−1 + 𝑅𝐼𝑁𝑉,𝑡𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑝,𝑡−1 + 𝑝,𝑡. Panel A3 summarizes the estimates for Model (5) that combines time-varying 
loadings in the time-series factors of Model (3).  
Panels B and C are analogous to Panel A, with the former having size-profit sort and the latter size-investment sort. For profit measure, OP 
(operating profitability), CP (cash profitability) or RP (ROE profitability) are used. The sample is from September 2008 to July 2015. 
The metrics for Panel A are A|𝛼| and A|t(𝛼)|, the average absolute intercept and the average absolute t-statistic for the intercepts; A𝛼2/V r̄, the 
average squared intercept over the cross-section variance of the average returns on the LHS portfolios, r̄; Aλ2/V r̄, the average difference between 
each squared intercept and its squared standard error, s
2
(𝛼), over the cross-section variance of the average returns on the LHS portfolios, r̄; Ase(𝛼), 
the average standard error of the intercepts; Asd(e), the average standard deviation of the residuals; Sh2 (𝛼), the maximum squared Sharpe ratio 
for the intercepts for the set of LHS portfolios; the GRS statistic (Gibbons, Ross and Shanken, 1989) and the p-value of GRS. 
 Panel A: Summary of intercepts from regressions explaining returns of size-BM portfolios in excess of Rf with five-factor models 
(3), (4) and (5) 
Model A|𝜶| A|t(𝜶)| A𝜶2/V r̄  Aλ2/V r̄ Ase(𝜶) Asd(e) Sh2(𝜶) GRS p(GRS)  
Panel A1: Model (3) with 9 LHS size-BM portfolios using different profitability factors; factor loadings are constant regression slopes  
(3) MKT, SMB, HML, RMW, CMA 0.0030 0.7750 0.7823 0.7451 0.0034 0.0293 0.1280 0.9157 0.5170   
(3) MKT, SMB, HML, RMWC, CMA 0.0036 1.0840 0.6764 0.3203 0.0032 0.0276 0.1440 1.0402 0.4178   
(3) MKT, SMB, HML, RMWR, CMA 0.0032 0.8801 0.7205 0.5354 0.0033 0.0282 0.1376 1.0175 0.4350   
Panel A2: Model (4) with 9 LHS size-BM portfolios using different profitability measures; factor loadings are constant regression slopes 
 
(4) MKT, RMC, RBM, ROP, RINV 0.0066 1.0149 2.4017 1.3352 0.0065 0.0515 0.1787 1.1093 0.3698   
(4) MKT, RMC, RBM, RCP, RINV 0.0083 1.2511 3.8515 2.4115 0.0065 0.0512 0.2124 1.2897 0.2607   
(4) MKT, RMC, RBM, RRP, RINV 0.0066 0.9843 2.4067 1.5565 0.0067 0.0512 0.2328 1.3153 0.2475   
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Model A|𝜶| A|t(𝜶)| A𝜶2/V r̄  Aλ2/V r̄ Ase(𝜶) Asd(e) Sh2(𝜶) GRS p(GRS)  
Panel A3: Model (5) with 9 LHS size-BM portfolios using different profitability proxies; factor loadings vary with characteristics 
(5) MKT, SMB, HML, RMW, CMA 0.0030 0.7555 0.6852 0.6608 0.0037 0.0278 0.0988    
(5) MKT, SMB, HML, RMWC, CMA 0.0029 0.7743 0.5012 0.3257 0.0035 0.0264 0.1127    
(5) MKT, SMB, HML, RMWR, CMA 0.0027 0.7093 0.5774 0.5666 0.0035 0.0270 0.1158    
Panel B: Summary of intercepts from regressions explaining returns of size-profit portfolios in excess of Rf with five-factor models 
(3), (4) and (5) 
Model A|𝜶| A|t(𝜶)| A𝜶2/V r̄  Aλ2/V r̄ Ase(𝜶) Asd(e) Sh2(𝜶) GRS p(GRS)  
Panel B1: Model (3) with 9 LHS size-profit portfolios using different profitability factors; factor loadings are constant regression slopes  
(3) MKT, SMB, HML, RMW, CMA 0.0031 0.8707 0.6667 0.5162 0.0035 0.0295 0.1434 1.0259 0.4286   
(3) MKT, SMB, HML, RMWC, CMA 0.0033 1.0104 0.7459 0.5882 0.0035 0.0299 0.1694 1.2241 0.2949   
(3) MKT, SMB, HML, RMWR, CMA 0.0030 0.8986 0.6779 0.6452 0.0035 0.0305 0.1785 1.3194 0.2431   
Panel B2: Model (4) with 9 LHS size-profit portfolios using different profitability measures; factor loadings are constant regression slopes 
 
(4) MKT, RMC, RBM, ROP, RINV 0.0051 0.7128 2.0130 1.1875 0.0064 0.0512 0.1421 0.8819 0.5462   
(4) MKT, RMC, RBM, RCP, RINV 0.0068 0.9235 3.5657 2.4397 0.0065 0.0510 0.2003 1.2161 0.3018   
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Model A|𝜶| A|t(𝜶)| A𝜶2/V r̄  Aλ2/V r̄ Ase(𝜶) Asd(e) Sh2(𝜶) GRS p(GRS)  
Panel B3: Model (5) with 9 LHS size-profit portfolios using different profitability proxies; factor loadings vary with characteristics 
(5) MKT, SMB, HML, RMW, CMA 0.0030 0.8062 0.5155 0.3593 0.0037 0.0283 0.1387    
(5) MKT, SMB, HML, RMWC, CMA 0.0028 0.7862 0.4575 0.4275 0.0038 0.0284 0.1153    
(5) MKT, SMB, HML, RMWR, CMA 0.0026 0.7086 0.4010 0.3777 0.0038 0.0287 0.1133    
Panel C: Summary of intercepts from regressions explaining returns of size-investment portfolios in excess of Rf with five-
factor models (3), (4) and (5) 
 
Model A|𝜶| A|t(𝜶)| A𝜶2/V r̄  Aλ2/V r̄ Ase(𝜶) Asd(e) Sh2(𝜶) GRS p(GRS)  
Panel C1: Model (3) with 9 LHS size-inv portfolios using different profitability factors; factor loadings are constant regression slopes 
 
(3) MKT, SMB, HML, RMW, CMA 0.0026 0.7054 0.4136 0.4540 0.0037 0.0314 0.1089 0.7789 0.6363   
(3) MKT, SMB, HML, RMWC, CMA 0.0032 0.9176 0.5951 0.5264 0.0036 0.0305 0.1508 1.0895 0.3819   
(3) MKT, SMB, HML, RMWR, CMA 0.0029 0.8327 0.5572 0.5328 0.0036 0.0308 0.1537 1.1361 0.3500   
Panel C2: Model (4) with 9 LHS size-inv portfolios using different profitability measures; factor loadings are constant regression slopes 
 
(4) MKT, RMC, RBM, ROP, RINV 0.0059 0.8479 1.8692 1.1874 0.0065 0.0521 0.1442 0.8947 0.5354   
(4) MKT, RMC, RBM, RCP, RINV 0.0077 1.0750 2.9745 1.7406 0.0066 0.0519 0.1622 0.9846 0.4618   
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Model A|𝜶| A|t(𝜶)| A𝜶2/V r̄  Aλ2/V r̄ Ase(𝜶) Asd(e) Sh2(𝜶) GRS p(GRS)  
Panel C3: Model (5) with 9 LHS size-inv portfolios using different profitability proxies; factor loadings vary with characteristics 
(5) MKT, SMB, HML, RMW, CMA 0.0020 0.5143 0.2566 0.5535 0.0040 0.0293 0.0942    
(5) MKT, SMB, HML, RMWC, CMA 0.0025 0.6741 0.3742 0.4825 0.0038 0.0282 0.1461    










Table 3.5 Explaining returns of each set of characteristic portfolios in excess of Rz 
Panel A reports the results for the variants of Model (2) in which 9 LHS size-BM returns are in excess of 𝑅𝑍,𝑡. Right-hand-side (RHS) factors are 
extracted from the variants of Model (1) coefficients similar to 𝑅𝑍,𝑡. Panel A3 provides the model results from the prescribed portfolio (size, value, 
profitability and investment) characteristics as time-varying factor loadings. Panel A2 provides the results where factor loadings are the time-
series average values of the time-varying characteristics. Panel A1 summarizes the results using OLS (with an intercept) regression slopes as 
factor loadings. 
Panels B and C are analogous to Panel A, with the former having size-profit sort and the latter size-investment sort. For profit measure, OP 
(operating profitability), CP (cash profitability) or RP (ROE profitability) are used. The sample is from September 2008 to July 2015. 
The metrics for Panel A are A|e| and A|t(e)|, the average absolute value of the model’s average residuals and the average absolute t-statistic for 
the model’s average residuals; Ae2/V r̄, the cross-section average value of the squared time-series mean residual over the cross-section variance 
of the average returns on the LHS portfolios, r̄; Aλ2/V r̄, the average difference between each squared time-series mean residual and its squared 
standard error, s
2
(e), over the cross-section variance of the average returns on the LHS portfolios, r̄; Ase(e), the average residual standard error; 
Asd(e), the average residual standard deviation; Sh2(e), the maximum squared Sharpe ratio for the residuals for the set of LHS portfolios; the 
Hotelling T2 F-statistic. The exception is Panels A1, B1 and C1 where running regressions with intercept α replacing mean residual e as an 
average model (or pricing) error and F-statistic of the Hotelling T2 is replaced with GRS statistic.  
 
  Panel A: Summary of average errors, explaining returns of size-BM portfolios in excess of RZ with four-factor model (2) 
Model A|e| A|t(e)| Ae2/V r̄  Aλ2/V r̄ Ase(e) Asd(e) Sh2(e) T2 p(T2)  
Panel A1: Model (2) with 9 LHS size-BM portfolios using different profitability measures; factor loadings are constant regression slopes 
(2) RMC, RBM, ROP, RINV 0.0054 0.3900 1.5203 6.0719 0.0136 0.1098 0.1590 1.0053 0.4454   
(2) RMC, RBM, RCP, RINV 0.0057 0.3976 1.7639 6.5105 0.0142 0.1137 0.1928 1.2004 0.3108   
(2) RMC, RBM, RRP, RINV 0.0075 0.4985 3.1783 5.7837 0.0147 0.1135 0.2097 1.2129 0.3033   
Panel A2: Model (2) with 9 LHS size-BM portfolios using different profitability measures; factor loadings are average characteristic 
(2) RMC, RBM, ROP, RINV 0.0061  0.4423 2.0426 6.5404 0.0143 0.1245 0.1605 1.2344 0.2669  
(2) RMC, RBM, RCP, RINV  0.0040 0.2975 1.0919 7.4546 0.0142  0.1241 0.1648 0.1498 0.6988  
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Model A|e| A|t(e)| Ae2/V r̄  Aλ2/V r̄ Ase(e) Asd(e) Sh2(e) T2 p(T2)  
(2) RMC, RBM, ROP, RINV 0.0043 0.3099 1.0364 7.6509 0.0143 0.1242 0.0749 0.3771 0.5394 
 
(2) RMC, RBM, RCP, RINV  0.0048  0.3440 1.1815  7.6630 0.0145  0.1252 0.0884 0.4908 0.4838  
(2) RMC, RBM, RRP, RINV  0.0042 0.2970 1.0354 7.7190 0.0144 0.1247 0.0350 0.6691 0.4136  
Panel B: Summary of average errors, explaining returns of size-profit portfolios in excess of RZ with four-factor model (2) 
Model A|e| A|t(e)| Ae2/V r̄  Aλ2/V r̄ Ase(e) Asd(e) Sh2(e) T2 p(T2)  
Panel B1: Model (2) with 9 LHS size-profit portfolios using different profitability measures; factor loadings are constant regression slopes 
(2) RMC, RBM, ROP, RINV 0.0039 0.2742 1.2088 7.7404 0.0136 0.1092 0.0860 0.5435 0.8372   
(2) RMC, RBM, RCP, RINV 0.0047 0.3274 1.6085 8.1573 0.0142 0.1132 0.1335 0.8309 0.5903   
(2) RMC, RBM, RRP, RINV 0.0061 0.3939 2.5747 7.8734 0.0147 0.1129 0.0984 0.5690 0.8173   
Panel B2: Model (2) with 9 LHS size-profit portfolios using different profitability measures; factor loadings are average characteristic 
(2) RMC, RBM, ROP, RINV         0.0059 0.4263 2.1845 7.3562 0.0142 0.1240 0.0958 1.5418 0.2148  
(2) RMC, RBM, RCP, RINV 0.0046 0.3386 1.2756 8.1980 0.0142 0.1234 0.1053 0.3955 0.5297  
(2) RMC, RBM, RRP, RINV 0.0072 0.5290 3.2182 7.0058 0.0140 0.1222 0.1571 2.3519 0.1256  
Panel B3: Model (2) with 9 LHS size-profit portfolios using different profitability measures; factor loadings are time-varying characteristics 
(2) RMC, RBM, ROP, RINV 0.0038 0.2748 0.9170 8.8203 0.0143 0.1242 0.0379 0.5819 0.4458  
(2) RMC, RBM, RCP, RINV      0.0050 0.3645 1.5671 8.3372 0.0144 0.1249 0.0749 0.8320 0.3620  










 Table 3.5 Continued 
 Panel C: Summary of average errors, explaining returns of size-investment portfolios in excess of RZ with four-factor model (2) 
 Model A|e| A|t(e)| Ae2/V r̄  Aλ2/V r̄ Ase(e) Asd(e) Sh2(e) T2 p(T2)  
Panel C1: Model (2) with 9 LHS size-inv portfolios using different profitability measures; factor loadings are constant regression slopes 
(2) RMC, RBM, ROP, RINV 0.0048 0.3427 1.2071 5.0227 0.0135 0.1085 0.1381 0.8731 0.5538   
(2) RMC, RBM, RCP, RINV 0.0053 0.3791 1.5027 5.2833 0.0141 0.1123 0.1702 1.0593 0.4048   
(2) RMC, RBM, RRP, RINV 0.0067 0.4361 2.1645 5.1089 0.0146 0.1121 0.1396 0.8078 0.6107   
Panel C2: Model (2) with 9 LHS size-inv portfolios using different profitability measures; factor loadings are average characteristic 
(2) RMC, RBM, ROP, RINV      0.0065 0.4794 1.9205 5.2215 0.0139 0.1215 0.1773 1.5350 0.2158  
(2) RMC, RBM, RCP, RINV 0.0046 0.3409 0.9522 6.1790 0.0139 0.1214 0.1564 0.3186 0.5726  
(2) RMC, RBM, RRP, RINV 0.0070 0.5234 2.2468 4.7608 0.0138 0.1204 0.1723 1.9446 0.1636  
Panel C3: Model (2) with 9 LHS size-inv portfolios using different profitability measures; factor loadings are time-varying characteristics 
(2) RMC, RBM, ROP, RINV 0.0046 0.3355 0.9796 6.2997 0.0141 0.1218 0.1143 0.4576 0.4990  
(2) RMC, RBM, RCP, RINV     0.0043 0.3125 0.9746 6.4424 0.0142  0.1228 0.1089 0.5951 0.4407  











HOW DO FIRMS DERIVE VALUE FROM 
POLITICAL CONNECTEDNESS? 




Firms in emerging market contexts have shown a rising level of 
competitive advantage by making substantial efforts in entrepreneurial 
and innovation activities (e.g., Chung & Tan, 2017; Kothari et al., 2013; 
Yiu & Liu, 2008). It is, therefore, not suprising that a sizable literature 
has built theoretical and empirical analyzes to better understand a set 
of factors that may affect a firm’s innovation and performance. Among 
these factors, a firm’s political connectedness with government plays a 
greater role in the firm’s innovation and value creation (e.g., Cull, Li, 
Sun & Xu, 2015; Halford & Li, 2019; Li, Xia & Zajac, 2018; Tihanyi, 
Aguilera, Heugens, van Essen, Sauerwald, Duran & Turturea, 2019), 
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defined as the extent to which and how firms have relationships with 
the government (e.g., Ridge, Ingram & Hill, 2017).  
While recognizing the important role of political connectedness in 
explaining firm innovation and performance outcomes’ value, the 
debates about the actual benefits and costs that political connectedness 
would bring to the firm are still inconclusive (e.g., Chen, Li, Luo & Zhang, 
2017; Yan & Chang, 2018). On the one hand, a body of research has 
shown that political connectedness had a greater influence in facilitaitng 
innovation (e.g., Acquaah, 2012) and generated positive outcomes for the 
firms, such as higher firm performance (e.g., Ridge et al., 2017), easier 
access to regulatory resources (Boubakri et al., 2012; Liu et al., 2013), 
the privilege over non-connected competitors and solutions for some 
organizational problems, e.g., corporate bailout (Facio and Hsu, 2016) 
and ligitation risk (Ning, Mao and Yuan, 2019). In contrast, another 
strand of academics argues that the value-enhancing impact of political 
connectedness on innovation and performance might be eliminated by 
the costs associated with rent-seeking activities (e.g., Fisman, 2001; 
Johhson and Mitton, 2003; Kotabe et al., 2011; Liedong & Raiwani, 2018; 
Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). While government can offer subsidies to 
firms with stronger links to politicians, it will require firms to fulfill the 
needs of pursuing social policy goals (Aggarwal, Meschke and Wang, 
2007; Faccio, 2006; Ferguson and Voth, 2008; Goldman, Rochol and So, 
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inconsistent findings suggest a need for more research to develop an 
understanding of how and the extent to which political connectedness 
contributes to a firm’s value creation. This study attempts to add to 
corporate finance literature with extensive examination of the 
performance outcomes of political connectedness and analyzing the 
effectiveness of different types of political connectedness through 
innovation and capital allocation mechanisms.  
This research addresses this issue by answering three questions. First, 
how does political connectedness affect innovation? Second, does 
political connectedness help understand the efficiency of capital 
allocation? Third, what are the performance outcomes of political 
connectedness? Specifically, political connectedness is distinguished 
between formal and informal relationships with the government. Formal 
political connectedness refers to a relationship with the government that 
is established through CEO appointment by government and/or state 
ownership, while informal political connectedness is about the 
relationship established through connections with government officials. 
This study then argues that formal political connectedness and informal 
political connectedness have different influences on a firm’s innovation, 
capitial allocation and performance.   
Innovation is the most important driving force of a firm’s competitive 
advantage. This study introduces a comprehensive index for innovation 
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onshore and offshore, new products/services and new business lines, 
introduction of new management techniques, establishment of new 
production quality controls, information access to innovative products 
and innovation performance. 
Moreover, capital allocation is at the core of the firm’s resource 
allocation and is considered to be efficient when capital flows to its most 
highly valued use (Kothari, Ramanna and Skinner, 2010). Although the 
topic of resource allocation has been extensively explored in the past, 
researchers have had challenges in developing methodologies to 
measure unobservable capital investment efficiency. Furthermore, the 
relationship between political connectedness, and capital allocation has 
commonly been neglected. Investigating the magnitude of the political 
influence on investment efficiency is more notable in emerging markets 
like China, where key resources are controlled by the state (Li, Meng, 
Wang and Zhou, 2008) and businesses seek ways to establish their 
connections with government (Jiang and Kim, 2015; Lin, Tan, Zhao and 
Karim, 2015). This chapter introduces a measure derived from 
innovation that can better capture capital allocation efficiency than the 
existing proxies in current literature. 
The survey from the World Bank comprising over 2400 Chinese 
companies from 84 industries is chosen for this research. China offers a 
natural setting for this study to investigate the dynamics of political 
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performance. First, it would be of paramount academic interest to 
examine an impressive economic phenomenon of any economy in history, 
given the fast and robust pace of China’s development as seen in its GDP 
growth and export values (Figures 1 and 2). The phenomenon poses the 
question of whether this robust growth is achieved from higher 
acceptance of risk and whether this growth is sustainable. In addition, 
the uniqueness of the institutional environment of China, with 
coexistence of SOEs and non-SOEs would provide further information 
on how a firm’s characteristics shape the short-, mid- and long-term risk 
attitude and tolerance as represented by leverage level, innovation 
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Figure 4.2: Exports of China 
Second, China has gone through various market reforms since 1978, 
with the government continuously and deeply involved in capital 
allocation. Over the past 40 years, China has opened up trade routes and 
investment flows through a series of economic reforms, resulting in a 
better quality of life for hundreds of millions of Chinese people. 
Third, China is a transitional economy characterized by a less stringent 
legal infrastructure featuring weaker copyright protections and more 
fierce market competition. However, in recent years, China has 
introduced many policies to facilitate corporate innovation abilities and 
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presence through innovation success. Hence, many businesses are 
incentivized to gain and maintain access to the government for 
innovation subsidies and privileges. This study provides important 
implications for policy makers to improve market-oriented innovation 
mechanisms through different channels of government interference with 
firms that lead to more successful outcomes for corporate innovation in 
China. 
The remainder of the chapter is organized as follows. Section 4.2 
provides a review of current literature and explains the hypothesis. 
Section 4.3 describes data and methodology. Section 4.4 reports the 
empirical results on the relationship between political ties and the 
quality of investment opportunities and discusses the implications of 
political connectedness on firm performance, including innovation. 
Section 4.5 concludes the findings. 
4.2 Literature review and hypothesis development 
Under the perfect capital market hypothesis, neither CEO 
characteristics nor company ties with government should affect 
corporate decision-making or risk-taking behavior. By analyzing the 
political connectedness of a firm with corporate performance measures, 
it is possible to see how the former facilitates or harms company 
performance and the value that political intervention brings into the 
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Theories developed in political economy have arrived at three main 
streams of bureaucratic relationship with businesses. The government 
plays an active role in facilitating the growth of businesses in the 
“helping hand” model, also known as the classical developmental state 
model in political science (Zheng, Singh, and Mitchel, 2015; Infante and 
Piazza, 2014; Cleassens, Feijen and Laeven, 2008; Correia, 2014; Firth, 
2011; Fisman, 2001; Brockman, Rui and Zou, 2013; and Stigliz, 1989). 
In the “grabbing hand” hypothesis, bureaucrats maximize overall 
political rent at the cost of firms’ growth and economic development 
(Frye and Shleifer, 1997; Shleifer and Vishny, 2002; Stulz, 2005; Carpio, 
Faccio and McConnell, 2013; Frye and Zhuravskaya, 2000; Evans, 1995; 
Pei, 2006; Shleifer and Vishny, 1993; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994). The 
“invisible hand” theory dictates that the government avoids intervening 
in the market (Sachs, 1994). More recent literature provides empirical 
evidence of the mixture of these models. The phenomenon of “dual 
incentives” of government to both facilitate business growth and extract 
short-term gains from firms has most recently attracted academics. 
Thus, with the increasing complication of the relationship between 
governments and firms through time, it is unlikely that a country would 
follow a purely helping- or grabbing-hand model. 
It is commonly agreed that firms gain from a helping-hand government 
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“dual” scenarios involving multiple actions that combine some rent-
seeking behavior with developmental support are yet to be explored.  
To evaluate how government affects businesses, this work is more 
inclined towards the “exchange of favors” hypothesis (Facio & Hsu, 2016) 
from behavioral finance, similar to the “mixed” scenario discussed above. 
This study argues that the government will be an “insurer of last resort” 
for the politically connected firm in the case of financial distress and 
company bankruptcy. Previous studies find evidence that politically 
connected firms are more resilient to economic crisis since they are more 
likely to be bailed out by the government than similar nonconnected 
peers (Facio, Masulis and McConnel, 2006). Another advantage to the 
firms is the access to information and resources (government subsidies, 
preferential loans, more choices of external funding, information and 
technology, etc.). To obtain such benefits through ties with government, 
firms bear the costs of government intervention and suffer from higher 
political influence in decision making (Bertrand, Kramarz, Schoar, and 
Thesmar, 2004; Fan, Wong, and Zhang, 2007; and Shleifer, 1998). Hence, 
political connectedness may lower the efficiency of connected firms. The 
hypothesis postulates that the formally connected firms are required to 
take on investment projects with less opportunity growth, which has 
socio-economic importance for the government and the country. Hence, 
there is a significant need for research that considers the dual incentives 
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businesses’ healthy growth. From this standpoint of behavioral finance, 
by being formally connected to government, a CEO will give up some 
good investment opportunities of a firm for the patronage that political 
ties would bring to his/her company. 
By examining political orientation from a psychological perspective, 
CEOs might need government’s further support for their next tenure or 
to secure future career opportunities. Hence, the prime pressure is that 
government-appointed CEOs want to maximize their personal utility 
(e.g. job security, longer post tenure, personal long-term relationship 
with politicians) by accommodating government’s needs under the 
constraint that excessive misuse of capital will hurt the firm 
performance and prevent firms to grow and be profitable, and thus, limit 
their future personal wealth, generate dissatisfaction of company 
owners, potentially lead to internal unrest within the company, and 
harm their reputation as CEO. 
4.2.1 Political connectedness and innovation 
Prior research has shown that in emerging market contexts, political 
connectedness affects innovation by providing the firms with political 
legitimacy (Sheng et al., 2011), securing key regulatory schemes, 
offering financial support such as the awarding of government-funded 
innovation projects (Acquaah, 2012) and forming CEOs’ political 
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has also demonstrated complex relationships between political 
connectedness and innovation by considering different perspectives of 
political connectedness.   
For example, Hou, Hu and Yuan (2017) find a negative relationship 
between politically connected CEOs and technological innovation 
activities. Qin and Zhang (2019) examine the reaction of firm’s 
innovation to policy changes. Their results show that de-politicization 
results in a 10.8% increase in patent volume, suggesting that companies 
are more prone to market competition without political connections and 
try to offset this effect through the focus on technological advancement. 
On the other hand, Su, Xiao and Yu (2019) report the buffering effect of 
political connections on the corporate innovation activities of Chinese 
firms. In their work, they find that government subsidies mediate this 
relation. Su, Xiao and Yu (2019) support these findings by providing 
further evidence that formal political connections amplify patent grants. 
Kim, Ross and Shang (2016) also come to a similar conclusion when 
analyzing corporate innovation activities and federal grants. 
While these studies provide valuable insights on the relationship 
between political connectedness and innovation, they focus only on 
formal political connectedness and consider only a single proxy for 
innovation activities. This study attempts to address the controversial 
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political connection measures to make a more informed judgement of 
political interference in corporate innovation.  
If seen from the risk approach, investment in innovation makes a stock 
more lottery-like; risk takers are the ones that invest more in innovation 
projects and influence firms’ innovative endeavors and facilitate growth 
opportunities int firms’ values (Adhikari and Agrawal, 2016). According 
to their report, firms located in areas with a taste for gambling tend to 
be more innovative, that is, they spend more on R&D and obtain more 
and better-quality patents.  
Innovation activities can be viewed as mid-term risk since R&D projects 
are hard to estimate and their outcomes take a longer time to realize. 
Innovation activity is thought to be a risk measure also because it turns 
reseources away from more assured short-term projects to less certain 
future plans. Hence, it shows the risk-taking approach of a firm whereby 
the possibility of R&D outcome distribution is associated with its use 
and the likelihood of those outcomes. The company makes riskier policy 
choices by investing more in R&D and higher leverage (Coles, Naveen 
and Naveen, 2006). Kamoto (2017) points out that a firm’s structure of 
ownership matters to a CEO’s innovation incentives since it impacts the 
extent of the shareholders’ intolerance of failure. Attempts at innovation 
entail risk because innovation projects require large capital and entail 
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Given the aforementioned studies that supply existing literature on 
innovation and political connections, this study examines how and which 
form of political ties is related to significant changes in innovation 
activities and performance. This study aims to draw a comprehensive 
picture of firms’ innovation activities, taking into consideration 
innovation in products, business lines, production processes, quality 
controls, management techniques, patent grants onshore and offshore 
and access to innovation information within and outside the company. 
This work argues that since previous literature has focused mainly on 
patent grants as a proxy for innovation activities, the results would not 
show the comprehensive innovation picture of a company. Instead, using 
the measures of this study, it is expected that formal political 
connections, i.e., state ownership and CEO appointment, do not affect 
innovation activities. Simply having SOE status or a CEO appointed by 
government would not make a difference to company innovation 
activities as a whole, but rather that informal political networks 
stimulate innovation activities. His argument is supported by prior 
studies that indicate other forms of political connections, like social 
networks with regulators are a significant source of company value 
derives from government (Facio, 2006; Peng and Luo, 2000). The 
influence of informal connections may be prominent in emerging 




Chapter 4: How do firms derive value from political connectedness? 




Innovation activities are considered to be internally driven by the 
company and require more government intervention in operations for it 
to have an effect. Firms that have stronger informal political connections 
may obtain more assistance in getting necessary licenses and patents, 
and have access to new information that may lead to new management 
techniques and processes. This study argues that if all innovation 
activities are taken together, they are amplified by the prevalence and 
strength of informal political connectedness, not with formal political 
connections.  
On the other hand, unlike internally driven innovation activities, 
innovation performance, manifested by the sale and exports of new 
products, is market led or consumer based. This is the best measure to 
determine a company’s growth and prosperity from innovation activities. 
It leads to the idea that more innovation activities do not necessarily 
induce innovation performance which is the final goal of a firm. The 
outcome of company-driven innovation activities may not be welcomed 
by consumers or the market as reflected in the sale and exports of new 
products and services. Hence, it is imperative to examine the 
relationship between political connections and innovation performance. 
As a result, despite the buffering effect of informal political ties on 
innovation activities, political connections may not have the same 
results on innovation performance. The firms suffer from reduced 
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and may eventually choose less value-added innovation projects as a cost 
of political interference. Therefore, firms are required to take on 
innovation projects that have socio-economic importance to government 
or accommodate national developmental policies and these projects do 
not necessarily bring the best value for the firm’s growth and prosperity. 
Hence, this study hypothesizes:  
H1a: Informal political connectedness has stronger influence on 
innovation activities than formal political connectedness. 
H1b: The effects of political connectedness on innovation activities are 
stronger than on innovation performance. 
4.2.2 Political connectedness and capital allocation 
This work extends existing literature by examining the effects of 
political connectedness on capital allocation. There are numerous papers 
that provide some insights around this issue. An, Chen, Luo and Zhang 
(2016) discover that political turnover has an association with the 
magnitude of corporate investment which is more prominent for SOEs, 
capital-intensive firms, and locally supported firms. Bekaert, Harvey, 
Lundblad and Siegel (2016), on the other hand, provide evidence 
estimated by 24% using the standard sovereign yield spread procedure 
to estimate international projects. Hence, misallocation of global 
investment could occur due to double counting of risks. A different 
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proposed by the aforementioned authors. Wurgler (2000) reports a 
positive relationship between the efficiency of capital investment and 
high state ownership. Facio and Mura (2016) provide evidence that 
differences in CEO personal characteristics (gender) leads to 
heterogeneity in a corporate risk-taking approach and results in a less 
efficient capital allocation process. Facio and Hsu (2016) provide 
evidence that the targeted companies increase employment following a 
buyout by politically connected private equity firms. Politically 
connected firms have lower investment intensity (Cull, Li, Sun and Xu, 
2015) and are less efficient (Boubakri, Cossett and Saffar, 2008; Facio, 
2010; Fan, Wong, Zhang and Tianyu, 2007; Luez and Oberholzer-Gee, 
2006; Jiang and Kim, 2015) than unconnected firms. Cull, Xu, Yang, 
Zhou and Zhu (2017) find that government assistance is positively 
associated with firm efficiency expressed in labor productivity. Chen, 
Sun, Tang and Wu (2011) suggest that SOEs suffer from investment 
inefficiency. Cull, Li, Sun and Xu (2015) argue that misallocation of 
capital by Chinese firms comes from lower financial constraints of 
connected firms. Song, Ai and Li (2015) report that the financial 
connection aside, the lower the financial constraints, the lower is the 
innovation efficiency. Hou, Hu and Yuan (2019) focusing on political 
connections and firm’s technological innovation find that political 
connections increase firms’ overinvestments, and thereby inefficiently 
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on its future performance. With the exception of the work of Chen, Sun, 
Tang and Wu (2011) and Wurgler (2000), none of the aforementioned 
papers investigate the relationship between political connections and 
capital allocation. Chen, Sun, Tang and Wu (2011) use investment 
opportunities (Tobin’s Q) measured as the sum of market value of 
tradable shares, book value of non-tradable shares and liabilities, 
divided by book value of total assets. Instead, Wurgler (2000) 
investigates the quality of investment opportunities through the value-
added growth perspective. Wurgler’s (2000) study of the value-added 
growth focuses on a country level and uses earnings before interest and 
taxes (EBIT) as the proxy for the quality of investment opportunities. 
The disadvantage of this measure is that it can incorporate other 
external factors not related to the investment itself. Value-added growth 
using innovation performance represents a better measure of 
investment opportunity quality. Value-added growth obtained from 
EBIT, plus the cost of employees (Wurgler, 2000; Facio, 2016) might 
include not only investment opportunity quality, but also other factors 
embedded in the EBIT including cost management and prevailing 
market situations. Hence, investment opportunity growth should be 
extracted from innovation performance to overcome the shortcomings of 
Wurgler’s (2000) value-added growth measure. 
This study argues that the connected CEOs take on investment projects 
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profound implications for a country’s socio- economic development. The 
investment approach that is based on suboptimal decisions can destroy 
the value of a firm. These are costs of political connections that need to 
be outweighed by benefits that these government-business relationships 
bring in order for the firm to be willing to enter into such a connection.  
Moreover, in the market environment with an incomplete competitive 
nature, firms with formal political connectedness face fewer financial 
constraints than their non-connected peers. But due to over-investment 
routed from over-confident behavior of connected firms (Hou, Hu and 
Yuan, 2019), the funds are wasted on less productive or less marketable 
new projects that, in turn, wipe out all the benefits that the connected 
firms have as compared with their non-connected peers in terms of 
financial constraints, thus, leading to inefficiency of capital allocation. 
This study hypothesizes that politically connected firms suffer from 
moral hazards of government appointed CEOs that need to fulfil their 
socio-economic responsibility towards government, thereby foregoing 
the best investment opportunities for the strategic projects that are the 
top priority for the country. Governments’ directives through CEO 
appointment force CEOs to take the government policies into 
consideration during the decision-making process, thus altering the 
investment behavior of a firm and leading to inefficiency in resource 
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H2: Firms without government-appointed CEOs are more efficient in 
capital allocation than firms with government-appointed CEOs. 
4.2.3 Political connectedness and firm performance 
There is an abundant literature on political connectedness and firm 
performance. Firm performance manifested by financial measures 
receives a buffering effect from politicial connectedness. The broad cross-
country study of Facio (2010) on nearly 20,000 firms points out that 
companies with political connections have higher market values. 
Corporate political strategies also help firms miminize policy risk and 
induce a lower cost of debt (Bradley, Panzalis and Yuan, 2016). Liu, Luo 
and Tian (2016) stress the importance of managerial professional 
connections for informal financing resources. Political connectedness 
affects the appointment of a second-generation member in a family firm 
and the involvement of the second generation induces higher operating 
ROA, higher operating return on sales, and fewer tunneling activities 
(Xu, Yuan, Jiang and Chan, 2015). 
The firms can also take advantage of their political links through 
obtaining more government subsidies and tax benefits (Wu, Wu, Zhou 
and Wu, 2012; Lin, Tan, Zhao and Karim, 2015), more financial support 
from government aid programs (Facio, Masulis and McConnel, 2006), 
less regulatory control and reporting (Stigler, 1971) and less severe 
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Yuan, 2019). Ning, Mao and Yuan (2019) suggest that ties with 
government would reduce corporate ligitation risk.  
Politically-connected firms boost employment (Facio and Hsu, 2016; 
Bertrand, Kramarz, Schoar and Thesmar, 2007), enhance market values 
(Ferris, Houston and Javakhadze, 2016; Facio, 2010), hold less cash (Xu, 
Chen, Xu and Chan, 2016), face lower financing costs and larger sales 
(Su and Fun, 2013), enjoy superior financial and operating performance 
after acquisition (Ferris, Houston and Javakhadze, 2016), gain easier 
access to loans and credit (Houston, Jiang, Lin and Ma, 2014; Cleassens, 
Feijen and Laeven, 2008; Li, Meng, Wang and Zhou, 2008; Cull, Li, Sun 
and Xu, 2015; Khwaja and Mian, 2005), exposed to fewer financial 
constraints (Cull, Li, Sun and Xu, 2015), enhance the growth and 
survival of start-up firms (Girma and Du, 2010), and are more likely to 
be bailed out by government (Faccio, 2006) than their non-connected 
peers. 
On the other hand, politically connected firms are found to have higher 
agency costs of free cash flows (Unsal, Hassan and Zirek, 2016), more 
cash holdings (Su and Fun, 2013), lower investment intensity (Cull, Li, 
Sun and Xu, 2015), less efficiency (Boubakri, Cossett and Saffar, 2008; 
Facio, 2010; Fan, Wong, Zhang, and Tianyu, 2007; Luez and Oberholzer-
Gee, 2006; Jiang and Kim, 2015) and worse exit performance (Cumming, 
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One common thing about the previous studies is that the authors take a 
single form of political connections (mostly a formal form) and focus only 
on one measure as a proxy for political connectivity. Given inconclusive 
results on the benefits and costs of political connections on various 
aspects of firm performance,  the recent study of Wong and Hooy (2018) 
further discovered that different forms of political connection affect 
corporate performance differently. More specifically, their results show 
that it is the stability of political connections that affects company 
performance. This study provides insights on the effects of different 
forms of political interference on company value. 
One of the explanations for firm’s performance impediment by political 
interference is the rent-seeking behavior of politicians (Johhson and 
Mitton, 2003; Fisman, 2001; Shleifer and Vishny, 1994) routing from the 
government’s needs to pursue social policy goals (Aggarwal, Meschke 
and Wang, 2007; Ferguson and Voth, 2008; Goldman, Rochol and So, 
2009; Gulen, Cooper and Ovtchinnikov, 2010; and Roberts, 1990). 
Christensen, Dhaliwal, Boivie and Graffin (2015) suggest that an 
individual’s political connectedness17 indicates underlying psychological 
differences in executives’ conservatism18 that may be predictive of a 
decision maker’s impact on the firm’s risk behavior, strategic choices and 
                                                     
17 One observable measure is CEO appointment by government that can be used as a 
proxy for executive’s attitudes and dispositions. 
18 Previous studies in this stream show that political conservatives tend to be loss 
averts, prefer financial and job stability, and have greater fear of ambiguity and 
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organizational outcomes. Boubakri, Guedhami, Mishra and Saffar 
(2012) provide evidence that politically connected firms bear less risk 
than their counterparts and therefore enjoy a lower cost of capital. 
Francis, Hasan, Sun and Wu (2016) also suggest that tax sheltering 
decisions could be driven by their political ideology. Differences in 
political ideology also have an effect on Tobin’s Q, agency costs of free 
cash flow and a company’s abnormal returns (Unsal, Hassan and Zirek, 
2016). The politician’s new appointments also shape the corporate risk 
attitude by urging firms to adjust to their cash holding strategy during 
the first year of a new city government official’s appointment (Xu, Chen, 
Xu and Chan, 2016). These arguments posit that political connectedness 
may help explain variation in executives’ risk tolerance that impacts 
corporate performance, since decision makers constantly make financial 
choices under uncertainty.  
Upper-echelon research has recently devoted much attention to 
determinants of firms’ risk (Chatterjee and Hambrick, 2007; Devers, 
Wiseman and Holmes, 2007). Specifically, academics look at firms’ risk 
by examining firm investment in risky, long-term projects such as R&D 
(Devers, Wiseman and Holmes, 2007; Sanders and Hambrick, 2007). In 
this chapter, two unique measures of the risk profile of a firm is 
employed: corporate innovation activities and innovation performance. 
Two other specific company performance measures of leverage and 
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by a firm. Leverage can be considered as corporate choice and innovation 
and likelihood of survival as corporate outcome. 
Leverage is a short-term risk that is continuously adjusted to 
accommodate current healthy operations of a company. The existing 
literature on formal political interference shows a higher leverage level 
used by politically connected firms (Facio, 2010; Johnson & Mitton, 2003, 
and Khwaja & Mian, 2005). This evidence begs for the question as to 
whether the informal relationship with government affects the financial 
risk-taking approach of firms. The results show new insights that the 
stronger the informal political ties, the less a company uses leverage. 
This finding suggests that formal and informal political connectivity 
would result in different short-term risk behavior of a firm. 
Although several papers report that politically connected firms are more 
levered (Johnson and Mitton, 2003; Khwaja and Mian, 2005; Facio 2010), 
based on the comprehensive literature analysis above, this study argues 
that this might not be the case since the politically connected firms do 
not need to rely largely on debt financing. Instead, they can raise funds 
from various sources with the help of the regulators (government aid, 
financial subsidies or tax exempts). The proposition is that government 
provides means and support to politically connected firms to avoid debt 
financing. The state assists partisan firms through the direct assistance 
from government officials who are capable of providing solutions to the 
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political connections) that will enable the companies to pursue their 
goals without dependence on loans and credit. In fact, Facio (2010) also 
provides evidence that connected firms do not benefit from reduced cost 
for debt financing. Even though firms connected with politicians are less 
constrained in financial terms (Cull, Li, Sun and Xu, 2015), they are 
affected by the decision-making approach of CEOs who have lower risk 
tolerance19 and different social cognition due to closeness to politicians 
(Francis, Hasan, Sun and Wu, 2016). Another argument for partisan 
firms not to have a higher leverage level than non-partisan peers is that 
companies with closer relationships to politicians can better predict laws 
and policies (i.e., another form of informal political connections); hence, 
the risk entailed in the firm’s business is lower since they can properly 
adjust the company strategy in anticipation of regulatory changes. 
Thus, this work argues that it is informal political connections that 
affects leverage, not formal connections with government. Since leverage 
is the short-term measure of the risk, the stability and persistence of 
informal interactions with government officials determine the corporate 
leverage level. It is expected that continuous informal political ties 
would lessen financial leverage due to good relationships with 
government officials and firms’ better prediction of market changes and 
government regulations. Therefore, the following hypothesis is 
developed: 
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H3a. Informal political connectedness has stronger negative effects on 
financial leverage than formal political connectedness. 
In the same manner, it is expected that political connections have a 
buffering effect on company survival since connected firms face less 
severe enforcement outcomes (Fulmer, Knill and Yu, 2012), are shielded 
from ligitation risk (Jia, Mao and Yuan, 2019) and are more likely to be 
bailed out by government (Faccio, 2006) than their non-connected peers. 
One explanation is that politically connected CEOs possess an exclusive 
understanding of the regulations and regulators’ practices that will help 
their firms circumvent exorbitant ligitation and legal proceedings 
(Ferris, Houston and Javakhadze, 2016; Brezis, 2002). 
Likelihood of survival shows the resilience of business operations that 
can only be possible with continuous sound performance and good risk 
management. This study considers likelihood of survival as a proxy for 
long-term risk. Girma and Du (2010) provide evidence that political ties 
facilitate the growth and survival of start-up firms. Zheng, Singh and 
Mitchell (2015) document a positive relationship between interlocking 
political ties and firm survival. Based on the resource-based theory, the 
authors argue that both resource and institutional advantages may 
moderate threats and increase the likelihood of survival. 
The firms with formal political connections also take more advantage in 
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additional subsidization and tax benefits (Wu, Wu, Zhou and Wu, 2012; 
Lin, Tan, Zhao and Karim, 2015), larger long-term loan portfolio and 
greater cash holdings (Su and Fung, 2013), that in turn, will facilitate 
business growth and increase the firm’s likelihood of survival. The logic 
of the buffering effect of political connections on the survival ability of a 
firm is also routed from the understanding that SOEs are considered 
more important to a national government; since they often occupy 
critical industries or operate in sensitive areas, government believes it 
needs to have an ownership in a firm. The bankruptcy of SOEs would 
endanger or significantly affect the safety and soundness of the entire 
industry or system that they function in. The same logic serves for CEO 
appointments. It is unlikely for a government to let SOEs go bankrupt 
and therefore many financial benefits are provided by government to the 
government-owned firms. It is also believed that government-appointed 
CEOs will have influence on government when it comes to the survival 
chances of those CEOs’ companies. Another argument is that 
government, at the highest level, would be more concerned with the 
broader issues of a firm, i.e., the company’s existence itself. Hence, 
formal political connections, represented by CEO appointment or state 
ownership, would focus more on the long-term risk of a firm, proxied by 
its survival chance. Therefore, the last hypothesis is developed: 
H3b. Formal political connectedness has stronger effects on survival 
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4.3 Sample and variable operationalization 
4.3.1 Data and sample 
The data used in this study come from the survey of investment climate, 
business environment and firm performance conducted by the World 
Bank and the Enterprise Survey Organization of China. This survey is 
part of the World Bank Enterprise Surveys. The Chinese data were 
collected from 18 cities across five regions in terms of different levels of 
regional economic development in China: (a) the Central Region: 
Changsha, Nanchang, Wuhan, and Zhengzhou; (b) the Northeast 
Region: Benxi, Changchun, Dalian, and Harbin; (c) the Northwest 
Region: Lanzhou and Xi’an; (d) the Southwest Region: Chongqing, 
Guiyang, Kunming, and Nanning; and (e) the Coastal Area: Hangzhou, 
Jiangmen, Shenzhen, and Wenzhou. One of the strengths of the survey 
is its coverage of different types of firms and broad range of information 
about such things as innovation and technology development, market 
environment, vertical relationships with clients and suppliers, 
relationships with the government, international trade, financial 
resources, human resources, access to finance and infrastructure 
services, corporate governance, ownership structure of the firm, and 
information on taxation. The questionnaire is split into two parts: the 
first covers qualitative information provided by firm’s senior managers 
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company, much of which goes back three years, about firms’ activities 
and operations, and is filled by firms’ chief accountant based on firms’ 
financial statements and accounting books. 
4.3.2 Measures of political connectedness 
Unlike the majority of previous studies that consider only CEO 
appointment or state ownership status as a formal form of political 
connectedness, this study extends a further understanding about 
political ties based on informal relationships. Wang, Yao and Kang 
(2019) investigate government’s site visits as a measurement for 
informal political connetions and link it to innovation activities. Unlike 
the study of Wang, Yao and Kang (2019) that postulates informal 
political connections stem solely from governmental initiatives, this 
work considers that informal connectedness is dually based on a firm’s 
own decision and linked to politicians to help firms out of problems or 
improve a company’s performance through government support. Formal 
linkage through state ownership or CEO appointment is the direct 
intervention of government into firms that usually are considered as 
important and core businesses with significant influence on the 
country’s economy and growth as a whole. Hence, it is more likely that 
the government has an intention to be connected to the firm in the 
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The comprehensive measure of informal relationship with government 
(PolitConnect) is the sum of the values of four variables: Government 
Assistance, Law Predictability, Competent Officials and Good Relations. 
The average value of PolitConnect in the sample is 8.56.  
Government Assistance is the total score assigned to each firm depending 
on the availability of government assistance in identifying foreign 
investors, locating foreign technology to license, identifying potential 
foreign clients, identifying potential foreign suppliers, obtaining bank 
financing, identifying potential domestic clients, securing loans by 
provincial/local government and access to information. Each type of 
state support is equal to 1 if the answer is “Yes” and 0 if “No”, except for 
access to information where 1 is assigned to an access to each of the 
following kinds of information: supply of input/services, demand for your 
product, export market and import sources, technical standards, 
product/technology development, laws and regulations.20 
Law Predictability is the variable that measures the predictability of 
laws or regulations that materially affect the operation and growth of a 
firm’s business. 
The variable of Competent Officials takes into consideration the share of 
competent officials among the government officials that a firm regularly 
interacts with. 
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Good Relations measures the share of government officials (among the 
competent officials among the government officials that a firm regularly 
interacts with) that is oriented toward helping rather than hindering a 
firm. 
For Law Predictability, Competent Officials and Good Relations, since 
raw data are in percentages, they are divided into five quantiles with 1 
for the quantile with the lowest values and 5 for the quantile with the 
highest values. 
Conventional measures are used for formal political connectedness. A 
company is defined as formally connected with government if it has a 
CEO appointed/approved by government or it is a state-owned 
enterprise (SOE). CEO Appointment takes the value of 1 if the CEO was 
appointed by government or approved by a government agency and 0 
otherwise. SOE is the dummy that is equal to 1 if the firm is a state-
owned company and 0 otherwise. These two measures are analyzed 
separately, as these two types of formal connection are believed to differ 
from each other in terms of their decision making approach, i.e., SOE 
refers to ownership of the company that reflects the legal status and 
CEO Appointment is about the direct impact of managerial style and 
personal characteristics that affect the behavior and attitude of the CEO. 
The unreported results on correlation also show relatively low 
correlation between CEO Appointment and SOE (37.07%). Hafsi, 
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relationship cycle whereby an incumbent SOE starts out as an obedient 
servant of the state, internalizing the political goals of the state, but 
gradually develops the technical competence and financial self-
sufficiency to pull away. This is not the case for a CEO appointment 
where the assigned CEO has an incentive to maintain a continuous and 
stable relationship with government during his/her entire tenure. 
As shown in Table 4.1, 25.5% of the CEOs are government-appointed 
and 34.6% are SOEs. By contrast, Cull, Li, Sun and Xu (2015) document 
13.3% of the firms have government-appointed CEOs and 22% are SOEs. 
The higher percentage of government-appointed CEOs and SOEs in the 
sample is, at least, due to inclusion of firms from different industries and 
sectors in the sample. There is a significant difference (Table 4.2) in the 
state ownership status, suggesting firms with government-appointed 
CEOs run more SOEs than firms without government-appointed CEOs 
(p<0.001). 
4.3.3 Company performance measures, innovation index and 
other variables 
The first company performance measure is leverage that assesses the 
riskiness of corporate financing choices. This measure is chosen as a 
proxy for short-term risk based on the argument that the impact of 
leverage on firm performance can be immediate and can be adjusted and 
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of financial debt (i.e., long-term debt and short-term loans) divided by 
the sum of financial debt and equity. Across the firms in the sample, the 
average Leverage ratio is 0.57% (Table 4.1). As shown in Table 4.2, this 
ratio is 56.3% for firms run by government-appointed CEOs and 57.3% 
for firms without government-appointed CEOs. Leverage is 49.9% for 
firms with strong informal connectedness and 63.6% for firms with weak 
informal connectedness. The p-value of the difference between the two 
groups is insignificant for all forms of political connectedness (0.884 and 
0.157).  
The second company performance and risk measure is Likelihood of 
Survival since riskier firms are less likely to survive (Facio, 2016). A 
threshold of a 15-year time window of business operations (very close to 
the average age value of all companies in the sample) is taken to 
estimate the Likelihood of Survival since it is a proxy for a long-term 
risk. This study finds that 30.75% of the firms in the sample survive at 
least 15 years (Table 4.1). The Likelihood of Survival is 60.0% for firms 
run by government-appointed CEOs and 20.7% for firms without 
government-appointed CEOs (Table 4.2). There is a significant 
difference for this variable (p<0.001). There is no significant difference 
in this variable for informal political connectedness (p=0.598). 
Innovation can be regarded as a proxy for a medium-term risk. A notion 
that new projects entail higher risk than other firm activities  is taken 
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impact of innovation on company performance cannot be immediately 
seen and can have the realized outcome only in the medium term.  
Innovation takes two forms: innovation activities and innovation 
performance. Innovation Activities takes the total score of 10 variables: 
new products/services entered into existing business, new business line 
introduced, new process improvements, new management techniques, 
new quality controls in production, new product number, patent grants 
in China, patent grants in the US, access to product and technology 
information and access to laws and regulations in the firm. Each sub-
group of Innovation Activities is equal to 1 if the answer is “Yes” and 0 if 
“No”, with the exception for new product number, patent grants in China 
and patent grants in the US. For new product number each year, 1 is 
assigned if its value falls between 1 and 50, 2 if its value falls between 
51 and 100, 3 if at least 100 and 0 otherwise. For annual patent grants 
in China, 1 is assigned if its value falls between 1 and 5, 2 if its value 
falls between 5 and 10, 3 if at least 10 and 0 otherwise. For patent grants 
in the US per year, 1 is assigned if its value falls between 1 and 3, 2 if 
its value is at least 3 and below 5, 3 if at least 5 and 0 otherwise. Only 
for this case, the values of new product number, patent grants in China 
and patent grants in the US for the consecutives years from 2000 to 2002 
are taken. 
Innovation Performance is the ratio of new product sales and exports to 
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sample, the average values of Innovation Performance and Innovation 
Activities are 42.8 and 23.8, respectively. This value of Innovation 
Performance is 40.1 for firms run by government-appointed CEOs and 
43.5 for firms without government-appointed CEOs (Table 4.2). The 
same ratio is 43.98 for firms with strong political connectedness and 41.2 
for firms with weak political connectedness. The p-value of the difference 
between the two values is insignificant for both forms of political 
connectedness (0.246 and 0.741). The average value of Innovation 
Activities is 23.5 for firms run by government-appointed CEOs and 23.9 
for firms without government-appointed CEOs. The same ratio is 24.5 
for firms with strong political connectedness and 23.2 for firms with 
weak political connectedness. There is a significant difference in this 
variable for both informal and formal forms of political connectedness 
(p<0.001). Because of data limitations, it is not possible to infer any 
causality from the results reports. However, the majority of the 
literature on political connection – company performance is more 
supportive of the idea that company performance reflects the benefits 
(i.e., the consequence) of political interference, rather than being a 
cause.21 
Besides internal cash, investment might depend on the access to 
external financing. Access to Loans is a dummy that takes the value of 1 
if a firm has an overdraft facility/line of credit and/or currently has a 
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bank loan, and 0 otherwise. This variable is used as the control variable 
in estimating capital allocation. Another measure is also used for access 
to external credit by computing the ratio of unpledged collateralizable 
assets (UCA) using Cull’s (2015) definition. Of the firms in the pooled 
sample, 25.40% are considered as having access to debt financing (Table 
4.1). Table 4.2. shows that there is a significant difference between the 
firms with strong and weak informal connections in terms of access to 
external financing (p<0.001). 
Multiple control variables are used in the models. An additional 
measure of access to external credit is used by computing the ratio of 
unpledged collateralizable assets, UCA (Cull, 2015), to check the 
robustness of the results. ROE is defined as the ratio of EBIT to total 
equity. This profitability measure is included in the regressions to 
control for differences in the quality of corporate governance when 
analyzing the risk-taking approach of a firm. Sales Growth is calculated 
as the annual rate of growth of sales. Firm Size is the natural logarithm 
of total assets. Firm Age is the natural logarithm of the number of years 
since a firm’s establishment. This variable is to control for differences in 
the lifecycle of a firm. Cashflows/Fixed Assets is calculated as a ratio of 
(net income + financing charges + tax payable) to the book value of total 
fixed assets (Cull et al., 2015). Managerial Age is the natural logarithm 
of average age of all management personnel. This variable is included in 
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to the age of the management team. CEO Ownership is the natural 
logarithm of a firm’s stock percentage ownership by the CEO. 
Geographic Dispersion is the location coverage of the main business of a 
firm. This control variable is used in the analysis of company 
performance to control for government expropriation hazards (Jia and 
Mayer, 2015). The value of 1 is assigned if the major market of a firm’s 
main product is in the firm’s city, 2 if the major market of a firm’s main 
product is in the firm’s province, 3 if it is in China and 4 if it is global. 
This variable is included in some regressions to control for the 
differences in the nature and scope of the corporate business that might 
require a different kind of approach in operation and management. 
An analysis of sample means for firms with different forms of political 
connectedness (Table 4.2) reveals some important differences in the 
characteristics of both firms and CEOs. Firms with government-
appointed CEOs tend to be older, larger, state-owned, to invest less, 
have fewer innovation activities, survive much longer, have less CEO 
ownership and a higher average age of their management team than the 
firms with company-appointed CEOs. Firms with strong informal 
political ties tend to be larger, have more innovation activities and less 
access to debt financing than the firms with weak connections. 
4.3.4 Empirical model for political connectedness, innovation 
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The impact of political connectedness on firm performance and 
innovation can be specified as follows: 
𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑖 = 𝛼 + 𝛽𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑖 + ∑ 𝛾𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑖,𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=0
 +  𝑖,  (1) 
where  𝑃𝑒𝑟𝑓𝑜𝑟𝑚𝑎𝑛𝑐𝑒 𝑚𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑢𝑟𝑒 𝑖 is either Leverage, Likelihood of Survival, 
Innovation Activity or Innovation Performance of firm i,  
𝑃𝑜𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑖𝑐𝑎𝑙 𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑛𝑒𝑐𝑡𝑒𝑑𝑛𝑒𝑠𝑠 𝑖  is any form (informal and informal) of 
connectedness or its subgroup, and ∑ 𝛾𝐶𝑜𝑛𝑡𝑟𝑜𝑙 𝑖,𝑘
𝑛
𝑘=0
 are the set of 
control variables 22  (CEO Ownership, Cashflows/Fixed Assets, ROE, 
Sales Growth, Firm Size, Firm Age, Geographical Dispersion). 
Managerial Age, Investment/Fixed assets and Leverage are additionally 
included in the regressions for Likelihood of Survival. These control 
variables are included to avoid spurious correlations. 
4.3.5 Innovation value-added growth (IVAG), investment 
model setup for capital allocation and political connectedness 
As previously discussed, an informal relationship with government has 
a significant positive impact on a corporate medium-term risk approach 
through increased innovation outputs. On the other hand, the 
connections (both informal and formal) with government may not 
facilitate firm’s sales and export of new products. The extent to which 
these results are driven by connections with government and influence 
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the company decision-making process can be verified by looking at the 
efficiency of capital allocation of the firm. 
Wurgler’s (2000) idea of looking at the quality of investment 
opportunities through value-added growth is explored in this analysis. 
The proposition is that to achieve an efficient allocation, capital should 
be invested in growing industries and divested from declining industries. 
A firm should make more (fewer) investments in sectors with good (poor) 
investment opportunities. It is a natural way of looking at value-added 
growth to measure the growth of the company since gross domestic 
product (GDP) is the sum of the value-added of all firms in the economy. 
This methodology has the advantage of assessing allocative efficiency 
from direct observation of investment flows.23 
However, this study argues that value-added growth obtained from 
earnings before interest and taxes (EBIT) plus the cost of employees 
(Wurgler, 2000; Facio, 2016) might be affected by not only the quality of 
investment opportunities, but also other factors (e.g., macroeconomic 
and market situation, cost-cutting strategies), which makes it 
impossible to see the standalone relationship between the quality of 
investment opportunities and capital allocation. By introducing 
innovation value-added growth (IVAG) that is taken from firms’ sales 
                                                     
23  Other advantages of Wurgler’s (2000) value-added growth compared with the 
distribution of estimated shadow prices or shadow values of capital are discussed in 
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and export of new products, 24  this study is able to more accurately 
estimate the efficiency of investment projects that have an output in the 
form of new products to be sold domestically and overseas: 
𝐼𝑉𝐴𝐺𝑖,𝑡 =
𝑆ales and export of new products𝑖,𝑡
Sales and export of new products𝑖,𝑡−1
.             (2) 




= 𝛼 + 𝛽
𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡
𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1








 represents internal funding and is computed as cashflow at 
time t  over fixed assets at time t-1 of firm i. 
This study extends further Cull’s (2015) model by introducing an 
innovation value-added growth (IVAG) into the investment model with 
financial constraints to assess the efficiency of capital allocation: 
𝐼𝑖,𝑡
𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1
= 𝛼 + 𝛽
𝐶𝐹𝑖,𝑡
𝐾𝑖,𝑡−1








 is the Cashflow at time t /Fixed Assets at time t-1 
representing internal funding of firm i, 𝐹𝑖  is an access to external 
financing for firm i (Cull, 2015), 𝐼𝑉𝐴𝐺𝑖 is firm i’s innovation value-added 
growth. 
                                                     
24 Another advantage of using this definition is that the values of sales and export in 
financial statements are much less prone to manipulative techniques frequently used 
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The model in a cross-sectional setting, augmented by an indicator 
denoting CEO Appointment and the interaction of this indicator with 
each firm’s IVAG: 
𝐼𝑖
𝐾𝑖
= 𝛼 + 𝛽
𝐶𝐹𝑖
𝐾𝑖
+ 𝛿𝐹𝑖 + 𝛾𝐼𝑉𝐴𝐺𝑖 + 𝜑𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖 +








the Cashflow/Fixed Assets (at time t-1), 𝐹𝑖 is access to external financing 
for firm i (i.e., Loans and UCA), 𝐼𝑉𝐴𝐺𝑖 is innovation value-added growth 
of firm i, 𝐶𝐸𝑂 𝐴𝑝𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖  is the dummy for CEO appointment that 
takes a value of 1 if a CEO in firm i is appointed or approved by 
government and 0 otherwise. 𝛾 represents the investment sensitivity to 
IVAG opportunities. Investment is computed as the total value of new 
investments made by a firm (i.e., investments into buildings, production 
machinery, equipment, cars, vans, trucks and other). 
The beta (𝛽) and delta (𝛿) coefficients in Equations (3), (4) and (5) are 
the measures for the degree of financial constraints. The traditional 
literature uses Tobin’s Q to control for the investment opportunites, 
whereare the more recent literature uses Wurgler’s value-added growth. 
IVAG is used in this study as a modified Wurgler’s measure to replace 
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new products and services as opposed to the changes in the firm’s market 
values from capital investment. 
By intuition, the better (worse) the IVAG opportunities, the more a 
wealth-maximizing manager should invest (divest). 𝜃 is the coefficient 
of prime interest which measures the difference in the investment 
sensitivity to IVAG opportunities between the firms with and without 
government appointment of CEOs. If CEO appointment is inapt to 
investment efficiency as theory suggests, then 𝜃 = 0. 
4.4 Empirical findings 
4.4.1 Political connectedness and innovation 
Table 4.3 reports very robust and consistent results of a positive and 
statistically significant relationship between all the measures of 
informal political connectedness and Innovation Activities25, supporting 
Wang, Yao and Kang’s (2019), Su, Xiao and Yu’s (2019) and Wong and 
Hooy’s (2018) findings. Innovation Activities have a statistically 
significant association with CEO Appointment at the 10% level, but the 
relationship between the former and the informal political 
connectedness (PolitConnect) is statistically significant at the 1% level 
(coefficient and z-statistics are 0.17 and 9.45, respectively); thus 
supporting Hypothesis H1a. The most robust relationship is evident 
                                                     
25 No endogeneity was detected in the unreported results of Durbin-Wu-Hausman test 
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between Innovation Activities and Government Assistance (coefficient 
and z-statistics are 0.42 and 11.44). 
On the other hand, from Table 4.4, state ownership (SOE) – a formal 
form of political ties – shows a negative insignificant relationship with 
Innovation Performance represented by the ratio of new product’s sales 
and exports to total sales (coefficient and t-statistics are -3.96 and -0.98, 
respectively). The relationship between Innovation Performance and 
PolitConnect is statistically significant at the 10% level (coefficient and 
z-statistics are -1.71 and -1.69, respectively). Of the informal connections 
with government, only Government Assistance has a negative and 
marginally significant relationship with Innovation Performance 
(coefficient and t-statistics are -3.72 and -2.00, respectively), supporting 
Hypothesis H1b. It is interesting to see that Sales Growth has a different 
effect on each type of innovation (negative effect on Innovation 
Performance, but a positive relationship with Innovation Activities). 
4.4.2 Political connectedness and the efficiency of capital 
allocation 
Table 4.5 presents OLS with regressions of firms’ Investment/Fixed 
Assets on innovation value-added growth (IVAG), political 
connectedness (CEO Appointment), the interaction between these two 
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endogeneity issues from omitted variables, industry fixed effects are 
applied in the estimation26.  
Consistent with optimal capital budgeting theory, a positive and 
statistically significant relationship is evident between 
Investment/Fixed Assets and IVAG for the firms without government-
appointed CEOs, the coefficient of investment sensitivity to innovation 
growth opportunities is 0.038 (t-statistics is 2.33) for the regression with 
Access to Loans as the only proxy for access to external funding (Column 
3). The results imply that company-appointed CEOs invest more when 
the prospects of their firms are promising and divest capital when their 
firms are operating in industries with low opportunities. In addition, the 
coefficient of CEO Appointment in Column 3 is  -0.046 (with t-statistics 
of -2.44), confirming the univariate results of Table 4.2 and implying 
that firms with company-appointed CEOs invest more aggressively than 
the connected firms. The results are robust even after including a second 
measure of access to external finance (UCA). 
On the other hand, the interaction coefficient between CEO 
Appointment and IVAG documents the fact that corporate investments 
are less responsive to IVAG in firms run by government-appointed CEOs, 
suggesting that CEOs appointed by government do not appear to 
allocate capital as efficiently as their peers that are elected by the 
company. In the unreported results, the evidence shows no relationship 
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between the efficiency of capital allocation and state ownership status 
(SOE), as opposed to the findings of Wurgler (2000), who reports 
efficiency of capital allocation is positively correlated with high state 
ownership and Chen, Sun, Tang and Wu (2011), who report a negative 
relationship. This chapter’s findings indicate that government 
intervention through the appointment of connected managers distorts 
corporate investment behavior and harms firms’ investment efficiency. 
In contrast to Cull, Li, Sun and Xu (2015), this study provides evidence 
that financial constraints are neither the cause of investment 
inefficiency for politically connected firms nor the primary concern for 
the firms with company-elected CEOs. The reported evidence shows that 
inefficiency of capital allocation comes from CEOs’ idiosyncratic 
characteristics and support Hypothesis H2. 
4.4.3 Political connectedness and company performance 
4.4.3.1 Political connectedness and leverage 
In contrast to existing literature that shows higher leverage used by 
politically connected firms (Johnson & Mitton, 2003, Khwaja & Mian, 
2005, and Facio, 2010), this work’s results report firms with weak 
informal connections take more financial risk. For each unit of increase 
in the comprehensive score of informal political relations in the sample, 
the leverage of firms declines by 0.8% on average (t-stat=-2.31), after 
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structure decisions27. Looking back at the summary statistics in Table 
4.2, it is seen that companies with weak informal political connections 
take about 27.45% more financial debt than their non-connected peers 
(p-value of difference is 0.157). It could be the case that when 
government intervenes in risk-taking behavior of the firm, it provides 
relevant people who are capable of providing appropriate solutions to 
the firms without the reliance on debt financing. Psychology can also 
play a role here as an individual’s political connectedness may reveal an 
individual’s motivated social cognitions. Another explanation is that the 
connected firms’ shareholder intolerance of failure is much higher than 
that of the non-connected peers. Hence, to satisfy the shareholders’ 
demand for financial safety, CEOs are forced to lower the corporate 
leverage level. The last explanation could be that firms with better 
prophesy on regulatory changes to accommodate their business strategy 
do not rely as heavily on leverage compared with the firms that are not 
able to foresee the legal rule and policy amendments. This study cannot 
make inferences on how connections with more influential politicians 
create more value for firms, however, the evidence in Table 4.6 
highlights the differences in reliance on debt financing by reporting the 
firms that interact more with government officials who are oriented 
toward helping firms (Good Relations) and the firms that can better 
anticipate laws and regulations (Law Predictability) are less financially 
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levered. The relationship is marginally significant and negative since 
the coefficients for Good Relations and Law Predictability are -0.021 (t-
stat=-1.80) and -0.023 (t-stat=-1.89), respectively. Overall, it is evident 
that the negative relationship between leverage and informal 
connections with government (PolitConnect) is statististically significant 
at the 5% level, whereas no statistically significant relationship is 
observed between any form of formal political connections and leverage. 
These findings confirm Hypothesis H3a. 
4.4.3.2 Political connectedness and likelihood of survival 
Consistent with Zheng, Singh and Mitchel (2015), the results in Table 
4.7 provide evidence that companies with formal political ties experience 
much higher survival rates than firms without formal connections to 
government. The coefficient and t-statistics for SOE – Likelihood of 
Survival relationship are 1.534 and 4.057 (i.e., statistically significant 
at 1%), whereas that of CEO Appointment – Likelihood of Survival 
relationship are 0.269 and 1.30628. 
The results of Table 4.7 reveal the fact that informal connections do not 
have statistically significant relationship with survivability. Further 
investigation show that only Law Predictability – Likelihood of Survival 
relationship is significant at 10% level, with the coefficient and z-
statistics of -0.095 and -2.327, respectively. Therefore, the formal 
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political ties represented through state ownership has stronger effects 
on survival of firms than informal political connectedness, thereby 
supporting Hypothesis H3b. 
Consistent with Facio’s (2016) finding on the US market, this study finds 
that Chinese firms that are larger and with an older management team 
survive longer. However, there is a strong positive relationship between 
Leverage and Likelihood of Survival in all forms of political 
connectedness, suggesting that debt financing is an important 
determinant of a firm’s survival. 
The coefficient and t-statistics for the Likelihood of Survival – 
Cashflows/Fixed Assets relationship in Column (1) of Table 4.7 are 
-0.337 and -2.057, respectively. These results are consistent with Xu, 
Chen, Xu and Chan’s (2016) findings on negative cash holdings during 
the first year of a new city government official’s appointment. According 
to the authors, this phenomenon of a negative cashflow–survival 
relationship arrives when a firm holds less cash to minimize the risk of 
political extraction. Under the grabbing hand hypothesis (Frye and 
Shleifer, 1997; Shleifer and Vishny, 2002), in which government officials 
can extract resources from a firm through fees, taxes, regulations or 
seizing all assets via nationalization, it is safer for a firm to hide its 
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In summary, the findings confirm the hyphotheses in this study. 
Informal political connectedness has stronger influence on innovation 
activities than formal political connections. The effects of political 
linkage on innovation activities are stronger than on innovation 
performance. This work also finds support for the hypothesis that firms 
with government-appointed CEOs are less efficient in capital allocation 
than their counterparts without government-appointed CEOs. 
Companies with strong informal political ties take less financial 
leverage than firms with weak connections, but it is the formal political 
connection that determines the survivability of a company. 
4.5 Conclusion 
With the introduction of a novel parameter into the traditional 
investment model, this work supports optimal capital budgeting theory 
by providing evidence of a positive and statistically significant 
relationship between investment and IVAG for firms without 
government-appointed CEOs. However, firms with government-
appointed CEOs are less efficient in terms of capital allocation than 
those without government involvement in CEO selection. 
The univariate analysis, supported by the empirical results, shows that 
firms with formal political connectedness (CEO appointment by 
government) tend to be SOEs and older, invest less, survive much longer, 
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than the firms that can appoint CEOs without government intervention. 
They also have fewer innovation activities and CEO ownership. Firms 
with strong informal political ties tend to be larger, have more 
innovation activities and less financial debt than firms that maintain a 
weak informal relationship with government officials. The univariate 
results are supported by the multivariate findings on company 
performance: 1) the stronger the informal political ties, the lower is the 
company’s leverage; 2) firms with greater help from government officials 
and firms with better prophesy on regulatory changes are less levered; 
3) companies with state ownership status experience much higher 
survival rates than non-SOEs; and 4) the more-levered firms of larger 
size with a more experienced management team have a lower chance of 
becoming bankrupt. 
The results of this study shed light on the linkage between political 
connectedness and innovation: 1) there is a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between all the measures of informal political 
connectedness and innovation activities, and 2) political connectedness 
has more linkage to innovation activities than innovation performance. 
Overall, the analysis on leverage, innovation and survival shows that 
the informal relationship with politicians enhances firm performance 
and affects the short- and mid-term risk-taking behavior of a company; 
however, it is the formal partisan ties that help increase the survival 
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In summary, this study shows both buffering and hindering impacts of 
political connectedness on Chinese firms, thus supporting the exchange 
of favors hypothesis (Facio & Hsu, 2016). Government acts as an 
“insurer” when the formally connected firms encounter economic 
turbulence. In exchange, politically tied firms through CEO 
appointment accept less profitable investment projects that are 
important to government. The explanation lends grounds from 
behavioral finance that by being connected to politicians or government, 
a company decision maker will give up some good investment 
opportunities of the firm for the patronage that political ties would bring 
to the firm. Psychology and social cognition can also play a role here, as 
a CEO may need government’s further support to increase his/her own 
personal utility. Hence, differences in managerial traits, in particular 
CEO appointment by government, appear to have implications for 
corporate choices and the quality of the capital investment process. The 
arguments of this study are supported by the interaction results of CEO 
appointment and IVAG. This study documents the evidence that 
corporate investments are less responsive to IVAG in firms run by 
government-appointed CEOs, suggesting political connectedness may 
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Table 4.1 Univariate statistics for the pooled sample 
This table reports mean, median, standard deviation (SD), maximum (max) and 
minimum (min) of each variable for the entire sample. PolitConnect is the sum of the 
values of 4 variables: Government Assistance, Law Predictability, Competent Officials 
and Good Relations as defined in Section 4.3.2 of this Chapter. IVAG is innovation 
value-added growth as defined in Section 4.3.5 of this Chapter. CEO Appointment 
takes value 1 if CEO was appointed by government or approved by a governing 
government agency and 0 otherwise. SOE is the dummy that is equal to 1 if the firm 
is state-owned company and 0 otherwise. Leverage is defined as a ratio of financial debt 
(i.e., long-term debt and short-term loans) divided by the sum of financial debt and 
equity. Likelihood of Survival is the dummy that is equal to 1 if the firm was 
established 15 or more years ago and 0 otherwise. Innovation Activities takes the total 
score of 10 variables: new products/services entered into existing business, new 
business line introduced, new process improvements, new management techniques, 
new quality controls in production, new product number, patent grants in China, 
patent grants in the US, access to product and technology information and access to 
laws and regulations in the firm as defined in Section 4.3.3 of this Chapter. Innovation 
Performance is the sale and exports of new products to total sales. Access to Loans is a 
dummy that takes value 1 if a firm has an overdraft facility/line of credit and/or 
currently has a bank loan, and 0 otherwise. UCA is the ratio of unpledged 
collateralizable assets as proposed by Cull (2015). ROE is defined as the % ratio of 
EBIT to total equity. Sales Growth is calculated as the annual rate of growth of sales. 
Firm Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Firm Age is the natural logarithm of 
the number of years since establishment till 2002. CEO Ownership is defined as the 
natural logarithm of firm’s stock percentage ownership by a CEO. Cashflows/Fixed 
Assets is calculated as a ratio of (net income + financing charges + tax payable) to the 
book values of total fixed assets. Managerial Age is the natural logarithm of average 














       
PolitConnect 2,394 8.556 8 4.456 0 26 
CEO Appointment 2,400 0.255 0 0.436 0 1 
SOE 1,837 0.346 0 0.476 0 1 
Investment/Fixed Assets 2,336 0.141 0.028 0.493 -0.491 15.91 
IVAG 384 0.274 0.182 0.725 -2.813 4.129 
Innovation Activities 2,393 23.81 24 2.104 21 28 
Innovation Performance 903 42.80 30 41.65 0 200 
Likelihood of Survival 2,400 0.308 0 0.462 0 1 
Leverage 2,354 0.571 0.446 2.459 -9.044 80.67 
Access to Loans 2,333 0.254 0 0.435 0 1 
UCA 2,314 -0.903 0.267 36.36 -419.7 1,180 
Cashflow/Fixed Assets 2,335 -8.292 0.105 796.4 -35,592 14,607 
Firm Size 2,358 9.680 9.607 2.279 0.095 17.91 
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Firm Age 2,400 2.430 2.303 0.799 1.099 3.970 
CEO Ownership 646 2.893 3.401 1.775 -4.605 4.605 
Managerial Age 2,260 3.602 3.638 0.164 2.996 4.522 
ROE 2,306 0.252 0.023 8.275 -67 356.9 
Sales Growth 2,373 1.040 0.071 26.473 -1 1,245 
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Table 4.2 Univariate statistics by political connectedness 
This table reports statistics for a sample of firms with formal and informal political 
connectedness. Column 1 reports the mean of a variable for a sample of firms that have 
government-appointed CEOs. Column 2 shows the mean of a variable for a sample of 
firms without government-appointed CEOs (Company-appointed CEOs). Columns 3 
reports p-value from a t-test of difference between the firms without and with 
government-appointed CEOs. For columns 4-6, the sample is divided into 2 portfolios 
with breakpoint equal to the mean of PolitConnect for the pooled sample (mean=8.556). 
Informal Political Connectedness of a firm is defined as Strong if its PolitConnect is 
above the mean of PolitConnect and Weak if otherwise. Column 4 provides the mean of 
a variable for a sample of firms with strong informal political connectedness. Column 
5 provides the mean of a variable for a sample of firms with weak informal political 
connectedness. Columns 6 reports p-value from a t-test of difference between the firms 
with and with weak and strong informal political connectedness. PolitConnect is the 
sum of the values of 4 variables: Government Assistance, Law Predictability, Competent 
Officials and Good Relations as defined in Section 4.3.2 of this Chapter. CEO 
Appointment takes value 1 if CEO was appointed by government or approved by a 
governing government agency and 0 otherwise. SOE is the dummy that is equal to 1 if 
the firm is state-owned company and 0 otherwise. Leverage is defined as a ratio of 
financial debt (i.e., long-term debt and short-term loans) divided by the sum of financial 
debt and equity. Likelihood of Survival is the dummy that is equal to 1 if the firm was 
older than 15 years by the date of survey and 0 otherwise. Innovation Activities takes 
the total score of 10 variables: new products/services entered into existing business, 
new business line introduced, new process improvements, new management 
techniques, new quality controls in production, new product number, patent grants in 
China, patent grants in the US, access to product and technology information and 
access to laws and regulations in the firm as defined in Section 4.3.3 of this Chapter. 
Innovation Performance is the sale and exports of new products to total sale. Access to 
Loans is a dummy that takes value 1 if a firm has an overdraft facility/line of credit 
and/or currently has a bank loan, and 0 otherwise. UCA is the ratio of unpledged 
collateralizable assets as proposed by Cull (2015). ROE is defined as the ratio of EBIT 
to total equity. Sales growth is calculated as the annual rate of growth of sales. Firm 
Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Firm Age is the natural logarithm of the 
number of years since establishment. CEO ownership is defined as the natural 
logarithm of firm’s stock percentage ownership by a CEO. Cashflows/Fixed Assets is 
calculated as a ratio of (net income + financing charges + tax payable) to the book 
values of total fixed assets. Managerial Age is the natural logarithm of average age of 
all management personnel. IVAG is the innovation value-added growth as defined in 




























        





Chapter 4: How do firms derive value from political connectedness? 




Table 4.2 Continued 
   
 
   
CEO 
Appointment    
 
0.438 0.252 0.716 
SOE 0.624 0.324 0.000  0.259 0.252 0.922 
Investment/ 
Fixed Assets 0.087 0.160 0.000 
 
0.555 0.135 0.583 
IVAG 0.390 0.243 0.101  0.254 0.295 0.582 
Innovation 
Activities 23.507 23.910 0.000 
 
24.503 23.195 0.000 
Innovation 
Performance 40.057 43.537 0.246 
 
43.975 41.245 0.741 
Likelihood of 
Survival 0.600 0.207 0.000 
 
0.295 0.319 0.203 
Leverage 0.563 0.573 0.884  0.499 0.636 0.157 
Access to Loans 0.241 0.259 0.394  0.204 0.311 0.000 
UCA -1.881 1.936 0.074  -0.315 -1.442 0.453 
Cashflow/Fixed 
Assets -59.597 9.292 0.254 
 
-31.820 12.823 0.195 
Firm Size 9.928 9.595 0.002   10.155 9.262 0.000 
Firm Age 2.951 2.251 0.000  3.263 3.274 0.555 
Managerial Age 3.670 3.577 0.000  3.595 3.607 0.066 
ROE -0.041 0.352 0.137  0.441 0.000 0.318 
Sales Growth 0.274 1.301 0.160  0.285 1.715 0.164 














Table 4.3 Political connectedness and innovation activities 
The table reports coefficients and z-statistics (in parentheses) adjusted for heteroscedasticity and industry clustering from cross-sectional ologit 
regressions of Innovation Activities that takes ordinary values as a proxy. Columns 1-2 analyze formal political connections with state ownership 
status (SOE) and CEO appointment by government (CEO Appointment) as proxies. Column 3 focuses on comprehensive measure of informal 
political ties (PolitConnect). Columns 4-7 investigate the specific areas of government interference that eventually make up PolitConnect. Leverage 
is defined as a ratio of financial debt (i.e., long-term debt and short-term loans) divided by the sum of financial debt and equity. PolitConnect is the 
sum of the values of 4 variables: Government Assistance, Law Predictability, Competent Officials and Good Relations as defined in Section 4.2.2 of 
this Chapter. CEO Appointment takes value 1 if CEO was appointed by government or approved by a governing government agency and 0 otherwise. 
SOE is the dummy that is equal to 1 if the firm is state-owned company and 0 otherwise. ROE is defined as the ratio of EBIT to total equity. Sales 
Growth is calculated as the annual rate of growth of sales. Firm Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Firm Age is the natural logarithm of 
the number of years since establishment. CEO Ownership is defined as the natural logarithm of firm’s stock percentage ownership by a CEO. 
Cashflows/Fixed Assets is calculated as a ratio of (net income + financing charges + tax payable) to the book values of total fixed assets. Geographic 
Dispersion is the location coverage of the main business of a firm. Investment/Fixed Assets is computed as the total value of new investments made 
by a firm (i.e., investments into buildings, production machinery, equipment, cars, vans, trucks and other) divided by the total fixed assets. Industry 





Political   Breakdown of Informal Political Connectedness 
 Connectedness  Connectedness   
 (1) (2)   (3)   (4) (5) (6) (7) 
                 
SOE -0.019         
 (-0.133)         
CEO Appointment  0.573*        
  (1.687)        
PolitConnect 
   
0.169*** 









Table 4.3 Continued 
          
          
Government Assistance      0.423***    
      (11.440)    
Good Relations       0.142***   
       (2.761)   
Law Predictability        0.193***  
        (3.627)  
Competent Officials         0.009*** 
         (3.519) 
CEO Ownership  0.073**  0.064  0.093** 0.071 0.074* 0.091** 
  (1.981)  (1.437)  (2.082) (1.594) (1.650) (2.015) 
Cashflows/ Fixed Assets -0.004 -0.013***  -0.003  -0.004 -0.005 -0.004 -0.005 
 (-1.293) (-2.733)  (-0.606)  (-0.823) (-1.004) (-0.768) (-1.026) 
ROE 0.023* 0.059***  0.026  0.029 0.029 0.024 0.032* 
 (1.790) (2.832)  (1.442)  (1.541) (1.562) (1.245) (1.675) 
Sales Growth -0.021 0.008**  0.026***  0.025** 0.018* 0.017* 0.018 
 (-0.964) (2.433)  (2.618)  (2.445) (1.765) (1.684) (0.738) 
Firm Size 0.310*** 0.319***  0.317***  0.273*** 0.363*** 0.371*** 0.387*** 
 (11.842) (5.627)  (6.836)  (5.839) (7.926) (8.162) (8.172) 
Firm Age -0.263*** 0.086  -0.001  0.027 -0.002 0.009 -0.074 










Table 4.3 Continued 
          
Leverage -0.008 -0.546**  -0.465**  -0.610*** -0.482*** -0.503*** -0.587*** 
 (-1.562) (-2.443)  (-2.540)  (-3.148) (-2.694) (-2.775) (-3.076) 
Geographical Dispersion 0.209*** 0.133  0.186**  0.148 0.188** 0.171* 0.175* 
 (2.950) (1.031)  (2.045)  (1.611) (2.061) (1.880) (1.852) 
Investment/Fixed Assets 0.224*** 0.117  0.183  0.170 0.203* 0.214* 0.211* 
 (3.461) (0.677)  (1.619)  (1.513) (1.787) (1.886) (1.831) 
          
Observations 1,697 601  599  599 599 599 568 












Table 4.4 Political connectedness and innovation performance 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) adjusted for heteroscedasticity and industry clustering from cross-sectional OLS 
regressions of Innovation Performance with the sales and exports of new products to total sales as a proxy. Columns 1-2 analyze formal political 
connections with state ownership status (SOE) and CEO appointment by government (CEO Appointment) as proxies. Column 3 focuses on 
comprehensive measure of informal political ties (PolitConnect). Columns 4-7 investigate the specific areas of government interference that 
eventually make up PolitConnect. Leverage is defined as a ratio of financial debt (i.e., long-term debt and short-term loans) divided by the sum of 
financial debt and equity. PolitConnect is the sum of the values of 4 variables: Government Assistance, Law Predictability, Competent Officials and 
Good Relations as defined in Section 4.3.2 of this Chapter. CEO Appointment takes value 1 if CEO was appointed by government or approved by a 
governing government agency and 0 otherwise. SOE is the dummy that is equal to 1 if the firm is state-owned company and 0 otherwise. ROE is 
defined as the ratio of EBIT to total equity. Sales Growth is calculated as the annual rate of growth of sales. Firm Size is the natural logarithm of 
total assets. Firm Age is the natural logarithm of the number of years since establishment. CEO Ownership is defined as the natural logarithm of 
firm’s stock percentage ownership by a CEO. Cashflows/Fixed Assets is calculated as a ratio of (net income + financing charges + tax payable) to 
the book values of total fixed assets. Geographic Dispersion is the location coverage of the main business of a firm. Investment/Fixed Assets is 
computed as the total value of new investments made by a firm (i.e., investments into buildings, production machinery, equipment, cars, vans, 
trucks and other) divided by the total fixed assets. Industry is the unique number assigned to an industry. The values are significant at 1% level 
(***), 5% level (**) and 10% level (*). 
  
Formal 
Ties   
Informal 
Ties   
Breakdown of 
Informal Ties 
 (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) 
                    
SOE -3.959         
 (-0.977)         
CEO Appointment  7.806        
  (0.836)        
PolitConnect    -1.711*      










Table 4.4 Continued 
          
Government Assistance      -3.724*    
      (-1.997)    
Good Relations       -0.333   
       (-0.163)   
Law Predictability        -2.124  
        (-0.907)  
Competent Officials         -0.124 
         (-0.855) 
CEO Ownership  0.519  0.681  0.495 0.588 0.737 0.757 
  (0.287)  (0.405)  (0.285) (0.337) (0.414) (0.396) 
Cashflows/ Fixed Assets -0.520 0.335  0.316  0.270 0.329 0.328 0.393 
 (-1.278) (0.645)  (0.682)  (0.573) (0.628) (0.637) (0.802) 
ROE 1.450* 0.756  1.432  1.214 0.740 0.839 1.139 
 (1.910) (0.655)  (1.439)  (1.345) (0.656) (0.760) (0.991) 
Sales Growth -0.729*** -0.289***  -0.430***  -0.412*** -0.299*** -0.316*** -0.634*** 
 (-3.344) (-3.706)  (-3.448)  (-3.571) (-3.856) (-3.717) (-4.089) 
Firm Size 0.124 1.894  2.811  3.020 1.942 2.086 2.146 
 (0.074) (0.836)  (1.281)  (1.463) (0.869) (0.912) (0.912) 
Firm Age 0.202 -4.205  -4.015  -4.806 -3.163 -3.095 -3.423 










Table 4.4 Continued 
          
Leverage -1.866 -4.249  -4.722  -2.145 -3.402 -4.697 -1.103 
 (-0.461) (-0.296)  (-0.339)  (-0.143) (-0.238) (-0.333) (-0.070) 
Geographical Dispersion 9.634*** 17.350***  16.337***  16.615*** 17.375*** 17.106*** 16.167*** 
 (3.273) (3.522)  (3.475)  (3.334) (3.617) (3.701) (3.488) 
Investment/ Fixed Assets 0.322 -11.927  -11.535  -12.155 -12.158 -12.769 -11.976 
 (-0.539) (-0.824)  (-0.884)  (-0.894) (-0.854) (-0.891) (-0.856) 
          
Observations 661 275  274  274 274 274 264 
Adjusted R2 0.064 0.197  0.221  0.233 0.195 0.199 0.187 
Industry fixed effects         Yes   Yes           Yes      Yes Yes    Yes Yes 














Table 4.5 The effect of political connectedness on capital allocation 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) adjusted for heteroscedasticity and industry clustering from cross-sectional 
regressions of capital allocation on innovation value-added growth (IVAG) and its interactions with political connectedness. Columns 1 and 4 
analyze the sample of the firms without government appointment of CEOs by regressing Eq. (4). Columns 2 and 5 also regress the same Eq. (4) 
but for the sample of the firms with government appointment of CEOs by regressing Eq. (4). Columns 3 and 6 use Eq. (5) to investigate the 
interaction effect using the pooled sample. IVAG is the natural logarithm of sales and exports of new products of this period divided by that of the 
previous year. CEO Appointment takes value 1 if CEO was appointed by government or approved by a governing government agency and 0 
otherwise. SOE is the dummy that is equal to 1 if the firm is state-owned company and 0 otherwise. Access to Loans is a dummy that takes value 
1 if a firm has an overdraft facility/line of credit and/or currently has a bank loan, and 0 otherwise. UCA is the ratio of unpledged collateralizable 
assets as proposed by Cull (2015). ROE is defined as the ratio of EBIT to total equity. Cashflows/Fixed Assets is calculated as a ratio of (net income 
+ financing charges + tax payable) to the book values of total fixed assets. The values are significant at 1% level (***), 5% level (**) and 10% level 
(*). 
 (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
              
IVAG 0.037** -0.008 0.038** 0.035** -0.007 0.036** 
 (2.309) (-0.345) (2.329) (2.288) (-0.448) (2.290) 
Cashflow/Fixed Assets 0.005 0.009 0.005 0.003 0.002 0.003 
 (0.428) (0.319) (0.475) (0.269) (0.062) (0.334) 
Access to Loans -0.000 0.000 0.000 -0.000** 0.000 0.000 
 (-1.177) (0.274) (0.224) (-2.222) (0.276) (0.024) 
UCA    -0.001 -0.005*** -0.001 
    (-1.629) (-8.791) (-1.633) 
CEO Appointment   -0.046**   -0.046** 








Table 4.5 Continued 
       
CEO Appointment x IVAG   -0.049*   -0.048* 
   (-1.922)   (-1.986) 
       
Number of observations 298 81 379 295 81 376 
Adjusted R2 0.015 0.141 0.029 0.006 0.163 0.047 
Industry fixed effects Yes Yes Yes  Yes Yes Yes 












Table 4.6 Political connectedness and leverage 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) adjusted for heteroscedasticity and industry clustering from OLS regressions of 
political connectedness on leverage using Eq. (1). Columns 1-2 analyze formal political connections with state ownership status (SOE) and CEO 
appointment by government (CEO Appointment) as proxies. Column 3 focuses on comprehensive measure of informal political ties (PolitConnect).  
Columns 4-7 investigate the specific areas of government interference that eventually make up PolitConnect. Leverage is defined as a ratio of 
financial debt (i.e., long-term debt and short-term loans) divided by the sum of financial debt and equity. PolitConnect is the sum of the values of 
4 variables: Government Assistance, Law Predictability, Competent Officials and Good Relations as defined in Section 4.3.2 of this Chapter. CEO 
Appointment takes value 1 if CEO was appointed by government or approved by a governing government agency and 0 otherwise. SOE is the 
dummy that is equal to 1 if the firm is state-owned company and 0 otherwise. ROE is defined as the ratio of EBIT to total equity. Sales Growth is 
calculated as the annual rate of growth of sales. Firm Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Firm Age is the natural logarithm of the number 
of years since establishment. CEO Ownership is defined as the natural logarithm of firm’s stock percentage ownership by a CEO. Cashflows/Fixed 
Assets is calculated as a ratio of (net income + financing charges + tax payable) to the book values of total fixed assets. Geographic Dispersion is 
the location coverage of the main business of a firm. The values are significant at 1% level (***), 5% level (**) and 10% level (*). 
  
Formal 
Ties   
Informal 
Ties   
Breakdown of 
Informal Ties 
 (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) 
                    
SOE 0.166         
 (0.578)         
CEO Appointment  0.178        
  (1.517)        
PolitConnect    -0.008**      
    (-2.314)      
Government Assistance      -0.006    
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Good Relations       -0.021*   
       (-1.803)   
Law Predictability        -0.023*  
        (-1.894)  
Competent Officials         -0.000 
         (-0.558) 
CEO Ownership 0.017 0.012  0.009  0.009 0.010 0.010 0.008 
 (1.086) (0.972)  (0.899)  (0.836) (0.993) (0.904) (0.724) 
Cashflows/ Fixed Assets -0.002 -0.003*  -0.003*  -0.003* -0.003* -0.003* -0.003* 
 (-1.316) (-1.757)  (-1.852)  (-1.800) (-1.826) (-1.825) (-1.803) 
ROE 0.008 0.010  0.012*  0.011 0.011* 0.011* 0.010 
 (1.331) (1.601)  (1.682)  (1.656) (1.668) (1.683) (1.630) 
Sales Growth 0.001 0.002  0.001  0.001 0.001 0.001 -0.003 
 (0.168) (1.168)  (0.712)  (0.923) (0.887) (0.970) (-0.373) 
Firm Size 0.026 0.016  0.023  0.022 0.022 0.021 0.019 
 (1.382) (0.975)  (1.622)  (1.570) (1.493) (1.435) (1.223) 
Firm Age 0.086* 0.069  0.078*  0.078* 0.078 0.079* 0.079 
 (1.708) (1.620)  (1.677)  (1.683) (1.659) (1.674) (1.573) 
Geographical Dispersion -0.049 -0.025  -0.027  -0.028 -0.029 -0.028 -0.021 
 (-1.400) (-0.989)  (-1.106)  (-1.117) (-1.166) (-1.132) (-0.788) 
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Observations 434 602  600  600 600 600 569 
Adjusted R2 0.081 0.079   0.071   0.066 0.070 0.071 0.060 










Table 4.7 Political connectedness and likelihood of survival 
The table reports coefficients and t-statistics (in parentheses) adjusted for heteroscedasticity and industry clustering from cross-sectional probit 
regressions of Likelihood of Survival that takes value 1 if the company in the sample is more than 15 years old by the date of the survey and 0 
otherwise. Columns 1-2 analyze formal political connections with state ownership status (SOE) and CEO appointment by government (CEO 
Appointment) as proxies. Column 3 focuses on comprehensive measure of informal political ties (PolitConnect).  Columns 4-7 investigate the specific 
areas of government interference that eventually make up PolitConnect. PolitConnect is the sum of the values of 4 variables: Government Assistance, 
Law Predictability, Competent Officials and Good Relations as defined in Section 4.3.2 of this Chapter. CEO Appointment takes value 1 if CEO 
was appointed by government or approved by a governing government agency and 0 otherwise. SOE is the dummy that is equal to 1 if the firm is 
state-owned company and 0 otherwise. ROE is defined as the ratio of EBIT to total equity. Sales Growth is calculated as the annual rate of growth 
of sales. Firm Size is the natural logarithm of total assets. Leverage is defined as a ratio of financial debt (i.e., long-term debt and short-term loans) 
divided by the sum of financial debt and equity. CEO Ownership is defined as the natural logarithm of firm’s stock percentage ownership by a 
CEO. Cashflows/Fixed Assets is calculated as a ratio of (net income + financing charges + tax payable) to the book values of total fixed assets. 
Geographic Dispersion is the location coverage of the main business of a firm. Managerial Age is the natural logarithm of average age of all 
management personnel. Investment/Fixed Assets is computed as the total value of new investments made by a firm (i.e., investments into buildings, 
production machinery, equipment, cars, vans, trucks and other) divided by the total fixed assets. Industry is the unique number assigned to an 
industry. The values are significant at 1% level (***), 5% level (**) and 10% level (*). 
  
Formal 
Ties   
Informal 
Ties   
Breakdown of 
Informal Ties 
 (1) (2)  (3)  (4) (5) (6) (7) 
                    
SOE 1.534***         
 (4.057)         
CEO Appointment  0.269        
  (1.306)        
PolitConnect    -0.024      
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Government Assistance      -0.018    
      (-0.569)    
Good Relations       -0.032   
       (-0.376)   
Law Predictability        -0.095**  
        (-2.327)  
Competent Officials         -0.002 
         (-0.498) 
CEO Ownership -0.064 -0.046  -0.047  -0.050 -0.048 -0.046 -0.028 
 (-0.933) (-0.903)  (-0.911)  (-0.960) (-0.910) (-0.877) (-0.494) 
Cashflows/ Fixed Assets -0.337** -0.253  -0.263  -0.259 -0.250 -0.278 -0.226 
 (-2.057) (-1.480)  (-1.508)  (-1.522) (-1.483) (-1.554) (-1.338) 
ROE -0.090 -0.079  -0.074  -0.075 -0.077 -0.074 -0.083 
 (-0.940) (-1.036)  (-1.133)  (-1.127) (-1.065) (-1.090) (-1.019) 
Sales Growth -0.407** -0.241  -0.237  -0.251 -0.248 -0.228 -0.230 
 (-2.555) (-1.513)  (-1.518)  (-1.573) (-1.543) (-1.447) (-1.578) 
Firm Size 0.182* 0.248***  0.280***  0.269*** 0.268*** 0.275*** 0.267*** 
 (1.891) (3.009)  (3.346)  (3.373) (3.059) (3.336) (3.294) 
Leverage 0.478*** 0.483**  0.514***  0.516*** 0.523*** 0.504** 0.544*** 
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Geographical Dispersion 0.122 0.043  0.048  0.043 0.037 0.035 0.000 
 (0.606) (0.257)  (0.272)  (0.253) (0.215) (0.193) (0.000) 
Managerial Age 1.713** 2.634***  2.689***  2.712*** 2.706*** 2.631*** 2.687*** 
 (2.242) (4.456)  (4.329)  (4.407) (4.344) (4.146) (4.383) 
Investment/ Fixed Assets -0.195** -0.222  -0.207  -0.198 -0.204 -0.192 -0.209 
 (-2.079) (-1.249)  (-1.203)  (-1.256) (-1.245) (-1.337) (-1.113) 
          
Observations 268 396  394  394 394 394 370 
Pseudo R2 0.337 0.329   0.330   0.328 0.329 0.332 0.319 














This thesis provides three essays that empirically investigate the asset 
pricing models and value of firms in emerging markets of Asia that 
feature strong government involvement in financial market 
development. 
Chapter 1 guides the reader to the background, structure and 
contribution of this PhD thesis. 
Chapter 2 examines three FF multi-factor models for the Vietnamese 
stock market during the 2008–2015 period. The findings document the 
superiority of the FF five-factor model over the three-factor and four-
factor models in explaining the average returns of all Vietnamese 
equities sorted on a combination of size and value, profitability or 
investment; whereas the three-factor model is a preferred model in 
explaining the average stock returns of private companies in Vietnam. 
This chapter also provides evidence that state-owned enterprises have 
significantly higher average returns than private firms, although the 
former invest less aggressively and have lower profitability and book-to-
market ratios than private firms. Profitable private entities tend to 








SOEs. This study also shows that investors holding the portfolio with 
average book-to-market, or focusing only on small-cap SOEs during the 
sample period, would bear the highest returns. The loser portfolio is the 
one that contains large-sized stocks with an average investment ratio. 
The findings suggest that the value factor (HML) is associated with 
portfolio returns and the profitability and investment factors cannot 
absorb its effect. HML is not redundant in the Vietnamese stock market 
after considering two other proxies for the profitability factor. The value 
factor and operating profitability have the largest marginal contribution 
to the maximum squared Sharpe ratio for the five-factor model’s factors. 
The operating profitability (RMW) used in the FF five-factor model 
performs better than cash profitability and ROE profitability. All the 
tests provide consistent results on the superiority of the FF five-factor 
model over other traditional asset pricing models, regardless of the 
profitability factor choice. 
Chapter 3 investigates factor models using both cross-sectional factors 
from the Fama-Macbeth (1973) approach and time-series factors of the 
Fama and French (2015) methodology. The study provides evidence that 
the cross-section factor models have less explanatory power than the 
time-series factor models, supporting the findings on FF five-factor 
superiority in Chapter 2. The pricing error metrics provide the 
preference for the model with a time-varying nature of factor loadings 
as the best model regardless of the choice of the Fama-Macbeth (1973) 








largely impact the pricing error of the models. The superiority of the 
times-series factor models with time-varying factor loadings is due to 
both its time-series factors and their time-varying characteristics. The 
findings provide evidence that a portfolio’s monthly standardized 
characteristics anticipate next month’s factor returns of the Vietnamese 
stock. The results support Chapter 2’s findings that operating 
profitability (RMW) still performs better than cash profitability and 
ROE profitability regardless of methodology of asset price testing and 
factor loading setting. 
Chapter 4 extends the analysis on state ownership and value of a firm 
in Chapter 2 by looking at political connectedness, innovation and other 
performance metrics. With the introduction of a novel parameter into 
the traditional investment model, this study supports optimal capital 
budgeting theory by providing evidence of a positive and statistically 
significant relationship between investment and innovation value-
added growth (IVAG) for firms with company-appointed CEOs. However, 
firms with government-appointed CEOs are less efficient in terms of 
capital allocation than those without government involvement in CEO 
selection. 
The study shows that firms with formal political connectedness (CEO 
appointment by government) tend to be SOE and older, invest less, 
survive much longer, and to have a higher average age of personnel in 
managerial positions than the firms that can appoint CEOs without 








activities and less CEO ownership. Firms with strong informal political 
ties tend to be larger, have more innovation activities and less financial 
debt than firms that maintain a weak informal relationship with 
government officials.  
The findings provide evidence that political connectedness has more 
linkage to innovation activities than innovation performance, with an 
informal political network significantly enhancing innovation activities. 
Overall, the analysis on leverage, innovation and survival shows that an 
informal relationship with politicians enhances firm performance and 
affects the short-, mid- and long-term risk-taking behavior of a company; 
however, it is the formal partisan ties that help increase the survival 
rates of a firm. Thus, this study documents both the buffering and 
hindering impacts of political connectedness on Chinese firms, which 
supports the exchange of favors hypothesis. This chapter provides 
evidence that corporate investments are less responsive to IVAG in firms 
run by government-appointed CEOs, suggesting political connectedness 
may lead to misallocation of capital, which has significant consequences 
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